

# נחל נובע

על סדר טהרות



Articles  
and  
Revision Questions  
on  
Mishnayot



לעילוי נשמת

יחזקאל זעליג בן ישראל ע"ה



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## Editors Forward

The *Torah* is compared to water. Just like water falls drop by drop and creates rivers the same is true by *Torah* – A man learns two *halachot* one day and two *halachot* the next until [the sum total of his learning] become like a gushing stream (*nachal nove'ah*).

This is *Nachal Nove'ah*! Two *mishnayot* a day for approximately five years and nine month and we have completed *Shas*. We have revision questions on every *Mishnah* and articles that span topics the full breadth of the oral law and by the time of printing, we are well into the next “wave”. *Nachal Nove'ah*!

Dear reader you must understand. Nearly all the contributors over the six volumes are not Rabbis, scholars or full-time learners, but regular people with busy lives and full schedules. Lawyer, accounts, engineers, university students to list just a few. Yet this is the result. This is *Nachal Nove'ah*.

I urge you to begin, continue or strengthen your humble daily learning program for the result is awesome. The result is *Nachal Nove'ah*.

I cannot end without a few expressions of gratitude. First, to the Creator for giving us strength and bringing us to this day. To those that attended the *shiurim* and were constant sources of *chizzuk*. To the *maggidei shiur* and contributors for their outstanding efforts and dedication. Finally to my wife, who was the coxswain while travelling down this river, constantly providing direction and inspiration.

Yisrael-Yitzchak Bankier

## Keilim

### *Kedushat Eretz Yisrael*

#### Keilim (1:6)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

With the beginning of the new *seder*, we start learning about the different sources (*avot*) of *tumah* (impurity) and their varying intensity. This is followed by the ten levels of impurity that apply to a person (1:5). Juxtaposed to that, the *Mishnah* then teaches us about the ten levels of *kedusha* (sanctity) as they apply to land.<sup>1</sup> It begins (1:6) with the distinction between *Eretz Yisrael* and the rest of the world and proceeds to identify the areas within the land that have higher levels of *kedusha*.<sup>2</sup>

Granted that *Eretz Yisrael* has *kedusha* but how so? The question is not how *Eretz Yisrael* got its *kedusha* – that alone is a subject that has much discussion. The question is how is it expressed? The land does not glow so what makes it qualitatively more *kadosh*?

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<sup>1</sup> The *Maharsha* explains that this juxtaposition follows the principle that “*ze le’umat ze asah ha’elokim*” – that for every level of impurity a level of *kedusha* was created.

<sup>2</sup> The *Mishnayot* seems to list more than ten locations. The *Bartenura* (1:9) cites the *Geonim* who explain that *Eretz Yisrael* is not counted in the list of *kedushot* presented by the *Mishnah*. This is because the *Mishnah* here is only interested in those locations that show honour to *HaKadosh Baruch Hu*. All the other locations listed in the *Mishnah* have some forms of restriction with respect to forms of impurity or people that may enter these areas, whereas *Eretz Yisrael* does not. Consequently since *Eretz Yisrael* does not share this form of *kedusha* it is not counted in the list.

The *Gra* flatly rejects this idea and directs the reader to the *Rambam* who explains that one of the other areas listed in the *Mishnah* is actually not included in the count. The *Rambam* explains that the *Ezrat Nashim* is not included as it was only given the level of sanctity described in the *Mishnah* after *Gezeirat Yehoshafat* before which the *Mishnah* was taught.

The *Mishnah* writes (1:6):

... *Eretz Yisrael* is more *kadosh* than all the lands. What is its *kedusha*? The [produce for] *Omer*<sup>3</sup>, *Bikurim*<sup>4</sup> and *Shtei Halechem*<sup>5</sup> are brought from its land as opposed to all other lands.

At first, one may think that the *kedusha* is linked to those *mitzvot* which can only be performed in *Eretz Yisrael*. However, this does not appear to be the understanding of the *Mishnah* which presents a very small subset of those *Mitzvot*. Why are only those few *mitzvot* selected?

The *Mishnah Achrona* answers, *mitzvot* being dependant on *Eretz Yisrael* is not considered *kedusha* for the land. He explains that while it is true that performance of *mitzvot* sanctifies a person this is not true by land. Instead, the fact that the produce used for these offering could only be brought from *Eretz Yisrael* is indicative of its *kedusha*.

In a similar vein the *Gra* excludes *Bikurim* from the list as he understands that it is an obligation of the land which albeit only occurs in *Eretz Yisrael*. The fact however that *Omer* and *Shtei Halechem* can only be sourced from *Eretz Yisrael* is due to its *Kedusha*.

We find therefore that *kedusha* is expressed differently in land than in people. By people *kedusha* is a function of the performance of *mitzvot*. By land, by *Eretz Yisrael*, while many *mitzvot* can only be performed there it is not due to its *kedusha*. What is more indicative of its *kedusha* is that its produce, and only its produce, can be used for these offerings.

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<sup>3</sup> The barley offering offered on the second day of *Pesach* before which new harvest could not be eaten.

<sup>4</sup> The first fruits that were brought to the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* and given to the *kohanim*.

<sup>5</sup> The two loaves brought as a communal offering on *Shavuot*.

**Broken *Klei Cheres***  
**Keilim (3:3)**  
**Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier**

If a *kli cheres* (earthenware utensil) has a large hole in it is no longer susceptible to *tumah* (impurity) (3:1-2). Furthermore if it was *tameh* (impure) prior to the perforation, it is no longer. We also learnt a different law that if an earthenware utensil shatters and one of the pieces can contain a significant measure (*revi'it*) of water then it is still susceptible to *tumah*. Two *mishnayot* combine these two principles together.

The first *Mishnah* (3:3) teaches that if a barrel was perforated, the hole was then plugged and then the barrel was shattered, if the broken piece with the plugging could contain a *revi'it* then it is still susceptible to *tumah*. If however a broken piece was perforated and then plugged, that piece is not susceptible to *tumah*. The *Mishnah* explains that in the first case it was always considered a *kli* (utensil), even when the barrel had a hole in it.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the piece (with its plugged hole) came from a complete utensil. However in the latter case, the broken piece prior to being plugged is no longer considered a *kli*; plugging it later has no effect – it is just a piece of pottery.

The second *Mishnah* teaches a similar case, regarding a barrel in a very poor state. It is severely cracked yet maintains its shape. If it is supported with a coating then is still susceptible to *tumah*. If however it fell apart in to small pieces then put together again with that same coating it is no longer susceptible to *tumah*. As

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<sup>6</sup> The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that despite the hole that would render it *tahor*, the barrel is still suitable to contain large items even though this fact would only render the *kli* susceptible to *tumah* if set aside for that purpose. Alternatively the *Mishnah Achrona* explains that even with a hole in it, it is still called a barrel. Also unlike broken pieces, the owner has not given up hope that the utensil can still be salvaged. (See the *Mishnah Achrona* for why he prefers this solution.)

with the previous *Mishnah*, the reason is that since the barrel fell apart completely and is no longer defined as *kli*, when put together again, it is considered to be a new *kli* and would need to be fired in a kiln to be completed.

It appears that the ruling in both *Mishnayot* depends on the principle: once the utensil loses its status as a *kli*, if the large broken piece is plugged or the finely broken pieces are put together then they are no longer susceptible to *tumah*.

When citing these rulings, the *Rambam* (*Hilchot Keilim* 19:13) appears to differentiate between them. With respect to the ruling of the first *Mishnah*, he explains that the reason why a broken piece that was perforated and then plugged is *tahor* is because “the [broken] *cheres* that has a hole is no longer a *kli* and *tahor* and once it is *tahor* for one moment it can longer become *tameh*.” Why was it necessary to provide this additional reason in this case?

*R' Chaim HaLevi*, citing *Rambam* (ibid. 18:10), explains that normally as soon as utensils lose their form are *tahor*, irrespective of what the broken pieces can contain. By *klei cheres* however, provided that the broken pieces can contain fluid, they have a use and are still susceptible to *tumah*. This exception is learnt from the *pasuk* “*ve'kol kli cheres*”. Consequently the loss of form does not remove the status of a *kli* from *klei cheres*. A broken piece still has the status of a *kli* while it is susceptible to *tumah*.

Accordingly there is a difference between a fully formed *kli cheres* with a hole in it and broken piece of *kli cheres*. In the former, even though it is *tahor*, it has the form of a *kli* and it still considered a *kli*.<sup>7</sup> In contrast, the above *pasuk* ruled that a broken piece of a *kli cheres* that loses its form is still considered a *kli* provided it is susceptible to *tumah*. Once the piece is no longer

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<sup>7</sup> See previous footnote.

susceptible to *tumah* a *kli cheres* is no different to any other utensil.

With this difference in hand one might have thought as follows. It appears that the loss of form does not apply to a broken piece; only utility is of interest. Consequently once the broken piece is plugged and can again contain fluid, perhaps it should once more fall under the category of “*v’kol kli cheres*” and be susceptible to *tumah*. The *Rambam* therefore had to add the reason in this case that “once [a broken piece] become *tahor* for one moment”, even if its utility is returned, “it can no longer become *tameh*”; its status as a *kli* is lost.

## The Toy Oven

### Keilim (5:1)

### Yehuda Gottlieb

A significant portion of *Masechet Keilim* deals with the purity and impurity of an oven and stove made of *cheres* (earthenware). The *Bartenura* explains that the oven was a *kli* that was open at the bottom; the ground served as its bottom. Therefore the fact that it can receive *tumah* is a *chiddush* (novelty) because clay utensils ordinarily must have a *beit kibal* (receptacle) to be susceptible to *tumah*. The *Bartenura* explains that the oven is different as its *tumah* is due to a *gezeirat ha'katuv* (decree of the *Torah*).

The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that there is a greater *chiddush* that can be learnt from the fact that an oven receives *tumah*. There is a general rule that anything which is attached to the ground cannot receive *tumah*. Most of the ovens used at that time were attached with clay to the ground. Therefore, one would think that these *keilim* would not be susceptible to *tumah*. However, the *gezeirat ha'katuv* comes to teach us that these types of ovens, as well as portable ovens<sup>8</sup> can receive *tumah*.

Interestingly, the *Tosfot Yom Tov* states that there were times that ovens were actually placed on a base (*Bava Batra perek 2*). This opinion would hold that there would be no need for the *gezeirat ha'katuv* as the oven would be *tamei* by virtue of it being a regular *kli* (with a *beit kibal*).

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<sup>8</sup> The *Tifferet Yisrael* quotes the *Gemara* (*Shabbos* 125a) which mentions certain types of portable ovens that Arabs used to take in to the desert loaded on the back of camels. If these ovens were open at the bottom like the other ovens of the time they would also be covered off by the *gezeirat ha'katuv*.

When discussing the different sizes of an oven the *Mishnah* (5:1) states:

An oven, its beginning (i.e. minimum size to be *mekabel tumah*) is four *tefachim*, and its remnant's [minimum size] is four, so says *R' Meir*. The *Chachamim* state "What is the case referring to? To a large oven. However, a small oven its beginning is *kol she'hu* [lit. anything – here, a *tefach*] and its remnant's [minimum size] is the majority [of its original size]...

There are a number of explanations for the opinion of the *Chachamim*. *Rashi* and the *Bartenura* explain there are two different types of ovens. One is a large oven which is used to bake bread. The method of use for this oven is to take dough, and to stick it on the inside wall of the oven leaving it to bake. This type of oven must be at least four *tefachim* high to receive impurity. However, there is another type of oven, the small oven, which can be any size and receive impurity. This type of oven is one which is made as a toy for children to play with. Therefore, *Rashi* says the differentiation between large and small is solely based on the function of the oven.

The *Tosfot* challenge this interpretation. They ask why a large oven which is less than four *tefachim* is deemed *tahor*, and yet a small oven of the same size can be *tamei*. How does the classification of the oven as small or large, whether it is used as an oven or a toy, make a difference to the status of its purity? They answer that it must be that the "large oven" is significantly different in its properties to the small oven, in its height, width or thickness of the walls. The physical differences between these two utensils lead to the differences in *shiurim* for *tumah*.

This argument provides further insight into the *Gemara* in *Niddah* (26b). There the *Gemara* discusses a "*Tanur Banot Tefach*". The explanation of this cryptic statement will be different depending on the views of *Rashi* and *Tosfot*. *Rashi* would hold that the oven of young girls (i.e. children) is a *tefach* in height. This follows his explanation here, that a small oven is one that is used as a

children's toy. However, *Tosfot* would explain that the words 'banot' and 'tefach' are joined words<sup>9</sup>. Therefore *banot tefach* is not referring to the fact that young girls use it as a toy, but rather solely a description of its height.

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<sup>9</sup> Other examples of joined words brought as examples by *Tosfot* include – 'Ben Krach' or 'Ben Ir'.

## My Sons Have Defeated Me

Keilim (5:10)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* deals with different cases of earthenware ovens and stoves and their susceptibility to *tumah*. One *Mishnah* (5:10) discussed two complex cases by name - the *tanur* (oven) of *Achnai* and the *tanur* of *Ben Dinai*. The commentaries explain that the former oven was named after the man who manufactured such ovens, while the latter was named after the thief who constructed these makeshift ovens.<sup>10</sup> While providing historical detail is interesting, it is nonetheless odd that the *Mishnah* stated the name of the ovens after they were clearly described. Why?

The *Gemara* (*Bava Metzia* 59) asks “What is *Achnai*?” The *Ben Yehoyada* explains that the *Gemara* is asking precisely our question. Granted that *Achnai* produced such ovens, why did the *Mishnah* need to mention it? The *Gemara* explains that the oven was the subject of a fiery debate between *R’ Eliezer* and the *Chachamim*. The *Chachamim* surrounded him with arguments like an *achna* (snake) and decreed such ovens as *tameh* according to their opinion.

The *Gemara* then continues describing the debate. When the debate hit a deadlock, *R’ Eliezer* proceeded to summon miraculous events in order to support his case culminating in a Heavenly voice that appeared to indicate that he was correct.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless *R’ Yehoshua* overruled all these proofs by declaring that *halachic* rulings cannot be swayed by heavenly intervention as the *Torah* had decreed that the final ruling is decided by the

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<sup>10</sup> See the *Mishnah* for further details about their construction.

<sup>11</sup> See the *Gemara* for more details. Also see, for example, the *Maharsha* and *Ben Yehoyada* who each explain the message contained in the miracles and how they supported his cause.

majority human opinion.<sup>12</sup> Later the *Gemara* recounts that *Hashem* smiled at that moment and said, “My sons have defeated Me, My sons have defeated Me.”

Having explained why the *Mishnah* included the name *Achnai*, the commentaries also explain the inclusion of the name of the other oven – *Ben Dinai*. The *Bartenura* writes that this oven required the *Chachamim* to rule (*danu*) many laws (*dinim harbe*). The *Tosfot Anshei Shem* explain further that the derogatory name of *Achnai* was given to the first case, because *R' Eliezer* did not concede defeat, while the more complimentary term *Dinai* was given to the second, as a resolution was reached.

The *Tosfot Anshei Shem* however cites a difficulty with this explanation. If that was the reason, then the second oven should have been referred to as “*Dinai*” and not “*Ben Dinai*”. The question is left as a difficulty. Based on the contrast in the naming one could suggest the following. The second case in which consensus was finally reached is referred to as “*Ben Dinai*”, with the word “*ben*” being a singular term, because it stresses the point that consensus was reached more clearly. The *Chachamim* reached a point where they were “like one man with one heart”.

With this we can perhaps offer a novel answer to another question. Why at the end of the episode with the *tanur* of *Achnai* did *Hashem* repeat “My sons have defeated Me”? Both times the word “sons”, a plural reference, is used. Perhaps the first reference is to the majority opinion that withstood the test of the miracles and ruled, consistent with the *Torah* dictum, according to the majority. The second reference is perhaps an allusion to the bitter-sweet conclusion. As the dust settled from the heated debate, *R' Eliezer* did not concede, and they remained “*banai*” – two groups in conflict.

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<sup>12</sup> The *Ben Yehoyada* explains that it was to teach this fundamental lesson (that *Chachamim* will not react to any miracles when it involves overriding a *Torah* principle) that such miracles occurred.

## Same Action, Different Outcome

Keilim (8:2)  
Allon Ledder

The *Mishnah* (8:2) discusses whether *tumah* passes from a utensil to an earthenware oven or vice versa, if the utensil is lowered into the oven with the opening of the utensil protruding from the top of the oven. Two scenarios are presented:

- the utensil contained a *sheretz* and the oven contained food;  
or
- the oven contained a *sheretz* and the utensil contained food.

In both cases, the *Mishnah* rules that *tumah* does not pass from the *sheretz* to the food. If the *sheretz* and the food were both contained within the same earthenware utensil then the *sheretz* would make the food *tamei*. However in our case, the food and the *sheretz* do not directly share the same utensil. One of the items is *toch* (inside) the oven and the other item is *toch tocho* (inside a utensil which is inside the oven). As long as the opening of the smaller utensil remains above the opening of the oven it cannot be said that the *sheretz* and the food are both directly contained within the same utensil.

The *Halacha* changes when the smaller utensil contains a puncture that makes it *halachically* invalid. In that case, the smaller utensil can no longer shield the food from the *sheretz*. As soon as the utensil is lowered into the oven, the *sheretz* and the food are both *halachically* contained within the oven and therefore the food becomes *tamei*.

The *Mishnah* deals with the question: how large does the puncture need to be to render the smaller utensil invalid? This depends on what the utensil was made for. If it was made to contain food then the hole must be large enough for an olive to fall out (see *Mishnah* 3:1). If the utensil was made to contain liquids then the

hole must be large enough for liquid to seep in when the utensil is immersed empty into liquid. If the utensil was made for both food and liquid then we act *l'chumra* and use the smaller *shiur* as if the utensil was made for liquids only.

We see that the exact same action can have a totally different outcome depending on one's intention. If one lowers the same utensil with the same puncture into the oven, the status of the food as *tamei* or *tahor* will depend on the person's intention in relation to what the utensil was made for. If the utensil has a small puncture that allows liquid to seep in:

- if the person made the utensil with the intention that it will be used to contain food, then the food in our *Mishnah* will be *tahor*;
- if the person made the utensil with the intention that it will be used to contain liquids, then the food in our *Mishnah* will be *tamei*.

Similarly, as we will shortly explain, two people can carry out the identical action but the intention lying behind that action can determine whether the action is a *mitzvah* or an *aveirah*.

The *Shulchan Aruch* (60:4) rules that *mitzvot* require intent. However, in the vast majority of cases the threshold level of intent is very low and intent can often be inferred. If the circumstances in which a *mitzvah* is performed indicate that one performed the *mitzvah* in order to fulfil their obligation then the obligation will be fulfilled.

Once the base level of intention is satisfied, it is the action that is most important. Two people can give *tzedaka*, one with the purest of intentions and the other grudgingly. Of course it is better to do a *mitzvah* with pure intentions; however both people would fulfil the *mitzvah* of *tzedaka*.

In some cases however, one's intention is critical. Two people can perform the same action but the intent behind that action will determine whether the action is praiseworthy or not.

Rav Zev Leff gives the example of correcting a *baal koreh* who makes a mistake while reading from the *Torah*. One person might dislike the *baal koreh* or harbour resentment or jealousy towards him. This person would be looking for mistakes so that they can correct the *baal koreh* and embarrass them publicly. Obviously this would not be praiseworthy. Another person might have the purest intentions – they are only concerned with the *Torah* reading being perfect so that the *kehilla* can satisfy its obligation to perform the *mitzvah* of *kriyat ha'Torah* in the most perfect way. Such a person would be pained to correct the *baal koreh* but they would have no choice. Such a person is performing a praiseworthy act.

Just as a person's intention as to what a utensil is to be used for can determine whether food is *tahor* or *tamei*, similarly, a person's intention can determine whether an act is praiseworthy or not.

## Metalware – Resurrecting *Tumah*

Keilim (11:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The eleventh *perek* starts the second third of *masechet keilim*. With this milestone we made the transition from learning about earthenware utensils to metal utensils. In the first *Mishnah* we are introduced to some of the differences between these two types of utensils.

One of these differences is as follows. If a utensil became *tameh* and is broken it becomes *tahor*. Uniquely, with metal utensils, if the utensil is then mended, it recovers its original *tumah* (see *Mishnah Achronah*). This novelty is a result of a rabbinic decree (*Shabbat* 16b) and whether it applies to all source of *tumah* (*Chachamim*) or *tumat ha'met* alone (*R' Shimon ben Gamliel*) is a subject of debate. What was the reason for this decree?

The *Gemara* (*Shabbat* 16b) cites two different reasons<sup>13</sup>. *Abaye* explains that when “breaking” the utensil, one may do so by drilling a hole in its base. However we are concerned that one may not drill it large enough to be considered legally broken. *Rava*, on the other hand explains that when purifying a utensil, immersion in a *mikvah* is not sufficient; one must also wait till evening. If a utensil is broken and mended this delay is not

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<sup>13</sup> This article only deals with the opinion of the *Chachamim*. From a simple understanding of the *Gemara* the reason for the decree according to *R' Shimon ben Gamliel* is as follows. The process for purification as a result of *tumat ha'met* is lengthy (seven days). Recognising that the process would be shortened by breaking and subsequently mending the utensil, there is a real concern that no one would ever engage in the proper purification process and it will be forgotten. *Tosfot R' Akiva Eiger* however explains the flow of the *Gemara* differently and that the reasons given for the opinion of the *Chachamim* also apply to the *R' Shimon ben Gamliel*. They argue whether the concerns of *Abaye* or *Rava* that follow apply to all forms of *tumah* or only to *tumat ha'met* which has the more involved purification process.

necessary. Consequently one might witness the latter process and confuse the two, thinking that the delay is also unnecessary by immersion.

What is the difference between these two opinions? The *Gemara* explains that *Abaye* and *Rava* would disagree in the case where the metal utensil was completely flattened before being reformed. The *Gemara* however does not explain how each of the opinions would rule.

The *Ran* cites two different explanations of this distinction. Some say that when the utensil is completely flattened, since it was not punctured, there is no longer a concern that it will be inadequately punctured. The concern that one might become confused and think that delaying until night fall is not required under normal circumstances is still however present. There are others however who explain in the reverse. If we allow flattening the *kli* one might think, what difference does it make how a *kli* is broken? Consequently the concern that one might not, at a later date, put a large enough hole in the utensil is still present. Yet, since a completely new *kli* has been fashioned and its old form is no longer recognisable, the concern that one might witness the event and think the delaying is not required after immersion is no longer present.

We find from the *Ran* that with these understandings of *Abaye* and *Rava*, the practical difference between these two opinions is not clear. The case provided by the *Gemara* can be understood as being problematic for both opinions.

The *Mishnah Achronah* provides a different explanation for the opinion of *Rava* that makes it easier to see how completely flattening the utensil differentiates between the opinions of *Abaye* and *Rava*. He explains *Rashi*'s understanding of *Rava* as follows. The concern is not that a person will become confused between the laws of breaking a utensil and immersion. He is well aware of these laws. The concern is that the witness will see the same

utensil he knew was *tameh* in the morning being used prior to nightfall and suspect that the person acted against *Halacha*. This type of concern is referred as *chashad* and the motivation for a number of *gezeirot*.

With this understanding of the opinion of *Rava* the difference between the two opinions is clear. If the utensil is completely broken and reformed, *Rava's* concern of *chashad* is no longer, as it is clear that a new *kli* has been formed and was not immersed in the *mikvah*. However allowing one to do so, does not alleviate the concern of *Abaye* thinking any form of breaking is sufficient and may not puncture the *kli* with a large enough hole in the future.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> More questions can be asked. Why does this *gezeirah* apply only to metal utensils? All the above concerns seem to apply to other non-earthenware utensils. Also *Rava's* concern can be address instead by requiring the one that breaks and mends metal utensil wait until nightfall. Why was it necessary to resurrect *tumah* instead? These questions are addressed by the *mefarshim*. See, for example, *Tosfot Yom Tov* and *Tifferet Yisrael*.

## Human and Animal Jewellery

Keilim (12:1)

Alex Tsykin

In our *Mishnah* (12:1) we are told that the “the ring of a person is impure (meaning that it is susceptible to impurity) [while] the ring of a beast or an implement is pure (meaning that it is not susceptible to impurity)”. In other words, all jewellery made for people is susceptible to becoming impure, whereas all other jewellery or decoration is not.

The *Ikar Tosafot Yom Tov* explains that this *Mishnah* is a continuation of the law explained in *Mishnah* 8 of the previous *perek* where it is taught that a woman's jewellery may contract impurity. There, the *Bartenura* explains that the source is a *drasha* made from the following *pasuk* (*Bamidbar* 31: 23)<sup>15</sup>:

Everything that comes into the fire, you shall pass through the fire, and it shall be clean; nevertheless it shall be purified with the water of sprinkling; **and everything** that will not pass through fire, you shall pass through water.

We deduce from the *pasuk* that discusses metalware that because the utensil is purified in water, it must be that it can become impure. However, because of the word “and”, we deduce an extra inclusion beyond that which would normally require purification. Since the rule is that only useful tools made of metal may become impure, it must be there is another class of metal object which may become impure - jewellery. The reason why it is only a person's jewellery which is included in the laws of ritual impurity is not clear, though, logically there should be no difference between metal decorations for people and for other things.

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<sup>15</sup> Ed note: The section of the *Torah* refers to the *kashering* of utensils discussed after the war with *Midyan*.

The answer to this question would seem to lie in an exploration of the nature of ritual impurity, or *tumah*. The Rebbe from Kotsk taught that *tumah* is simply the lack of Godliness in an object which has instead been filled up with something else. However, when it comes to the ritual impurity of objects, there is a difference, for what we are discussing is a factor which affects our relationship with *Hashem*, however, animals and inanimate objects have no direct relationship with *Hashem*. As such, it must be that their *tumah* is different to ours. We will posit based on this that the *tumah* of an animal or inanimate object is not the absence of Godliness from the object (for such a description would have no meaning), but rather the ability to induce an absence of Godliness from our own bodies.

The second fact which we must use in explaining the difference between decorations for people and for others things is that when a person wears jewellery, he does so for himself, and similarly, when he decorates something in his control or care, he does so for himself (or at least for other people). What this tells us is that the purpose of jewellery on a person is to impact the person and is directly impacted by being worn, whereas the purpose of jewellery and decorations for animals and things is to indirectly impact people, rather than the animal or things, for what difference does it make to a cat or a pot if it is wearing a necklace? As such, there is a fundamental difference in purpose, human jewellery is meant to benefit the wearer whereas other jewellery is not.

Based on the above the answer would seem to be that an object, whether it is practically useful or merely decorative, must be intended to directly impact human beings so as to be able to contract ritual impurity. Otherwise, the eventual impact on humans is too indirect. There is no point in its contracting ritual impurity, for the animal or the pot it is placed upon have no relationship with *Hashem* which may be affected by that contact and the impure nature of the object.

## “Fixing” a Needle Keilim (14:5) Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

A needle whose hole or tip broke off is *tahor* (no longer susceptible to *tumah*). If it was “fixed” for stretching [the edge of a curtain for weaving] then it is *tameh* (susceptible to *tumah*)...

*Keilim* 14:5

When the end of a needle breaks, it can no longer serve its original purpose. It might however be used to pin down fabric. The *Bartenura* explains that it was indeed the practice of weavers to use broken needles. The *Mishnah* however explains that it must be “fixed” for that purpose to be susceptible to *tumah*. There are two ways to understand this requirement. The *Mishnah* may be understood literally requiring some modification to the broken needle. Alternatively, we sometimes find that designation is enough.

The *Tosfot* (*Shabbat* 49b, 123a) explains that ordinarily simple designation is enough. For example if a utensil breaks and its remainder is still fit for another purpose, designating for that purpose would make it susceptible to *tumah*. In this case however some physical modification is required. Based on the *Gemara* (*Shabbat* 123a) on which the *Tosfot* comment, it would appear that the reason that this case is different, is because once the utensil is broken it is no longer defined as a *kli* (utensil) and generally discarded. Consequently a more significant act is required than simple designation.

The *Mishnah Achrona* (12:7) understands the *Tosfot* in the above described manner but raises a difficulty from a *Mishnah* learnt previously. The *Mishnah* (12:7) explains:

A *dinar* (coin) that is no longer in circulation and was “fixed” to hang [as a necklace] around the neck of a minor is susceptible to *tumah*...

The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that a coin is not defined as a *kli* as it has no function and is not used as jewellery. Consequently, one would expect that the *Tosfot* would explain that the term “fix” there is also understood literally and some change is required.

Based on the above expectation the *Tosfot* (*Bava Metzia* 52b) are surprising. They explain that if the coin requires some modification to be used as a necklace then fine. If however the coin does not require anything, then designation alone is enough because “all utensils descend to *tumah* (i.e. become susceptible to *tumah*) through *machshava* (thought).” What is odd here is that it appears that even items that are not defined as *keilim* can become susceptible to *tumah* with designation alone.

Perhaps we can answer the *Mishnah Achrona*’s question based on the *Ritva*’s understanding of our *Mishnah*. He explains that once it is broken in this manner such that it is normally discarded, “thought [alone] no longer helps, because since it was once [susceptible] then rejected (i.e. no longer susceptible), it can no longer be susceptible with *machshava* unless it is [physically improved].” Based on this explanation, perhaps it not just because the needle is not a *kli* that it requires more than *machshava*; indeed we find by the coin that *machshava* is enough. This needle is subject to a worse circumstance; it had the ability and then lost it. Only with a physical modification can new life be given to it, enabling it once again to be susceptible to *tumah*.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See *Tosfot* in *Chulin* 55a from which this idea could be based.

# The Wool Comb

## Keilim (13:8)

### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

... [A comb used] for wool from which every second tooth was removed is *tahor* (i.e. no longer susceptible to *tumah*). If three [teeth] remained in one place it would be *tameh* (susceptible to *tumah*). If one of the external teeth was one of [the three remaining teeth] then it is *tahor*...

*Keilim* 13:8

The above *Mishnah* deals with a wool comb whose “teeth” break, focusing on when it is no longer susceptible to *tumah*.

At a quick glance, one would be hard pressed to extract a rule for when this comb would be *tahor*. The first statement that the comb would be *tahor* if every second tooth was removed seems to imply that provided that two consecutive teeth remained, the comb would be susceptible to *tumah*. However the next statement explicitly states that three teeth must remain in one place. Do we require two or three teeth?

The above observation is not new; the *Gemara* asks this very question. Before bringing the answer, one must first understand that the wool comb in the times of the *Mishnah* was made of multiple rows (we might refer to it as a narrow brush). The *Gemara* therefore responds that one statement refers to the “inner” row of teeth while the other statement refers to the “outer” row of teeth. *Rashi* explains that most of work when combing wool was performed with the outer teeth. Consequently the outer row required a greater number of teeth (three) than the inner rows (two) for the comb to maintain its susceptibility to *tumah*.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The *Chazon Ish* (*Nashim* 143, 43a) explains that according to this understanding a total of five teeth would be required.

When the *Rambam* brings this *Halacha* (*Hilchot Keilim* 11:3) he appears to require three teeth under in all cases:

A comb used for wool from which teeth were removed, if three remained in one place then it is *tameh*...

The *Kesef Mishnah* draws our attention to the above cited *Gemara* and is at a loss for why the *Ra'avad* did not even question the *Rambam*.

Rav Shach *ztz"l* explains (*Avi Ezri, Keilim* 11:3) that according to the *Rambam* there are two reasons why this comb can become *tahor*. If there are less than three teeth together in any part of the comb then the comb is indeed *tahor* for it is no longer fit for purpose. The first statement of the *Mishnah* however refers to a different reason why the comb becomes *tahor* as will be explained.

The *Rambam* writes (*Hilchot Keilim* 18:10):

All utensils that broke and lost their form, the broken parts are not susceptible to *tumah*, even if those parts are useful, except for *klei cheres*...

The loss of form is therefore another means to which the utensil becomes *tahor*. Therefore if the comb does not have three teeth together, it might not be fit for purpose, but still have the form of the comb. It is only when every second tooth is removed that it also has lost its form.

One would then understand the *Gemara's* explanation of our *Mishnah* differently. The first statement (regarding the removal of every second tooth) refers to the “outside” of the *kli* - its form. The second statement (regarding the requirement of having three teeth together) refers to its “inside” – its function.

[Rav Shach explains (based on *Rambam* 19:13) that the following is the practical difference. If a utensil loses its function but still maintains its form, then (using the above example) even if a third tooth was replaced with one whose substance ordinarily would not be susceptible to *tumah*, the comb is now susceptible to

*tumah*. If however the comb lost its form and (using our case) every second tooth was replaced with one that is not susceptible to *tumah*, then the comb would still not be susceptible to *tumah* as it no longer can be.]<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> *Rav Shach* adds that the first statement is not included explicitly in the *Rambam* as the rule is covered by the above cited *Rambam* and “loss of form” is something that depends on the opinion of people. See inside for more detail. Also see the volume 6 issue 4 for a similar discussion regarding earthenware utensils. *Rav Shach* brings the *Rabbeinu Chaim* cited in that issue to explain the *Rambam* (*Keilim* 19:14) which at face value seem to imply that the loss of form removing the ability for a *kli* to become susceptible to *tumah* only applies to *kli cheres*.

## A “Standard” Meal

### Menachot (17:11)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnayot* defined many of the common units used throughout *shas*. Amongst the list were a number of measures that were relative. At the end of this list was the two meals that were required as part of the forming of an *eiruv*. The *Gemara* (*Eiruv* 30b) explains that the relative measure is provided for one who is not able to eat a regular meal, for example the elderly or sick. However one who is able to eat an excessive amounts of food would only be required to set aside two standard meals.

The *Mishnah* continues with a number of opinions. *R' Meir* and *R' Yehuda* debate whether the *Shabbat* or weekday meal should be used as a measure, where as *R' Shimon* and *R' Yochanan ben Bruka* provide fixed measures. The *Mishnah* explains that both *R' Meir* and *R' Yehuda* intended on ruling leniently. *Rashi* (*Mishnah Eiruv* 82b) explains that *R' Meir* understands that people eat more on *Shabbat* due to the tastier foods, consequently the weekday meal is smaller. *R' Yehuda* however understands that since on *Shabbat* people eat an extra meal (three meals) each of these meals is smaller than the weekday meal. At first the debate seems to be quite surprising. Why not simply go out and see how people behave?

The *Mishnah Achrona* suggests that perhaps they argue about how one should enjoy *Shabbat*. *R' Meir* argues that one can have large meals, as the sweet foods enjoyed generate an appetite ensuring that the meal is not gluttonous. *R' Yehuda* however disagrees arguing that a small amount from a wide variety of foods is preferred. The *Mishnah Achrona* however find his suggestion difficult as the *Gemara* (*Eiruv* 82b) records *R' Yosef* asking *R' Yosef* the son of *Raba* how his father behaved. The response is that he behaved like *R' Meir*. The reason provided is

that *R' Yehuda's* position is difficult due to the well know saying, "sweet foods increase an appetite" implying that general behaviour is at the core rather than desire custom.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* answers that everyone agrees that on *Shabbat* people will eat more delicacies. However this is provided that one has the means to purchase them. Consequently *R' Meir* rules leniently for the wealthy as for them the weekday meal is smaller, while *R' Yehuda* rules leniently for the poor.<sup>19</sup> This explains why the *Mishnah* stated that each of them intended to be lenient", implying that each remained with a stringent element.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* however continues that even though this is how the debate appears at the surface, at the core of the debate is something else. The *eiruv techumim* is setup prior to *Shabbat* but is intended for the purpose of *Shabbat*. Consequently *R' Meir* is focused on the size of the meals when the act takes place, while *R' Yehuda* is focused on the time of its effect.

However, as stated above in the question of the *Mishnah Achrona*, it appears from the *Gemara* that the behaviour of people presented a problem for *R' Yehuda* and is consequently at the core of the debate.

One might be tempted to concede - perhaps indeed we are debating which of the two was really the smaller and it was important in order to determine the standard meal. By the time of *Raba* it was well known, for the behaviour was already captured in a common saying.

To suggest an alternative answer a point must be introduced. There is a discussion in the *Rishonim* regarding which case *R'*

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<sup>19</sup> See the *Tifferet Ya'akov* who provides sources for *R' Meir* and *R' Yehuda's* own financial statuses matching their leniency as described by the *Tifferet Yisrael*.

*Meir* and *R' Yehuda* argue. Are they arguing about the case of the elderly person for whom his meal will be a relative measure (*Rashba's* preferred answer<sup>20</sup>)? Or are they arguing about how to define the standard meal (*Rashba*)? Or perhaps both (*Ritva*)?

One could therefore answer that the question posed by *R' Yosef* was indeed relating to the definition of a standard meal. The response however was that *R' Meir* and *R' Yehuda* cannot be arguing about the average meal; that is well known. There is even a well known saying that helps to define the average meal. Their debate is only regarding the leniency applied to those that cannot consume a regular meal in terms of how far or on what basis can the leniency be formed.

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<sup>20</sup> The *Meiri* explains similarly, but rules that since both intended to rule leniently then each person would take the smaller of the two measures that apply to him.

## To Teach or Not To Teach

Keilim (17:16)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* faced a dilemma. The *Mishnah* discusses a number of utensils that ordinarily would not be susceptible to *tumah* (17:16). However due to their unconventional and illegal use, they were converted into a receptacle whose container was hidden, thereby defining it as a utensil. *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* therefore exclaimed, “Woe to me if I state [these laws], Woe to me if I do not state [them]”. What exactly was his concern and how was the matter resolved.

We find that *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* made this exclamation in another context as well. The *Gemara* (*Bava Batra* 89b) records the laws of a *machak* – a utensil used to level off the excess of dry goods in a measure. It lists its material attributes and the manner in which it should be used to ensure that the purchaser is not cheated. The *Gemara* explains that *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* was concerned that if he taught these laws then it may be providing swindlers with new tools. However if he did not teach these laws, he was concerned these cheaters would say that “the *Talmidei Chachamim* are not experts in these matters.”<sup>21</sup>

What was the nature of the second concern? Was he simply concerned for the honour of *Talmidei Chachamim* albeit an important one? Did he feel it was important to break any false stereotype that “the Rabbis just do not know the ways of the world”?

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<sup>21</sup> Why was *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai*'s main concern not that this is *Torah* and it should be taught? See *Mishnah Achrona* that indeed this law could be derived from a previous *Mishnah* and the *halachic* aspect is therefore not a concern.

The *Rashbam* explain that there was an even deeper concern. If they had this false perception that the sages were easy bait, then it might encourage them to widen the operations. Interestingly, we find that keeping quiet could also increase corruption.

The *Maharsha* provides a different explanation. If these laws were not taught, the cheater would assume that the *Chachamim* do not know about these forms of theft. They might think then that the only reason why they do not engage in them is because they do not know about them. Had they known, they would be no different.

Indeed we find from the *Maharsha* the common form of self justification: “You are no better. If you could do it, you would too.” Consequently it was important for the criminals to know that despite the knowledge and availability of committing such crime, the *Chachamim* remain answerable to the higher ethical standard set out by the *Torah*.

How was the matter resolved? The *Gemara* explains that *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* decided to teach the laws, based on the *pasuk*: “The paths of *Hashem* are just, the righteous walk on them, the evil stumble open them.” (*Hoshea* 14:10) The *Rashbam* explains that *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* understood that the words of the *Torah* are straight. The righteous will be cautious with them ensuring that they do not swindle others. In the context of the *Gemara* they will choose an appropriate *machak* and use it in the correct manner. Making these laws known will keep the righteous honest. The criminals will just stumble in the path and learn to cheat in any event.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> For our *Mishnah* as well it was important that these laws are known not only so the righteous will not unwillingly cheat others if they mistakenly purchase such modified items, but also so that the laws of *tumah* and *tahara* are maintained. See also *Midrash* on *Kohelet* (6:1)

Another explanation might be given based on the commentaries on the above quoted *pasuk*. The *Radak* explain that the *Navi* is explaining that indeed all the ways of *Hashem* are just. This is difficult for Man to perceive when the good appear to suffer and the evil appear to prosper. Nevertheless one's standing is difficult to assess. Furthermore there are a plethora of potential reasons for one particular human experience even before taking into account that this world is merely an "antechamber" for the next. The righteous recognise the limits in their perception in these matters. The evil, in their short-sightedness prefer to turn to quick returns instant gratification even if the means run counter to the *Torah*, Heaven forbid. Unfortunately, they will stumble.

Perhaps then this is where *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* found counsel. With all the considerations at hand what should he do? The answer: teach these laws – teach the *Torah*. And those of corrupt hearts? Well, no one will lose on their account, for the ways of *Hashem* are just – He'll take care of it.

## The Impurity of Wooden Vessels

Keilim (18:9)

Rav Yonatan Rosensweig

At the beginning of the second chapter of *Keilim* we learn:

Wooden utensils... when flat are pure, and when containers are impure.

In other words: only wooden vessels that can serve as receptacles can contract impurity, while if they are flat they are not susceptible to impurity - like vessels made of rock. (The exception is a wooden mattress or any other wooden objects one commonly lies on, the source of which is a unique *pasuk*).

While this seems quite clear, many *Rishonim* disagree and the issue of the possible impurity of wooden vessels becomes a matter of great debate. Let us mention 3 sources, from which one can imply that wooden vessels can and indeed become impure:

1. The *Gemara* in *Bava Batra* (66a) tells us that flat wooden utensils contract impurity by way of rabbinic decree. So although there is no Torah-based impurity, there is a rabbinically-based one.
2. There is a discussion in the *Torat Kohanim* which deals with the issue of flat wooden utensils, and states that although we generally hold that they do not contract impurity, if they serve things that serve man (like a table facilitates a plate used by people) - they also can become impure.
3. The *Tosafot* (*Sukkah* 16a) and *Ritva* (*Sukkah* 12b) infer from *Mishnah* (18:9) that wooden flat utensils can become impure. The *Mishnah* teaches that a bed becomes pure and impure in the same way: Meaning, if the bed became impure fully constructed it can only be purified in the same way, and if it became impure when it was disassembled then it can only

become pure in that way. Since beds are made of wood, it is interesting that we learn that even when it is not assembled - hence: not usable - it still can become impure.<sup>23</sup>

Generally, we find three opinions in the *Rishonim* regarding what the *Halacha* is:

- (a) The *Rashbam* claims that there is no impurity for wooden utensils, at all. The *Gemara* in *Bava Batra* is according to a singular opinion; the *Torat Kohanim* is overruled by the *Gemara*; and our *Mishnah* can be explained as talking about a bed made from other materials.
- (b) The *Tosafot* adopt the view of the *Torat Kohanim*, as stated earlier.
- (c) *Rambam* appears to interpret the *Torat Kohanim* in saying that any wide wooden utensil can become rabbinically impure.

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<sup>23</sup> Ed Note: This is one understanding of our *Mishnah* based on the *Tosefta*. Others explain the basic meaning of the *Mishnah* differently. (See the *Tifferet Yisrael*, for example, for more detail.)

## Covered Utensils

### Keilim (22:1)

### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* discusses a wooden table whose surface was covered with stone – a substance that is not susceptible to *tumah* (22:1). The *Mishnah* discussed the debate regarding how much of the originally wooden surface must be showing for the table to remain susceptible to *tumah*. The implication of the *Mishnah* is that if the table was completely covered than it would no longer be susceptible to *tumah*. The explanation of the *Bartenura* that “we go according to the [susceptibility of the material of the] cover” therefore seems appropriate.

The difficulty is that in earlier cases the *Bartenura* appeared to explain the opposite. For example, the *Mishnah* (11:6) discussed the susceptibility to *tumah* of a metallic *pika* (spinner’s coil). The *Chachamim* ruled that it was indeed susceptible to *tumah*. However if it was made of wood, which in that form would not be susceptible to *tumah*, and then coated with metal, it would not be susceptible to *tumah*. There the *Bartenura* explains that we are only interested in the *ikar* (essence) of the utensil and not the coating. How can the apparent discrepancies between the *Mishnayot* be explained? How can the apparent contradiction in the opinion of the *Bartenura* be resolved?

The *Mishnah Achrona* differentiates between these two cases. In the earlier *Mishnayot* the coating only serves a decorative value. Consequently the coating is insignificant compared to the utensil itself. However in our case of the table, the stone serves a functional purpose – it cools and protects the food.

The *Gra* differentiate between classes of coatings in a similar way. The reason why in the earlier cases the metallic coating was not significant is because the coating alone cannot turn a wooden utensil into a metallic one (*Eliyahu Raba* 11:4-6). However if the

prime use is through the material of the coating, then significance is given to the coating (*Biur HaGra Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah* 120:16). The *Chazon Ish* (*Keilim* 14:8) explains that when the prime use is made from the coating, for example in the case of the table, then the coating is important. However if the prime use is made with the utensil itself and the coating simple serves as a protective layer, as in the case of the *pika*, then the substance of the coating is of no importance.

The *Rambam* (*Hilchot Keilim* 4:4) however explains that any utensil, even if it has a receptacle, even with a metallic coating, is not susceptible to *tumah*. He bases the rule on the *pasuk* that discuss the susceptibility to *tumah* of utensils as those “that one performs work inside them.” The *Rambam* understands that this excludes coated vessels whose work is not performed inside them, but inside its coating. Consequently in both our *Mishnah* and the earlier ones, the object in question is not susceptible to *tumah* due having a covering.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> See the *Kesef Mishnah* for an explanation of the position of the *Rambam*.

## Three Types of *Sevachot*

Keilim (24:17)  
Yehuda Gottlieb

The twenty-fourth *perek* of *Masechet Keilim* is interesting from a stylistic point of view as each *Mishnah* begins by mentioning a particular item and its three categories of susceptibility to *tumah*. The sixteenth *Mishnah* discusses the impurity of *sevachot*, which literally refers to a netting-like material. The three types of *sevachot* and their susceptibility to *Tumah* are as follows:

1. A girl's *sevacha* is able to contract *Tumat Midras* – a form of *tumah* that is imparted through standing, sitting or lying upon, unique to items intended for these purposes.
2. An elderly woman's *sevacha* is able to contract *Tamei Met* and other forms of *tumah* transferred through direct contact.
3. A *sevacha* for outdoors is *tahor* and not susceptible to *tumah*.

The *Rishonim* provide differing explanations as to the uses of this netting like material and it is this use which impacts its capacity for contracting *Tumah*.

The *Rambam* and *Bartenura* seem to agree that the word *sevacha* refers to a lady's head covering. It follows then that the *Mishnah* is referring to head coverings that belong to different individuals. The *Rambam* states that a girl's head covering can be sat upon and therefore contracts *Tumat Midras*. On the other hand, the head covering of an elderly woman was slightly different and constructed in a manner that one would not sit on it. Interestingly, the *Bartenura* quotes the *Tosefta* which reverses the *Halacha* – i.e. that a child's head covering has the ability to contract corpse *Tumah*, and an elderly woman's contracts *Midras Tumah*. This is because an elderly woman is not particular about her head covering, and will therefore sit upon it from time to time, while a child is particular about her clothing and will not sit upon it.

The *Mishnah Achrona* disagrees with the above interpretation. He writes that it does not seem logical that the *Mishnah* would be referring to a head covering as it is quite rare to find a woman that would uncover her hair to sit on her head covering! Rather, the *sevachot* mentioned in the *Mishnah* is some sort of handkerchief which a woman uses to clean her mouth and hands from dirt. According to the *Mishnah Achronah*, the *Mishnah* informs us that a girl is particular about her clothes, and therefore will sometimes place this handkerchief on top of her chair in order to prevent her clothes from getting dirty, thus enabling the handkerchief to contract *Tumat Midras*. The handkerchief of an elderly lady, on the other hand, will only contract corpse *tumah* as she is not particular about her clothes and will never sit on the handkerchief.

Another explanation is provided by the *Tifferet Yisrael* who interprets the use of the *Sevacha* as a veil. He mentions that a girl's veil typically covered her head, shoulders and parts of her body. Therefore, when she sits down, she will find herself at least partially sitting on her veil (and thus allow for *Tumat Midras*). An elderly lady however, will typically have a shorter veil and never find herself sitting on the material.

Interestingly, according to all opinions, there is still the question of why a *sevacha* "for going out" is completely *Tahor*. *Tifferet Yisrael* answers that this covering does not have the appropriate *shiur* as a *begged* – and therefore remains *tahor*. *Bartenura* answers that this type of covering is not really a vessel and therefore cannot receive impurity. The *Mishnah Achronah* develops this idea further. He says that this *sevacha* was actually a type of sheet that was worn by women on top of their clothing when they went out to protect them from the rain. Since this sheet was only used as protection, it is not considered a *kli* in its own right and therefore escapes susceptibility to contracting *tumah*.

## ***Keilim - Inside and Out***

**Keilim (25:1)**

**Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier**

The twenty-fifth *perek* begins as follows:

All utensils have outsides and inside, for example pillows, mattresses, sacks and leather bags.

With this we are introduced to the concept of *achoraim va'toch* (literally outsides and inside), which refers to the distinction between when a *tameh* liquid comes into contact with the inside or outside of a *kli*.

To explain, ordinarily liquids that came into contact with *tumah* cannot transfer this impurity to utensils. There are however some liquids which themselves are sources (*avot*) of *tumah* and can impart impurity to utensils, for example fluid that came from a *zav*. Often the difference between liquids is not readily discernable. Consequently the *Chachamim* found it necessary to enact a decree (*gezeirah*) deeming that any *tameh* liquids can transfer impurity to utensils.

In some cases however, it is important that one knows that the *tumah* is of rabbinic origin. Consequently part of the decree is the difference between where the *tameh* liquid made contact. If the *tumah* came into contact with the inside of the utensil, then the entire *kli* is *tameh* (albeit rabbinically). If however the *tameh* liquid came into contact with the outside of the *kli* then only the outside is *tameh*. This is not the case with those few liquids that are sources of *tumah* and hence the legal reminder that this *tumah* is rabbinic.

The first words of the *Mishnah* however require thought. Can the *Mishnah* really mean that “all” utensils have this unique decree of *achoraim va'toch*? The basis for this question is that if a source of *tumah*, even the liquid that came from a *zav*, came into contact with the outside of an earthenware utensil (*kli cheres*) it does not

become *tameh*. Earthenware utensils are only susceptible to *tumah* if the source is placed inside it. Therefore it does not make sense that this decree, that if a *tameh* liquid came into contact with the outside that it alone would be *tameh*, should apply to *klei cheres* as well.

This indeed is the position of *Rashi* (*Bechorot* 38a s.v. “*ve’lo*”) amongst others. Accordingly our *Mishnah* should not be understood literally. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that the *Mishnah*’s language supports this view. The *Mishnah* adds “for example pillows...” If it really referred to all utensils it should have stated “even” as opposed to “for example”. The term “for example” therefore appears to limit the scope of the initial statement.

The *Rambam* however rules that the decree also applies to *klei cheres* and that they become *tameh* if a *tameh* liquid touches its outside (*Hilchot Avot Ha’Tumah* 7:3). The *Raavad* questions the *Rambam* based on our initial question. If the liquid of a *zav* or *zava* cannot transfer *tumah* to a *kli cheres* if it touches its outside, why would the *gezeirah* of *tameh* liquids apply to such utensils?

The *Kesef Mishnah* answers that since liquids are more readily susceptible to becoming *tameh* (they do not require *hechsher* like other items) the *Chachamim* treated them stringently. Being able to make utensils *tameh* no matter how they contracted *tumah* (even if they themselves are a *sheni le’tumah* that cannot transfer *tumah* to regular food) is just one example. The other is that they can transfer *tumah* to the backs of *klei cheres*.

The *Yeshuat David* provides another explanation. How do we understand how a *kli cheres* is only *tameh* if the *tumah* is inside (even only in the space of) the *kli*? One understanding is that the utensil itself is only susceptible to *tumah* in its inside. In other words it is an issue with the utensil. *R’ Chaim* (*Hilchot Metamei Mishkav U’Moshav* 8:4) however explains that the *Rambam* has a different understanding. The issue is not with the utensil, but with

the object of *tumah*. It is a *gezeirat ha'katuv* (a decree by the *Torah*) that objects of *tumah* are only defined as sources of *tumah* for a *kli cheres* once they are placed inside the utensil.

Based on this explanation, the *Yeshuat David* explains that the issue for a *kli cheres* is not with the *kli* but with the object of *tumah*. Consequently once the *Chachamim* instituted the *gezeirah*, all *tameh* liquids have a status of sources of *tumah* even for *klei cheres*. Now that it has a status of a source of *tumah*, since there was never a problem with a *kli cheres*' ability to attract *tumah* at its outside, they too would be effected by this *gezeirah* and their outsides would also become *tameh* if in contact with *tameh* liquids.

## ***Yi'ush* – Losing Hope in the Face of Theft**

**Keilim (26:7)**

**Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier**

Mental designation (*machshava*) can transform an item requiring no extra labour to become functional, into a *kli* (26:7)<sup>25</sup>. This is important since from that point onward it becomes susceptible to *tumah*. We also learnt that in some circumstance the mental designation of a thief (*ganav*) or robber (*gazlan*)<sup>26</sup> can be significant (26:8):

...Those [hides] stolen by a *ganav* become susceptible to *tumah* through *machshava*; those stolen by a *gazlan* do not become susceptible to *tumah* through *machshava*. *R' Shimon* says, the matter is reversed: those [hides] stolen by a *gazlan* become susceptible to *tumah* through *machshava*; those stolen by a *ganav* do not become susceptible to *tumah* through *machshava*.

We find a debate between the *Chachamim* and *R' Shimon* whether the *ganav* or *gazlan* has the ability to change the status of the stolen item with *machshava* alone. Before the debate can be analysed some background information is required.

The *Gemara* (*Bava Kama* 66b) explains that in this context, one must be the owner of the item for *machshava* to be effective<sup>27</sup>. Consequently, an important factor is whether the legal ownership of the hide has changed. A critical (but not sole) factor is whether the owner has given up hope of retrieving his property - referred to as *yi'ush*.<sup>28</sup> Consequently the debate appears to be whether in

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<sup>25</sup> See the *Tosfot Yom Tov* who rules that mental designation alone is not enough and one's intentions must also be articulated.

<sup>26</sup> A *ganav* steals the object secretly, in a manner where he ideally will not be seen and will not get caught. A *gazlan* however is not bothered with confronting his victim or being identified.

<sup>27</sup> There is a discussion in the *Rishonim* on that *Gemara* regarding the state of the hide and the form of *tumah* that the hide is becoming susceptible to. This discussion is beyond the scope of this article.

<sup>28</sup> The *Gemara* explains that *yi'ush* alone is not enough. A physical change in the stolen object is also required. In this case however *machshava* also affects a

the case of a *ganav* and *gazlan* the original owner has given up hope that he will ever retrieve the object.

The commentaries explain the debate as follows. The *Chachamim* believe it is only in the case of the *gazlan*, where the robber has been identified, that the owner does not give up hope in retrieving his property. In the case of the *ganav*, since the owner does not know who stole his property, he gives up hope and the *machshava* of the thief is effective. *R' Shimon* applies the reverse logic. It is in the case of the *gazlan*, where the owner had already been confronted by the robber and learnt that he is powerless against the strong criminal that he gives up hope. With respect to the *ganav* however, hope still remains that he may be able to liberate the stolen item.

When faced with any debate in *Mishnah* or *Gemara*, one is apprehensive to attribute the debate to a disagreement about a fact of nature. If it were such a matter a survey or other investigation could and should have been performed to resolve the matter. In this case the *Chazon Ish* explains that here too the debate cannot be understood in this manner – the debate is **not** regarding whether or not the owner has given up hope in the case of the *ganav* and *gazlan*.

The *Chazon Ish* explains that *yi'ush* is a far more complicated issue – it is not a black and white matter. In the case of theft there is a mix of emotions of both hope and despair. Monetary ownership is a function of one's control of the object in question and it is up to the Sages to decide at what point in this mix of emotions is this control lost. For the *Chachamim* this point is reached in the case of the *ganav*. The identity of the thief is unknown and there is no place direct his hope in retrieving the stolen item. For *R' Shimon* however, current lack of identity is not

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change in the name of the object. Initially it was a hide and it became a table cover. The *Gemara* teaches that a change in name is equivalent to a physical change for these purposes.

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a problem for a search can be initiated. The overriding issue is rather the feeling of powerlessness.

This explanation helps to understand a debate in the *Gemara* (*Bava Kama* 114). According to *Ulla*, if one heard the original owner exclaim that he gave up hope then all would agree that in both cases *machshava* is significant. This position appears to make sense as the question of the owners hope is clarified. However according to *Rava* the debate still stands. Why? The *Tosfot* explain that his exclamation is not taken seriously and his true feelings are otherwise. Understanding *yi'ush* as a function of complex emotions this makes sense. The exclamation of the owner is but one of his emotions that is also partnered with enduring feelings of hope. Consequently an exclamation alone, according to *Rava*, would not resolve the debate.

## Combining Different Materials

Keilim (27:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The twenty-seventh *perek* begins with the differences between various materials and their susceptibility to *tumah*. One difference mentioned is their minimum sizes for them to be susceptible to *tumah midras* – *tumah* that is transferred by, for example, a *zav* sitting or lying upon it. The determining factor is how large the material must be such that it becomes useful to sit on. The *Mishnah* taught that this varies with type of material in question.

What if the patch is made from a combination of materials? The *Mishnah* (27:3) explains:

If one made [a patch] two [*tephachim*] of cloth and one [*tephach*] of sacking... it is *tahor*.

The minimum measure of cloth is three-by-three *tephachim* and the minimum measure for sacking is four-by-four. The *Mishnah* teaches that if the minimum measure is completed with another material whose minimum measure is greater, then the patch is not susceptible to *tumah*.<sup>29</sup> If however a patch was completed in the reverse way, for example sacking of three with an extra *tephach* of cloth, then it would be susceptible to *tumah*.<sup>30</sup>

Why do the different fabrics not combine? The *Bartenura* explains that “the less significant cannot complete the *shiur* (measure) of the more significant.” In other words, that which has a larger *shiur* (in the above example sacking) is considered less

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<sup>29</sup> The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that this is only if the patch was made unintentionally or by a minor. The reason is that we learnt (27:4) that if one intentionally crafted any fabric, then the minimum measure in all cases is one *tephach* by one *tephach*.

<sup>30</sup> Ordinarily items that have different *shiurim* cannot combine. The *Gemara* (*Sukkah* 17b) explains since in some cases these materials share the same measure (see previous footnote) they can combine even in our case when they have different *shiurim*.

significant and cannot complete the smaller *shiur*. According to this understanding the problem is the “significance” of the fabric being used to complete the *shiur*. It is as if each of the fabrics have different, for want of a better word, potencies. The *Tifferet Yisrael* understands that if one and a third *tephachim* of sacking were added to the two *tephachim* of the cloth then the *shiur* would be complete. To explain, since three *tephachim* of cloth is equal to four *tephachim* of sacking, one and third *tephachim* of sacking should be enough to complete the missing *tephach*. Once the minimum measures were fixed by the *Chachamim* this “mathematical” system came into play.

The *Mishnah Achrona* explains differently. He understands that since it is not the way for one to complete a garment of a higher quality fabric with an inferior one, it is as if it is not attached. Accordingly, even if one added sacking of a *tephach* and a third, the patch would not be susceptible to *tumah*. One proof comes from the *Rash* who learns that when the *Mishnah* teaches that this composite patch is *tahor* it should not be taken literally. The reason is that we find that for a cloth to be susceptible to *tumah* that is transferred by contact, the minimum size is three finger-breadths. Consequently, using the above example, the *Mishnah* means that if a source of *tumah* touched the two *tephachim* sized cloth, even though the cloth would be *tameh*, the attached sacking would not. Consequently it is as if the sacking is not attached.

A difficulty faced is that the *Tifferet Yisrael*, cited as part of the first understanding, also brings the ruling of the *Rash*. If the sacking can complete the minimum measure of cloth if it is large enough, why is not considered attached when it cannot not? Perhaps that answer is found simply by asking the following question: is the detachment in the ruling of the *Rash* a cause or effect? According to the *Mishnah Achrona* since people do not combine material in this manner, they are by definition considered detached. According to the *Tifferet Yisrael*, the sacking is not by definition detached; given the right quantity it could complete the *shiur*. However since in the case of the

*Mishnah* it does not, the effect is that for the purpose of *tumah* transferred by contact, it is considered detached.

This explains another question. The *Mishnah Lemelech* is initially unsure that if, within the patch, the cloth alone was larger than the minimum shiur and had the sacking attached is it now considered one garment or is the sacking still considered detached? The *Mishnah Achrona* believes that it is obviously detached and does not understand the doubt. Perhaps one could explain that the doubt is based on the question above: is the detachment the cause of effect?

## Bigdei Aniyim Keilim (29:8) Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

A small piece of cloth, three by three fingerbreadths, is susceptible to *tumah*. Even though such a small patch does not appear to be very useful, it is for the poor who use it to mend clothing. Nonetheless, the *Gemara* (*Shabbat* 26a) learns from the strange wording of the *pasuk* (“*ve-habeged*”) that a patch of these dimensions is susceptible to *tumah* no matter the financial standing of the owner. Elsewhere the *Gemara* (*Sukkah* 16a) explains that below the minimum measure, such a patch has no use to anyone and is consequently not susceptible to any *tumah*. Therefore the *Mishnah* (29:8) at first appears puzzling:

A poor person’s cloth, even though it is less than three by three [fingerbreadths], is *tameh* (i.e. susceptible to *tumah*)...

The *Rash* explains that one would be tempted to change the text of the *Mishnah* to read “three by three [*tephachim*]<sup>31</sup>”. In other words, while the minimum size for a cloth to be susceptible to *tumah met* (more accurately the forms of *tumah* transferred by direct contact) is standard, the larger minimum size for the *tumat midras* varies. This is indeed the version of the *Tosfot* (*Shabbat* 47a).

The *Rash* and *Rosh* however wish to preserve this version that is widely found. They explain based on the *Tosefta* that the cloth in this *Mishnah* refers to a large one that is well worn out and with multiple tears such that there is not a consistent area of three by three *tephachim*.

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<sup>31</sup> The nuances of the text do not translate well into English. Due to the Hebrew grammar the words for “three”, whether masculine or feminine imply handbreadths (*tephachim*) or fingerbreadths respectively.

The *Rambam* and *Bartenura* (and ultimately the *Rash*<sup>32</sup>) also explain the case differently. They understand that the case in the *Mishnah* refers to a larger cloth that has been put together by small patches. Such clothing was only worn by those hard pressed and it is therefore only theirs which is susceptible to *tumah*.

What then is the novelty of the *Mishnah* if we are dealing with a large cloth made of small patches? We have already learnt that different fabrics can combine to complete the minimum measure for *tumat midras* (see previous article). Certainly then if they are put together from the same fabric they should combine!

The *Mishnah Achrona* answers that when the *Mishnah* that taught that different fabrics could combine, it referred to pieces that were larger than three by three fingerbreadths; that were susceptible to *tumat met*. In this case however the small patches were not susceptible to any form of *tumah*. One might have thought that such small patches could not combine at all; after all, many multiples of nothing accounts to nothing. This *Mishnah* is therefore still required.

One might still ask, why should there be a difference between the financial standing of the owner?<sup>33</sup> Just as we learnt that it makes no difference by a patch of three by three fingerbreadths, the same should apply in this case as well. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that that the universal rule applies by the three by three patch, because it is generally useful for *ani'im*. The difference here is that ordinarily the patches that are less than three by three fingerbreadths are not useful. It is only when it is considered important to him, through its combination with other such patches, that it becomes considered useful.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> See the *Mishnah Achrona* and *Tosfot R' Akiva Eiger*.

<sup>33</sup> See the *Rash* who explains that if a wealthy person decided to wear it, it would be susceptible to *tumat midras*.

<sup>34</sup> This is the *Mishnah Achrona*'s second answer, see inside for more details. Also see the *Rash* at length.

## Ohalot

### Tumah B'Chiburin

Ohalot (1:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*Masechet Keilim* opens with a discussion regarding *tumah* originating from a corpse. More specifically, how the level or “potency” of the *tumah* degrades as it is transferred between people and/or utensils. The case in the first *Mishnah* is as follows. If a person touches a corpse he becomes *tameh met* and must engage in the seven day purification process. During that time he is defined as an *av ha'tumah*, meaning that he has the ability to transfer *tumah* to anything that is susceptible to *tumah*, including other people. If he then touches a utensil or another person, it becomes *tameh* albeit to a lesser degree. Firstly the purification process is shorter. Furthermore, it is defined as a *rishon le'tumah* and can only transfer *tumah* to food and liquids.

The *Bartenura* explains however, that if the second person touches the first person while he is still in contact with the corpse, then he too would be required to undergo the seven day purification process. This is referred to as *tumah b'chiburin*.<sup>35</sup> The *Tifferet Yisrael* notes that *tumah* being transferred in this manner, such that it can cause another person to become *tameh*, is unique to *tumat met* (*tumah* originating from a corpse).

There are two ways to understand *tumah b'chiburin*. On the one hand, one could explain that while the first person is in contact with the corpse his own *tumah* is as strong as the corpse's. On the

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<sup>35</sup> The *Bartenura* explains that this rule is *d'rabbanan*. This is however the subject of debate whether it is *d'oraita* or *d'rabbanan*. The *Rambam* (here) and *Tosfot Rid* (*Avodah Zara* 37b) holds it is *d'rabbanan*, while the *Tosfot* and *Ramban* (*Avodah Zara* 37b) maintain it is *d'oraita*.

other hand, one may understand that when the second person touches the first, it is as if he is contact with corpse itself.<sup>36</sup>

The *Ramban* (*Avodah Zara* 37b) explains that “...the entire time that person is touching the corpse he is like [the corpse]” which appears to follow the first understanding. The *Tosfot Rid* however explains that “when *Reuven* is touching the corpse, and *Shimon* touches *Reuven*, it is considered as if *Shimon* touched that the *tumah* that *Reuven* is in contact with.” The *Tosfot Rid* aligns therefore with the second understanding.

Is there a practical difference between these two understandings? In the *Shut Be'er Moshe* it is explained that one difference would be if two people, touching one another, each held half a *kezayit* from a corpse. According to the first understanding, neither person is holding a full *kezayit* and therefore both would be *tahor*. According to the second understanding, if it is as if the second person is in direct contact with the *tumah*, then both people would be considered holding a full *kezayit* and therefore *tameh*.  
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Another practical difference brought is as follows. A *kohen* is warned against coming into direct contact with a corpse. This appears to be only when in direct contact, because a *kohen* is not warned against touching a “sword” that touched a corpse which shares the same level *tumah* as the corpse. Is the *kohen* warned against touching another person who is in contact with a corpse? The answer might once again depend on how one understands *tumah b'chiburin*. If it is as if he is touching the corpse itself then yes. If however it is only as if the *tumah* of the first person is on the same level as the corpse then perhaps no.

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<sup>36</sup> Much of the content that follows is found in the *Metivta*, *Yalkut Biurim*, *Nazir* 44b, footnote 136.

<sup>37</sup> Were one brave enough, they might argue that the concept of *tumah b'chiburin* only begins when one person is directly in contact with *tumat met* above the minimum measure of a *kezayit* and consequently according to both understandings, both people would be *tahor*.

Another question, brought down by the *Minchat Chinnuch* as follows. A *kohen* is allowed to become *tameh* for the sake of particular deceased relatives. Can a *kohen* however touch a person who is touching that relative? Once again the doubt may be based on the above question. If the *kohen* is only permitted to directly touch the deceased relative then the question may depend on whether *tumah b'chiburin* is considered direct contact.

## The Foot Bone's Connected to the Leg Bone

Ohalot (1:8)  
Yehuda Gottlieb

The last *Mishnah* in the first *perek* of *Ohalot* lists the 248 limbs that form the human anatomy. It is stated that all these limbs, when detached, transmit *tumah* in an *Ohel*.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* asks an interesting question – although the *Mishnah* states that the body is made up of 248 limbs, and the *Gemara* in *Bechorot* (45a) states that the disciples boiled the corpse of a harlot and discovered that a man does indeed have 248 limbs, there had been anatomy studies that put forward that there was actually less than this amount! How does this scientific, observable fact, reconcile with the *Mishnah*'s view?

The *Tifferet Yisrael* answers that in actual fact the number quoted in the *Mishnah*, and that put forward by anatomy experts are referring to two different things. He states that one cannot doubt the accuracy of the *Mishnah*, since it was brought by the Sage's who had *ruach Hashem* dwell amongst them. He explains the discrepancy by stating that the Sage's definition of what constitutes a bone and a limb does not necessarily correlate with that which is defined by the 'experts'. The *Tifferet Yisrael* proves this point from the fact that the *Gemara* itself has a doubt whether those that had boiled the harlot's body had counted the limbs correctly. He says, if this is the case, then it must mean that those who studied anatomy could also have defined bones in a different way and therefore come to a different number to the *Chachamim*.

The *Encyclopaedia Talmudit* explains further that the *Mishnah* and anatomy experts are not referring to the same person. He states a fundamental principle that as a person grows and develops, their bones fuse together. As a baby and a young child, a person does not have a large number of bones as they are quite

soft and still forming. By the time a person reaches approximately 16-17 years old, the bones will have solidified and hardened and have separated to a degree. As a person grows toward adulthood these hardened bones will fuse and join together. Therefore, the *Mishnah* which mentions the 248 bones in a person is referring to the hard, separated bones that are found in a teenage body. However, the anatomy experts who mention that a person has a lot less bones is actually referring to bones found in an adult, fully grown body.

It is interesting to note that the same *Gemara* in *Bechorot* states that women actually have 252 limbs. This seems to be inconsistent with our *Mishnah*. The *Gemara* there answers that although women do in fact have 252 limbs, nonetheless, only 248 of these actually transmit *tumah*.

The *Shulchan Aruch* (O.C 61:3) writes that *Kriyat Shema* has 245 words, and there is a preference to say 248 words. Therefore, when davening with a *minyan* the *Chazzan* should repeat the last three words of the third paragraph, and when davening alone the words “*Kel Melech Ne’eman*” should be said before beginning *Shema*. This brings the total words of the *Shema* to 248 and thus corresponds to the number of limbs in a person’s body. The *Da’as Zekeinim M’Baalei HaTosfos* says that those who say the 248 words of *Kriyas Shema* properly will merit to having Hashem Himself guarding over his 248 limbs. *Kivyachol*, *Hashem* says, “You guard My possessions (the *mitzvos*), and I will guard your possessions (your 248 limbs).”

If this is the case, the rebbi of the *Ramban*, *Rabbeinu Yehuda ben Yakar*<sup>38</sup>, asks how women (who have 252 limbs) will be able to receive this merit. The *Gemara* above mentions that the extra limbs that a woman has are described as “two doors and two door pivots”. Since obviously a door pivot are always connected to the

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<sup>38</sup> *Perush Ri ben Yakar Lehasiddur Tefilot veBrachot Chelek 1*: quoted from *Daf Yomi Digest: Sotah 27*

door, they do not necessarily need to be counted separately, which brings the total limbs down to 250. Additionally, if you exclude the sentence of “*Baruch Shem Kevod...*” *Kriyat Shema* contains 239 words included in which are 11 names of *Hashem*. Each name of Hashem could be counted twice since it represents the name “*Hashem*” and “*Elokim*” and this brings the total to 250. By using this method, women also receive the *zechut* of having *Hashem* guard over their limbs.

## Kli Cheres in the Arubah

Ohalot (5:3-4)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* revisits a debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* where the latter finally acquiesced (5:3-4). The *Mishnah* here deals with a case where a complete *kli cheres* (earthenware utensil) is filling an *arubah* (hole between two floors in a house). Since a *kli cheres* is not susceptible to *tumah* on its outer face, it can complete the *ohel* between the two floors. Consequently everything in the upper storey is protected from *tumat met* (*tumah* origination from a corpse) if a corpse was found in the bottom floor. This was indeed the original position of *Beit Hillel*. *Beit Shammai* however argued that only those items that cannot be purified from *tumah* (food, drink and *klei cheres*) are *tahor*; the rest however would be *tameh*.

The *Mishnah* in *Eduyot* (1:14) explains this debate (albeit referring to a different case):

...*Beit Hillel* asked [*Beit Shammai*], why? *Beit Shammai* explained, because [the utensils] of an *Am Ha'aretz* (one not particular with the law of *tumah* and *taharah*) are [presumed] *tameh*, and *tameh* utensils cannot act as a [protective] barrier. *Beit Hillel* asked, but you have ruled that the food and drink contents are *tahor*! *Beit Shammai* responded, when we made the food and drink *tahor* we made it *tahor* for him, but when you made the utensils *tahor* you made it *tahor* for him and you!

How do we understand the above discussion?

A *Beraita* brought in *Gemara Chagigah* (22b) elaborates further:

*R' Yehoshua* said, [I am at a loss] at the words of *Beit Shammai*. How can the jug be *tameh* and its contents *tahor*? ...A student of *Beit Shammai* responded... Does a *tameh kli* protect or not? He answered, it does not. [The student] asked, are the utensils of an *Am Ha'aretz* *tameh* or *tahor*? He answered *tameh*. [The student] continued, if you tell him he is *tameh* will he listen to you?

Furthermore, if you say his utensils are *tameh*, he will respond that his are *tahor* and yours are *tameh*.

*Rashi* explains the above concern as follows. The *Am Ha'aretz* is likely to listen if the decree that his utensils are presumed *tameh* is not overly harsh. Where the utensil can be immersed in a *mikvah* the effort is manageable. However if, because of a presumption that the *kli* blocking the *arubah* is *tameh*, everything is declared *tameh*, the *Am Ha'aretz* will not listen at all.

The *Tosfot* disagrees, particularly as there are methods of purifying liquids as well (*hashaka*). He therefore explains that a *Chaver* (one who is particular with the law of *tumah* and *tahara*) would only borrow *keilim* for an *Am Ha'aretz* that can be purified. The reason being that the *Chaver* assumes the all the utensils are *tameh* and will only borrow those that he can purify prior to using for his own food.

The *Bartenura* explains further that an *Am Ha'aretz* does not think that his utensils are *tameh*. Consequently, in our case, if the *Am Ha'aretz* subsequently would lend one of the utensil from the attic, that utensil would be *tameh met* and require the seven day purification process. Were it not for this rule, the *Am Ha'aretz* would assume that all the utensils in the second floor were certainly not exposed to *tumat met*. The *Chaver* would then borrow the utensil and use them without performing the full purification for *tumat met*. The *Siach Yitzchak* continues, that as a result of this law, it would become wide spread and the *Am Ha'aretz* would sees that *Chaver* also purifies for his utensil found in a similar situation from *tumat met*. Consequently he would follow suit, particular as one is more conscious of, and particular about *tumat met* than other forms of *tumah*

These two explanations can perhaps be behind another debate: Does this law apply only to the *kli* of an *Am Ha'aretz* that covers the *arubah* or to anyone's *kli*? If the reason for the distinction it to make the ruling that his utensils are presumed *tameh* more

acceptable (*Rashi*) then perhaps it make sense that it applies to a case involving his utensil only. However according to the second explanation (*Tosfot*) there is a necessity for the ruling to be wide reaching for it to have the desired impact, consequently it must apply to everyone.

## The spread of Tumah

Ohalot (7:3)

Allon Ledder

The *Mishnah* (7:3) discusses the spread of *tumah* from a corpse in a house with more than one exit. If the exits contain recessed doors, then the areas under the lintels are treated as part of the house and the *tumah* spreads to utensils that are situated in these doorways. If the doors are closed, *tumah* will still be transmitted, but only through the exit through which the corpse will be removed. If it is not yet known which exit will be used, *tumah* will be transmitted to utensils in all of the exits. This principle is known as *sof tumah latzeit*.

When the decision is made to use a particular exit, any other closed exits will no longer transmit *tumah*. However, *Beit Shammai* say that this principle only applies if this decision is made before the person dies. If it is made after the person dies, the doorways remain *tamei*. The only way the *tamei* status can be removed is if a physical act is done; opening the selected door is such an act (*Bartenura*). According to *Beit Hillel*, the other exits become *tahor* as soon as the decision not to use them as the exit is made, even without an action. If a *tahor* utensil was then placed in one of the other exits, it would remain *tahor*.

A *Mishnah* learnt in the previous *masechet* appears to be relevant to this *machloket*. The *Mishnah* (*Keilim* 25:9) states: “All utensils descend into impurity through intention, but ascend from impurity only through a physical alteration.” The intention to use an object for a particular purpose is sufficient to render it susceptible to *tumah*<sup>39</sup>. However if that intention subsequently changes, the

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<sup>39</sup> The same object can be susceptible to *tumah* or not, depending on the purpose for which the object is to be used. E.g. A ring for use by a person is susceptible to *tumah*. The same ring, if it is for the use of an animal, is not susceptible to *tumah*.

object remains susceptible to *tumah*. There must be a physical alteration to remove the susceptibility to *tumah*. Until a physical alteration is made, we are concerned that the person might change their mind (*Mishnah Achronah* to *Keilim* 27:4).

It seems that *Beit Shammai* applies the same principle to the case of our *Mishnah*. Until the person performs an action such as opening the door, *Beit Shammai* is concerned that the person will change his mind. *Beit Hillel*, on the other hand, is not concerned that the person will change his mind. As soon as the person decides to use a particular exit to remove the corpse, the *tamei* status is removed from the other exits. It follows that the *machloket* between *Beit Hillel* and *Beit Shammai* only relates to the time at which the *tamei* status is removed from the other exits. According to *Beit Hillel*, this occurs when the decision is made to use a particular exit. According to *Beit Shammai*, this occurs when the selected door is actually opened.

However, the *Gemara* (*Beitzah* 10a) explains that the *machloket* between *Beit Hillel* and *Beit Shammai* may go even further. Apparently, the *machloket* might also concern the principle of *breirah* (retroactive clarification) (*Rashi*). The *Gemara* discusses the status of a utensil placed in a doorway before the decision was made to use another doorway. When the decision is made to use another doorway, does the utensil remain *tamei*, or does it become retroactively *tahor*? According to *Beit Shammai* the principle, of *breirah* is not valid. The utensils in the doorways become *tamei* at the moment of death and they remain *tamei* even after the decision is made to use another doorway.

The *Gemara* gives two interpretations of *Beit Hillel's* opinion:

- (a) According to *Rabbah* and *R' Oshaya*, *Beit Hillel* holds that the decision to remove the corpse through a particular door makes the other exits *tahor*, but only from that time on. Utensils that were already in the other doorways before the decision is made remain *tamei*. This would accord with the ruling of *Beit Shammai* apart from the difference as to what

constitutes a sufficient trigger to change the status of the doorways not chosen for the corpse's exit.

- (b) According to *Rava*, *Beit Hillel* holds that the decision to remove the corpse through a particular door makes the other doorways *tahor* retroactively. *Rava* interprets this to mean that utensils that are in the other doorways also become *tahor* at the time the decision is made, based on the principle of *breirah*.

In general, whether or not *breirah* is a valid principle is a *machloket* raised in a number of places in the *Gemara*. The above analysis suggests that *Beit Shammai* does not accept the principle of *breirah* while according to *Rava*, *Beit Hillel* accepts the principle of *breirah* as valid. According to *Rabbah* and *R' Oshaya* it would appear that both *Beit Hillel* and *Beit Shammai* agree that the principle of *breirah* is not valid, at least in this instance.

## The spread of Tumah

### Ohalot (9:i)

From Introduction to ninth perek - Rabbi Pinchas Kehati (Trans.)

The ninth perek of *Ohalot* discusses various *halachot* that relates to a *kaveret* (a ‘beehive’) and *ohalot*. The commentators have great difficulty in explaining this *perek*, due to a number of puzzling facets and their interpretations have been strained and even challenged by other commentators.

The main problem of this chapter is its subject –the *kaveret*. Most commentators identify the *kaveret* in this chapter with a regular beehive, made of wood or reeds. However, since it is clear from the context that the hive of the first *Mishnah* is not susceptible to impurity, they refer to an ‘oversized’ hive – i.e. having a capacity of at least 40 *seah* of liquid. This, however, does not explain the chapter satisfactorily, and entails several contradictions toward the end of the *perek*. Accordingly, *Raavad* explains that the hive of our chapter is not ‘oversized’ but rather made of earthenware (which is not susceptible through its exterior). This interpretation too is challenged by the *Mishnah Achrona*.

The *Eliyahu Rabbah* agrees with most commentators that the hive is made of wood, but rejects the idea that it has a capacity of forty *seah*, since we have learnt that an oversized utensil screens against impurity like an *ohel* (8:1), whereas our chapter stipulates that the hive is considered a utensil that does not screen against impurity, unless it is broken. He attributes the hive’s insusceptibility to the many bee holes perforating it, but *Ma’ayanei Yehoshua* notes several difficult points in the chapter that cannot be explained in this way.

*Ma’ayanei Yehoshua* however, has a unique interpretation of our chapter, based on the *Tosefta*, and following well-defined rules grounded in the *Mishnah*, *Tosefta*, *Talmud* and Classic

Commentaries. He defines the hive as a utensil designed to keep bees and produce honey, which is hollow and cylindrical with covers at either end – a permanent fixed cover on the bottom (the ‘base’) and a loose removable cover on the top (the ‘mouth’). A hive may be of straw or reeds, or of wood, or of mud moulded into shape and dried in the sun. Mud hives are not baked in a kiln (which would render them earthenware), as they are not designed to be exposed to fire, nor used to store items that would seep through: rather, they are what the *Mishnah* calls ‘utensils made of clay’ (*klei adama*) which are unsusceptible to impurity.

Whenever a *Mishnah* refers to a hive made of straw or reeds, it will state this explicitly. Thus when the first *Mishnah* refers to a ‘hive’ without qualifying terms, it must be made of wood (if the context indicates a susceptible hive) or mud (if not susceptible), and since the hives of our chapter are all unsusceptible, they must be made of mud (or perhaps stone). Moreover, the *Mishnah* must be referring to a hive smaller than 40 *seah*, since a larger hive would be considered a tent (as per *Eliyahu Raba* above). When we encounter a hive with a capacity of larger than 40 *seah*, it will be called out explicitly in the *Mishnah* (as in *Mishnah* 12).

Some modern commentators agree with *Ma’ayanei Yehoshua* that the hive here is made of mud, but insist that the word *kaveret* need not refer to an actual beehive, but to a large basket resembling a hive, used to store grain in the home.

## Levud for Tumah

### Ohalot (10:2)

### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (10:2) discusses a case where *tumah* (originating from a corpse) is placed entirely beneath a hatch or opening in the ceiling (*arubah*) of a house that is less than a *tephach* wide. The ruling given is that anything inside that house remains *tahor* while anything vertically in line with that *tumah* is *tameh*.

The *Bartenura* notes that the *Mishnah* teaches that the principle of *levud* does not apply to the laws of *tumah* “even if it is less than a *tephach*”. One may recall that the principle of *levud* (*Nachal Nove’ah Zeraim*, “*Levud*”) is where a space that is less than three *tephachim* is considered filled in. It may be surprising then that the *Bartenura* notes that here *levud* does not apply for a space “even less than a *tephach*”. Certainly it should have been enough to just state that *levud* does not apply to *tumah*. It is made particularly more difficult since the previous *Mishnah* taught a similar law with an *arubah* that was the size of a *tephach* and there the *Bartenura* makes no mention of *levud*.

The *Mishnah Achrona* answers this question. First however, we shall bring the opinion of the *Ritva* (*Sukkah* 18a). The *Ritva* explains that *Torah* made one *tephach* for the laws of *tumah* (which is the minimum measure for *tumat met* to transfer between rooms) equivalent to the three *tephachim* for the laws of partitions. Indeed this is also the understanding of the *Mishnah Achrona*. Consequently the novelty is not that *levud* does not apply to the laws of *tumah* for an *arubah* the size of a *tephach*; it could never anyway just as *levud* could not apply for a space greater than three *tephachim*. The novelty is that it does not apply even for a space less than a *tephach*.

The *Mishnah Achrona* brings a proof that this is indeed the position of the *Bartenura*. Earlier (4:1) we learnt about a case of a *migdal* (chest) that was placed in a house such that the space between it and the walls, ceiling and floor was less than a *tephach*. The *Mishnah* ruled that if *tumah* was in the house and *keilim* (utensils) were in the spaces, they would be *tahor* – but only if the spaces were less than a *tephach*. The *Bartenura* there explains that this is because the principle of *levud* applies, thereby making it as if the *keilim* were not in the house. Consequently we find that the limit of *levud* for *tumah* is one *tephach*.

The proof however introduced a difficulty. Why does *levud* apply earlier whereas here it does not? Another important rule found in the *Rama* (*Yoreh Deah* 342:4), answers this question: the principle of *levud* is only applied when it results in a leniency and not stringency.<sup>40</sup> Here, if *levud* applied it would result in the entire house being *tameh* and thus a stringency, where as in the earlier *Mishnah*, *levud* protected those *keilim* from becoming *tameh*.

The *Taz* question the ruling of the *Rama*. If *levud* is applied in the case of a leniency then how could *tumah* ever transfer between rooms where the adjoining hole is a *tephach* in size? The *Mishnah Achronah* answers the question of the *Taz* with the principle already stated in this article. The reason why it does not apply for a *tephach* sized hole for the laws of *tumah* is because such a space is equivalent to three *tephachim*. In other words it is too large for the principle of *levud*. The question only arises for *tumah* when the space is less than a *tephach*.

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<sup>40</sup> There is much discussion on this ruling of the *Rama* which is however beyond the scope of this article. See for example the *Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim* 502:9.

## II

### Ohalot (12:6) Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

In a number of *Mishnayot* discuss the relationship between the circumference of a circle and its diameter is mentioned. In mathematics, this relationship is defined by an irrational constant (3.14159...). The Greek letter *Pi* ( $\pi$ ) has been popularised due to its adoption to represent that value.

Having a mathematic and engineering background, the adoption of three in the *Mishnah* and *Gemara* had been at first surprising. Matters are further complicated as the *Gemara* (*Eirubin* 14a) brings a *pasuk* from *Melachim* (I 7:23) in support of this position:

And [*Shlomo HaMelech*] made the pool of cast metal ten *amot* from rim to rim circular all around and five *amot* was its height and a line of thirty *amot* would encircle it all around.

The *Rambam* (*Eirubin* 1:5) notes that *Pi* is irrational and cannot be known. He adds that in his time  $\frac{22}{7}$  (3.1429...) was the well accepted approximation. The *Rambam* explains that since the number is irrational the *Chachamim* took a large figure, the nearest integer, as a satisfactory approximation.

In this manner, the *Rosh* (*Teshovot* 2:19) answered the *Rashba*'s question of why it was necessary to bring a *pasuk* in support of a matter than can be solved scientifically. He explains that the source was required to teach that an approximation of three is sufficient for legal matters. In fact the *Aruch HaShulchan* (*Orach Chaim* 363:22) rules that this is indeed a divine decree that three is used for all legal questions.

Conversely, the *Tashbetz* (1:165) explains that the *Chachamim* did have accurate approximations and used them for practical applications. Nonetheless they followed the principle that “One should always teach his student in a brief manner” (*Pesachim* 3b) and the approximation of three achieved this end.

A person shared with me an insight in the name of the Vilna Gaon on this issue. The source brought for the relationship being three is from the *Yam Shel Shlomo*; a ‘sea’ that was one of the utensils constructed by *Shlomo HaMelech* in the *Beit Ha’Mikdash*. It is described in two places in *Tanach*: in *Melachim* (1 7:23) and *Divrei Ha’Yamim* (2 4:2). In *Melachim* however there appears to be a ‘spelling mistake’ - the word for line (קָר) is written קוה. In other words the line that is taken and multiplied by three, as stated in the *pasuk*, is distorted. Taking the numerical value (*gematria*) of קוה (111) and dividing by the numerical value of קו (106) and then multiply by three as stated, the result is 3.141509... far more accurate than  $\frac{22}{7}$  that I grew up with!<sup>41</sup>

To be honest I do not remember the conclusion and I have since heard different endings from the above exercise. Nonetheless, it appears to support everything stated above. The *Navi* is conveying that the value 3 is suitable for all intents and purpose – whether for teaching alone or even practical applications. Nonetheless we find, albeit encoded, a far more accurate value that aligns so perfectly with the meaning of the text. It appears to be recognition that three, or any other such value adopted for practical purpose, is just an approximation.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Note that engineers use approximation to four or five decimal place.

<sup>42</sup> As an aside the Guinness record for reciting the digits of Pi from memory is 67,890 taking him 24 hours and 4 minutes. *Baruch sh’natan Torah l’amo Yisrael!*

## Ziz and Kaneh

### Ohalot (14:3)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

At this stage in our learning we should be familiar with the idea that for *tumah* to be transferred under an *ohel*, the covering must be at least a *tephach* by *tephach* in area. In some situations the *Chachamim* instituted that *tumah* may be transferred under spaces of less than these dimensions. One such example was that of a *ziz*.<sup>43</sup> The *Mishnah* (14:1) taught that a projection over a doorway can sometimes spread *tumah* into a house, provided that two conditions are met. The first is that it is structured in a manner that acts to protect the house (*panav l'mata*). The second is that it is within twelve *tephachim* above<sup>44</sup> the door.

There is a debate in the *Mishnah* (14:3) regarding whether a reed that is placed over a doorway has the same height restriction. *R' Yehoshua* explains that a reed is treated more harshly and therefore no height restriction applies enabling *tumah* to always be transferred, even if the reed is one hundred *amot* above the door. *R' Yochanan ben Nuri* however reasons that the reed should not be treated any harsher than the case of the *ziz*. The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that since the law applying to the *ziz* is a rabbinic enactment, there is no reason to add an extra ruling or stringency above it.

Even though *halacha* agrees with the position of *R' Yochanan ben Nuri*, analysing the position of *R' Yehoshua* will help to better understand the initial decree regarding the *ziz*. We therefore ask, why does *R' Yehoshua* rule that even if the reed is placed higher than twelve *tephachim* above the door, can it still transfer *tumah* if its width is less than a *tephach*?

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<sup>43</sup> Some *mefarshim* understand that this measure is *halacha l'moshe mi'sinai*.

<sup>44</sup> See the *Rambam* who rules that this measurement is from the ground.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that since the reed is a movable item and could be moved closer to the door, *R' Yehoshua* felt it was necessary to place a further decree in that case. Importantly, the concern is that the reed could be moved and placed within twelve *tephachim*. In other words the only real reason for the *gezeirot* concerning the reed and *ziz* is for if and when they are situated in that region. This understanding fits with the earlier explanation of the *Tifferet Yisrael* that the original decree for the *ziz* is because when it is within twelve *tephachim* the overhang serves [to protect] the house. Consequently the *Chachamim* considered it an extension of the house's roof. As *Kehati* adds, when above twelve *tephachim* it no longer serves a functional purpose.

The *Mishnah Achrona* however explains that the decree only applied where the overhang was placed intentionally to protect the house. The limit of twelve *tephachim* was made because this was the region in which such protective overhangs were constructed. Protrusions any higher may simply be remnants of the original construction. The difference with the case of the reed, according to *R' Yehoshua*, is that it can be readily removed. Consequently, because it has still not been removed, it is evident that it was intentionally placed there.

Perhaps then we can glean two different understanding of the ruling by the *ziz* that overhangs the doorway. Either because it serves a functional purpose or alternatively because it is perceived as being constructed purposefully for the house, that it is considered to be an extension of it.

## ***Tumah* Behind a Partition**

Ohalot (15:4)

**Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier**

The *Mishnah* (15:4) teaches:

If a [one-roomed] house was portioned off with boards or curtains, from the side [near the wall] or from the roof, and there is *tumah* in the house, *keilim* in the partitioned area are *tahor*. If *tumah* is found in the partitioned area (*chatzatz*), the house is *tameh*.

Examples of the case in the *Mishnah* are the false wall or lowered ceiling, the construction of which leaves a void. The boards act as a barrier, effectively make the *keilim* in the void as if they were in a separate *ohel*. Consequently, it is understood that if *tumah*<sup>45</sup> is found in the house, those *keilim* remain *tahor*. Why however, if the situation is reversed and the *tumah* is in the void and *keilim* are in the house, are the *keilim* *tameh*?

The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that the reason the contents of the house are *tameh* is due to the principle of *sofa tumah l'tzeit* - "the *tumah* will eventually leave". To explain, we have seen a number of times the idea that if *tumah*'s only exit path is via other rooms, even if the *tumah* is still enclosed in its current location, the contents of those room is *tameh*. Consequently in this case, the house is in only exit path for the *tumah* and is therefore *tameh*.

The *Bartenura* however explains that the reason why the house is *tameh* is because this barrier can only prevent *tumah* from entering, but not from entering. The comparison made is to case of a sealed earthenware utensil (*tzamid patil*). In such a case if the house contains *tumah* then the contents of the earthenware utensil remains *tahor*. However, if the utensil contained *tumah*, the entire house would be *tameh*.

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<sup>45</sup> Note: the term *tumah* in this article refers to *tumah* originating from a corpse.

The *Mishnah Achrona* claims that the comparison made by the *Bartenura* should not alarm. He explains that the principle of *sofa tumah l'tzeit* is learnt from the law of *tzamid patil*. The concept of the latter – that since there is no other escape the *tumah* passes through the house – acts as the basis for the former.

The *Rambam* however categorically states that an *ohel* inside an *ohel* that contains a corpse functions in the same way as *tzamid*. In other words, it can protect from *tumah* coming in but not going out. On this the *Ra'avad* argues on the *Rambam* that an internal *ohel* cannot protect *tumah* from leaving only when it itself is susceptible to *tumah* or in the case of *sofa tumah l'tzeit*. Consequently, it would appear that the *Rambam* holds that the internal *ohel* cannot protect even if there is another exit path.<sup>46</sup>

How do we understand the position of the *Rambam*? Indeed in a number of cases we have seen that an *ohel* inside or over an *ohel ha'met* can serve to stop *tumah* spreading<sup>47</sup>. The *Sidrei Taharot*, citing *Rashi*, draws a distinction between this case and others. Here the boards have been constructed in a temporary manner, for example, as a decoration. Consequently the resulting *ohel* is defined as an *ohel arai*. With the distinction drawn, what is the logic?

R' Chaim Brisker (*al HaRambam*) explains that there are two ways *tumah* is prevented from transferring from one *ohel* to the next. The first is that each *ohel* is its own independent area in which *tumah* spreads. Items are only *tameh* if they are found in the same area. The other is that the *ohel* itself protects and contains the *tumah*. In this case since the *chatzatz* is only a temporary *ohel*, we have a principle that *ein ohel arai mevatel ohel keva* (*Sukkah* 21b). In other words a temporary *ohel* cannot become an independent area when inside a permanent *ohel*. Consequently, in this case (unlike others studied) the first method

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<sup>46</sup> See the *Sidrei Taharot*.

<sup>47</sup> See for example chapters 9 and 10.

does not apply. Only the second method, in which the *ohel* must protect, is applicable and in such a case the *ohel* acts like a *tzamid patil* only preventing *tumah* entering but not exiting.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Please see *R' Chaim* inside, as he develops this idea much further considering additional complexities.

## Beit Ha'pras Ohalot (17-18) Yehuda Gottlieb

In chapters seventeen and eighteen of *Masechet Ohalot* we are introduced to the concept of a *Beit Ha'pras*. The *Beit Ha'pras* is a field which has a *safek* of *tumat met* (for which one usually becomes *tameh* for seven days).

The *Beit Ha'pras* is so called due to the fact that the *tumah* has spread throughout the field. The term *pores* is used in *Sefer Shemot* (40:19) where it indicates “*vayifros et HaOhel*” where *Hashem* spread the *Ohel Moed*. The *Tosafot* (*Niddah* 87a) mentions two other interpretations of the name. A first interpretation states that the origin of *Beit Ha'pras* comes from the word “*perusah*” which is something that is broken or sliced. This is due to the fact that the bones of the dead person are broken into fragments as they are moved around by either people’s feet or by farming machinery. The second interpretation is related to the word “*parsah*” which is usually related to a measure of distance. This interpretation is based on the fact that people prevent themselves from walking any distance within this field due to its doubtful status with regards to *tumah*.

There are three different types of *Beit Ha'pras* mentioned in our *Masechet*

1. A field in which a grave was ploughed.
2. A field in which there is a grave, but its location is unknown.
3. *Sadeh Buchin* (literally field of crying) – a field adjacent to the cemetery where the bereaved eulogized the deceased.

The *Rambam* and majority of *mefarshim* accept that in general the term *Beit Ha'pras* refers to the first type. Supporting this is the fact that only the case of a field in which a grave was ploughed

aligns with all three interpretations of the word ‘*Beit Ha’pras*’ mentioned above.

The *Rambam* also states in his *Peirush Ha’Mishnayot* that it is only the first two categories of *Beit Ha’pras* that are classified as ‘impure’ while the third category is ‘*tahor*’. The reason behind this is that in these cases, no one can actually locate a specific grave in the field. Yet the restrictions relating to the presence of the dead cannot be ignored only due to the fact that we do not have the knowledge of where it is. In the first case, the grave does not exist as a unit any longer, however there may be bits and pieces of the corpse, previously buried in the now ploughed grave, which may exist in large enough quantities to contaminate. In the second case, the grave is there, only we don’t know exactly where.

In the third category however, there is no certainty that a dead person ever existed there at all. This field was only used as a spot to eulogize the dead, and according to the *Rambam* does not contaminate and it is not deemed impure at all. Moreover, this is so to the extent that even sacrificial meat, such as the *Korban Pesach*, which must be eaten in a state of purity (and which itself also must be totally free of *tumah* contamination) can be prepared in an oven made of dried mud taken from such a field (see *Ohalot Perek 18* and *Moed Katan 5b*).

The question arises as to whether a *Beit Ha’pras* exists in *Chutz La’aretz*. The *Tosefta* in *perek 18* of *Ohalot* answers that this *din* does not apply outside the land of Israel. There are differing interpretations as to why this is so. There are those that say, that a *Beit Ha’pras* cannot exist in *Chutz La’aretz* because one of the reasons for the *gezeirah* of a *Beit Ha’pras* is because we are primarily worried about the contamination of *Trumah* and *Maaser*. Since these gifts do not apply outside the land of Israel, there is no need to be concerned for a *Beit Ha’pras*.

However, the *Kesef Mishneh* interprets the *Tosefta* in a different manner. He writes that when it states that there is no *Tumah* in *Chutz La'aretz* he means to say that there is no *remedy* for a *Beit Ha'pras* in *Chutz La'aretz*. That is – there is a concept of a *Beit Ha'pras* outside of Israel, however, once it has been deemed so, there is no way to purify it.

## Negaim

### Inspecting a *Metzora* on Sunday

Negaim (1:4)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*Masechet Negaim* deals with the identification and treatment of *tzara'at* affecting the body, clothing and houses. *Tzara'at* was no ordinary affliction. Its cause did not have a scientific reason, and its healing process, at the very least, would today be considered alternative. The reason for this difference is despite the illness having a physical manifestation, the cause and remedy were both spiritual.

One would only become a *metzora* with the *kohen's* inspection and declaration that he is indeed a *metzora*. In some cases a *metzora* can be subjected to two, seven day quarantines; referred to as a *metzora musgar*. At the end of each seven day period (including the first day of inspection) the *metzora* is reassessed and it is determined whether the *metzora* is *tahor*, *tameh* or must undergo another seven days of quarantine.

The *Mishnah* (1:4) stated a concern which then takes the form of debate. The *Chachamim* ruled that judgements (*dinim*) cannot be performed on *Shabbat* out of concern that those ruling would write the details of the judgement down, thus violating a prohibition of *Shabbat*. The *Bartenura* explains that the inspection of a person suspected of being a *metzora* falls under this prohibition. The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that this is because the inspection requires a high level of expertise and weighted analysis.

While the above law is accepted by all, the debate is about whether the initial inspection can be performed on a Sunday or Monday. The reason is that potentially the inspections after the first or second seven day quarantines could fall on *Shabbat*. *R'*

*Channinah segan Ha'Kohanim* rules that the initial inspection cannot be performed on Sunday and Monday so as to prevent the potential conflict. Since the timing of the review being after seven days is *Torah* law, while the initial inspection is not, that potential conflict must be avoided.<sup>49</sup> *R' Akiva* however rules that the initial inspection is not delayed and nevertheless performed on Sunday and Monday. This is despite the potential future conflict. In the case that a subsequent inspection falls on *Shabbat* then that inspection will be pushed off till after *Shabbat*. The *Mishnah Achronah* explains, in his second answer, that since at present there is no current need there is no justification for delay.

In the first answer brought by the *Mishnah Achronah*, he explains that this debate is not based on logic alone but hinges on something else. Later we will learn (3:2) that if a groom develops a *nega*, his initial inspection is not performed till after the festive week – the first week of marriage. Similar the initial inspection of anyone that develops a *nega* during one of the three festivals is also delayed till after the festival. The *Gemara (Moed Katan 7b)* brings a *Beraita* that records a debate regarding this law. *R' Yehuda* maintains that it is derived from the *pasuk* that states “On the day that it is seen [on the *metzorah*]” implies that there are particular day that the *nega* is not seen, i.e. in the event of a *mitzvah*. *Rebbi* argues that such a derivation is unnecessary, for the *pasuk* already stated that when the *kohen* came to inspect a *nega* on a house, “The *kohen* shall instruct them to empty the house [of its contents]... so that everything in the house should not become *tameh* [when he declares it so]”. *Rebbi* explains that if for mundane matters the inspection can be delayed then certainly this would be the case for the sake of a *mitzvah* (e.g. *simchat yom tov*). The *Gemara* explains that the practical difference between the positions of *R' Yehuda* and *Rebbi* is whether the initial

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<sup>49</sup> The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that while it is true that the *Chachamim* have the ability to overrule *Torah* law when instructing one to take no action (*shav ve'al ta'aseh*), nonetheless *R' Channinah* maintains that this licence should not be used about *lechatchila*.

inspection can only be delayed only for a *mitzvah* or for other matters as well (*davar reshut*).

The *Mishnah Achronah* explains that this is indeed the debate in our *Mishnah* as well. He explains that delaying the initial inspection from occurring on a Sunday would be considered a *davar reshut* since currently there is no *mitzvah*-need. *R' Channinah* maintains that even for a *davar reshut* one can delay and consequently rules that the inspection must be pushed off till Tuesday. *R' Akiva* on the other hand insists that a *mitzvah* driven reason is the only basis for delay and therefore the initial inspection must be performed.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> The *Mishnah Achronah* however cites the *Rambam* who rules like *R' Akiva* that initial inspections can be performed on any day (except *Shabbat* and *Yom Tov*), yet cites the explanation of *Rebbi* for delaying the inspection of a groom. The question is left for further thought.

## *Tzara'at* Covering the Body

Negaim (4:1-3)

Jeremy Herz

The first three *mishnayot* of the fourth *perek* of *Masechet Negaim* compare and contrast the three signs (*simanim*) of skin blemishes (נגעי עור הבשר) which constitute *tzara'at*. Skin blemishes exist with the appearance of either two white hairs in the blemish; live skin in the blemish; or spreading of the blemish. The Torah states that this blemish must be white, and the beginning of the *masechet* lists four shades of white that would render the blemish *tzara'at*.

The *Torah* also articulates a procedure to be undertaken by a *kohen* in assessing whether the blemish is indeed *tzara'at*.<sup>51</sup> Upon initial viewing, a *kohen* may immediately determine that the blemish is *tzara'at* if there are two white hairs or live skin inside the blemish. If neither of these symptoms exists, the *kohen* exiles the potential *tzarua* and returns after a week. If either of the aforementioned symptoms has manifested, the *kohen* deems the blemish *tzara'at*. Alternatively, if the blemish has increased in size or become whiter, it is deemed *tzara'at*. If it appears exactly the same as the week before, the *kohen* leaves the person in exile for a further week, at the conclusion of which the same procedure is followed. The only difference at the end of week two is that if none of the three signs have manifested, the person is considered *tahor* and allowed back into society.

If the person is in fact a *tzarua* (someone afflicted with *tzara'at*), he must wait until the symptoms pass before he can bring the necessary *korbanot* and become pure. The only exception to this rule with regard to these three signs is when the blemish spreads over the entire body of the person. In this case, the *tzarua* is

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<sup>51</sup> The procedure for determination of the status of the blemish differs between *tzara'at* of a house, clothing and human. See *Vayikra* 13, 14.

declared *tahor*.<sup>52</sup> The *Mishnayot* in *Negaim* (4:1-2) explicitly qualify this as a characteristic of the ‘spreading’ *siman* of *tzara’at*, as distinct from the other two. That is, for example, if someone had white hairs all over their body, they would not be considered *tahor*.

Why does this *siman tahara* only apply to the ‘spreading’ *siman*? The answer would seem intuitive. The two white hairs that cause *tzara’at* must grow specifically from the blemish. Therefore, it follows that the only way the entire body could be covered with ‘*tzara’at* hair’ would be if the whole body is afflicted with the blemish. Were this to be the case, the very fact that the blemish envelops the entire skin would suffice to make the *tzarua tahor* anyway.<sup>53</sup> In the case of the *siman* of live skin in the blemish, the very presence of live skin means that the body could not be completely covered in a blemish, which is the basis of the *tahara*.

On a philosophical level we may ask why when a *tzarua* is completely covered by *tzara’at* he is deemed *tahor*, whilst when he is partially covered he is *tameh*. *R’ Bachya* explains that this is indeed unintuitive, and is an example of a *chok* – a *mitzvah* unintelligible to the limited human psyche.

*Rav Hirsch* posits that the *Torah* has lost hope for this *tzarua*. *Tzara’at* is an affliction caused by a spiritual shortcoming, *lashon hara*. When there is only partial *tzara’at*, the person is isolated and left to reflect on the actions which have caused this malady. It is assumed that the *tzara’at* will be a wakeup call for him to change his ways. But once the person is completely covered, the *Torah* purifies the person and sends him back into society, as it is evident that this individual is utterly indifferent to his moral pitfalls, and no amount of segregation will coerce him into changing.

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<sup>52</sup> *Vayikra* 13:12-13.

<sup>53</sup> If these were white hairs that did not sprout from a blemish, then in any case they would not cause *tzara’at*.

In diametric opposition, the *Chafetz Chaim* suggests that partial *tzara'at* may lead the *tzarua* to think that he incidentally spoke *lashon hara* and he has no fundamental problem to set right. Therefore, the Torah sends him into isolation to notify him that indeed he must improve his ways. However, the engulfed *tzarua* recognises on his own accord that he has serious issues to remedy, and will naturally do *teshuva*.

*Ibn Ezra* seems to go one step further. It is not that the full covering of *tzara'at* will spur the *tzarua* to mend his ways, but rather that he has already undertaken serious *cheshbon nefesh* during his time in exile,<sup>54</sup> and this has allowed him to completely 'sweat out' the 'virus' (i.e. *lashon hara*) which has caused the *tzara'at*. The spiritually defective *lashon hara* pent up in his soul has transformed itself into a physical manifestation, *tzara'at*, thereby cleansing the soul of the *tzarua* and making him *tahor*.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> A *tzarua* can only become *tahor* when he is completely covered by *tzara'at* if he has already served a period of time in exile.

<sup>55</sup> See *Ibn Ezra*, *Vayikra* 13:13.

## Safek in Negaim

### Negaim (5:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

In the beginning of the fifth *perek* we learnt that “all” cases of doubt involving *negaim* are treated as *tahor*. In the fourth *Mishnah*, the above rule is restricted to only when the *kohen* has not yet ruled that the person is a *metzora* *muchlat* (“confirmed *metzora*”). The following example is brought to illustrate:

...Two people that came to the *kohen*, one had a *baheret* the size of a *gris* and the other the size of a *sela*. At the end of the week [of quarantine], one had [a *nega*] the size of a *sela* and the other the size of a *sela*, and it is not know whose *nega* [was the one] that spread; whether [the above two *negaim*] were found on one person or two [different people], [the people in] both [cases] are *tahor*. *R' Akiva* rules that if they were found on one person, he is *tameh* [*muchlat*]; if [the case involved] two people, they are *tahor*.

One must note that the case in the *Mishnah* involves both people being *musgar*. Initially, both were quarantined and both *tameh*. Even though one of the two is now a *metzora* *muchlat* and the other a *metzora* *musgar*, since the *kohen* is not sure who, both are *tahor*. According to the *Chachamim*, this is even if the doubt involves two *negaim* on one person, where clearly one *baheret* has spread on his skin. The *Bartenura* explains that the *pasuk* states, “And if [the *baheret*] spreads on him, and the *kohen* makes **it** (אורו) *tameh*” (*Vayikra* 13:22). From here, the *Chachamim* understand that the *kohen* must know with certainty which *baheret* spread, so that it can be deemed *tahor*.

The above explains why, in the case of the individual, he cannot be made a *metzora* *muchlat*. Why however, does the individual not remain a *metzora* *musgar*? One of the two *negaim* did not

spread, so why does he not remain in quarantine? Where did the *tumah* go?

The *Mishnah Achrona* initially suggests that the entire purpose of *hesger* is in order to clarify whether the person will become *muchlat*. In a situation where the person cannot be made a *muchlat*, the *hesger* is automatically undone. In this case there is a doubt. According to the *Rosh*, even if in the case that involves two people, both *negaim* spread to more than a *sela*, the *Chachamim* would still rule that they are both be *tahor*. This is because the *Chachamim* require certainty with respect to the actual *nega* itself. Consequently since they can never be deemed as a *muchlat*, the *hesger* is annulled.

The *Mishnah Achrona* rejects this suggestion, as we find *R' Akiva's* problem of doubt in the *Mishnah* is not with the *nega*, but with the person. Recall, that he rules that a person is *tameh muchlat* if the doubt is regarding two *negaim* on one person. Nonetheless, regarding a case where the doubt is regarding two *negaim* on two people, even though if both spread he would rule that both are *tameh muchlat*, he rules that both are *tahor*. Consequently the explanation that the *hesger* disappears since neither can reach *hechlet* does not apply.

The *Mishnah Achrona* therefore provides another explanation. After the week of quarantine, since one of the subject's *nega* has spread, the *kohen* needs to rule again for both. The rulings now are not a continuation of the previous ones; rather they are new and the first ones are complete. Since the *kohen* cannot rule on either, they both are *tahor*.

## Hiding the Sin

### Approaching Yom Kippur

### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

One who removes a marker of *tumah* from a *nega* on his body transgresses a negative biblical prohibition. For example, an indication of *tumah* for *tzara'at* found on the skin is the subsequent growth of two white hairs. A person who plucks them from the site has transgressed the prohibition. The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that this prohibition applies to all forms of *negaim*, whether affecting the body, clothes or a house. The *Mishnah Achrona* adds that it even extends to a *baheret* that has not developed one of those indications of *tumah*.

The *Bartenura* explains that the source of this prohibition is the following *pasuk* (*Devarim* 24:9):

Beware of a *tzara'at* affliction, to be very careful and to act; according to everything the *Kohanim*, the *Levi'im*, shall teach you – as I have commanded them – you shall be careful to perform.

The *Ohr Ha'Chaim* notes that this *pasuk*, the source of the prohibition, is immediately followed by the *mitzvah* to remember what *Hashem* did to *Miryam*. Consequently one is reminded that the true source of *tzara'at* is not of physical or medical root, but rather punishment for sins committed – the more famous of those listed being evil speech. Consequently cutting off the indication of *tumah* is clearly not the right path. Rather *teshuva* and improving on the character flaws at its root should rather be sought.

The *Oznayim Le'Torah* comments that the above quoted *pasuk* contains three expressions of caution eluding to the three things that *tzara'at* can affect – skin, clothes and houses. He then cites the *Rambam* who explains that initially *tzara'at* would affect ones house. If he does not get the message and continues to sin, his clothes will be affected and then his body. The *Oznayim Le'Torah*

explains that this is why the *Torah* cautions one to be “very careful” as “if one becomes accustomed to sinning, he no longer sees anything wrong with his actions, making it difficult to repent.”

The above reasoning can explain the *Ramban*’s unique position that expands this prohibition to cover one that simply hides his affliction and does not show it to the *kohen*. The *Ohr Ha’Chaim* explains elsewhere that the realisation that the illness was of a spiritual nature would “force” him to go to the *kohen* to seek guidance in *Teshuva*. Consequently, concealing the problem would also not achieve the intended end.

Finally, perhaps we can understand why this prohibition appears in the *parasha* of *Ki Teitze* and not *Tazriya-Metzora* with the other law regarding the *metzora*. The *parasha* of *Ki Teitze* begins with going out to war. Many understand that the description can also be understood as the war against the *yetzer ha’rah*. The prohibition against concealing or superficially slicing away the physical manifestation of the sin is well suited on this battlefield. For this is exactly what the *yetzer ha’rah* wants. He wants us to glaze over our deficiencies, become accustomed to our sins so that we simply continue on a downward spiral. However, our task is to recognise and repair. Even though there may not be a physical blemish, a “*kohen*” should still be sought for clarifying matters not readily obvious.

## Wisdom in Upholding the Words of *Chachamim*

Negaim (9:3)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

Chapter nine discusses in greater depth *tzara'at* of *shchin* (boils of inflammations) and *michva* (burns). This type of *tzara'at* sighting is only significant if the *nega* appears when the *shchin* or *michva* has already begun to heal and a thin layer of skin has formed over them. This form of *tzara'at* differs from a regular skin affliction in that there are only two indications that the person is a *metzora muchlat* (confirmed *metzora*); the *nega* has spread or two white hairs have appeared.

A fascinating question is asked of *R' Eliezer* in the third *Mishnah*. What is the status of person if a *shchin* the size of a *sela* is found on the palm of a person's hand, containing a *nega* the same size? The problem is that hairs do not grow on the palm of the hand. Furthermore, spreading is only an indication of *tumah* if it spreads within the *shchin* and not onto the skin. In this case the *nega* has nowhere to spread. Consequently neither of the indications of *tumah* can occur, so why should *hesger* (isolation) be required?

*R' Eliezer* responds that it is possible that the *nega* might reduce in size (while greater than the minimum size of a *gris*). As the *nega* has not increase after the week of *hesger* the *kohen* will rule that he is *tahor*. The *nega* may then later spread again which would be an indication of *tumah*;<sup>56</sup> therefore *hesger* is necessary.<sup>57</sup> The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that those that asked knew of this possibility; they nonetheless wanted to know whether a double-doubt – that the *nega* would shrink then grow – still requires *hesger*.

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<sup>56</sup> As spreading after *p'tur* is a sign of *tumah*.

<sup>57</sup> As explained by the *Bartenura*.

This question was followed with an even more complex one. What if the *shchin* was originally the size of a *gris* and contained a *nega* of equal size? In this case, if the *nega* shrunk it would be smaller than the minimum size and if it later grew again it would be treated as a new *nega*. In such a case, spreading is not an indication of *tumah*, as the *nega* must undergo *hesger* first. To this question, *R' Eliezer* responds, "I have not heard."

The *Bartenura* explains that he had learnt from his teachers that in such a case the person must still undergo *hesger*, but *R' Eliezer* had not heard the reason why. The *Tifferet Yisrael* importantly adds that *R' Eliezer* never taught anything that he had not learnt explicitly from his teachers. It was possible that the rule was a *gzeirat ha'katuv*, a decree authorised by the *Torah*, without a readily available logic to explain it.<sup>58</sup>

After gaining permission to speak, *R' Yehuda* offered a solution. He suggested that perhaps another *shchin* would develop next to the first and if the *nega* would spread to that one, then it would be an indication of *tumah*. *R' Eliezer* responded to the suggestion, "You are wise, for you upheld the words of the *Chachamim*."

There are two ways of understanding *R' Eliezer* response, both of which appear in the *Tosfot Yom Tov*. The second explanation provided is that *R' Eliezer* is stating that "You are exceedingly wise as you did not become overwhelmed or confused by the difficulties that stood to dismantle their words." From here we see that upholding the *Chachamim's* rule is the outcome, and the wisdom is the way *R' Yehuda* achieved it.

The first explanation in the *Tosfot Yom Tov* however, is that "you are wiser than had you destroyed their words." One can

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<sup>58</sup> Alternatively the *Mishnah Achrona* adds that perhaps his teachers ruled that *hesger* was required as they were doubtful that the reason provided by *R' Yehuda ben Beteira* was reason for *hesger*. Therefore the ruling might be based on a doubt.

understand that *R' Yehuda ben Beteira*'s wisdom is found in his entire approach. Faced with the difficulty, he was single-minded in find the way of building and not destroying. Finding the truth and not dismissing it. "You upheld the words of the *Chachamim*" was the source of his wisdom.

## ***Tzara'at* on Clothing**

### **Negaim (11:1)**

### **Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier**

Like other forms of *negaim*, *tzara'at* cannot affect the cloths of *goyim* (nations not Jewish). The *Rosh* explains that this is learnt in *Torat Kohanim* from the *pasuk* (*Vayikra* 14:34): "...and I will place *tzara'at* affliction on the house in the land of your dwelling." Even though this *pasuk* refers only to *negaim* affecting houses, nonetheless, all forms of *negaim* are connected to each other in the *pesukim* thereby also excluding the clothes of *goyim*.

The first *Mishnah* of the eleventh *perek* rules that if clothing is purchased from a *goi* and already has the appearance of a *nega*, then it is treated as if the *nega* just appeared while in the property of the *Yisrael*. The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that this rule is novel and a stringency. We have learnt previously (7:1) that if a *nega* appears on the skin of one when its appearance is insignificant, even if the person's status changes, the *nega* remains *tahor*. For example, if a *nega* developed on a *goi* who later converts, the *nega* is *tahor*. In this case however, even though the *nega*'s first appearance is on the clothing of a *goi* and thus *tahor*, once it is acquired by a *Yisrael* it requires *hesger*.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that the difference is that with respect to skin *negaim*, the exemption of those cases listed is because of a problem with the *nega* itself; the areas of skin are not places a *nega* can be *tameh*.<sup>59</sup> In this case however, there was nothing wrong with the garment per se. The only problem is its ownership – an exterior issue. Consequently once its ownership is transferred to a *Yisrael*, the previous days are discounted and it can now begin assessment.

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<sup>59</sup> The *Tosfot Yom Tov* explains that in the case of the *nega* affecting the *goi* prior to conversion, once the *goi* converts he is considered as "a new born child" – a new person.

The *Minchat Chinnuch* raises an interesting question. What would the law be in the case where a garment with a *nega* belonging to a *Yisrael* was already defined as *musgar*, was then sold to a *goi* and then sold to another *Yisrael*?<sup>60</sup> Does the assessment of the garment begin anew? Is it as if the *nega* has only just appears on the newly purchased garment? Or is the garment still *tameh* despite the fact that it was owned by a *goi* during the intermediate period?

We have learnt that with respect to skin *negaim* that if there was an intermediate period where it was considered *tahor* then the law is that it is *tahor*. For example if a *nega* was on one's face and then covered over with a beard, and the subsequently the covering hair fell out, the *nega* would be treated as *tahor*. In this case too, since there is an intermediate period where the *nega* is owned by a *goi* and *tahor*, perhaps the breaks means that the garment must be treated as if it has newly appeared on the garment once purchased.

Nonetheless, the *Minchat Chinnuch* suggests that perhaps there is reason to differentiate. In the case with the skin *nega*, when it was covered over with the hair of the beard, it was no longer defined as a *nega* at all. Furthermore, unlike this case, if a *nega* that appeared in an area already covered by a beard was then exposed, the *nega* would be *tahor*. However, in this case, since in the case of the *Mishnah*, when it comes into possession of an *Yisrael* it is treated as a *nega*, perhaps then here too the intermediate ownership is not important. To explain the doubt using the above logic of the *Tifferet Yisrael*, since it never lost its status of a *nega* – it was only that exterior factor that it was owned by a *goi* that

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<sup>60</sup> The reason that this is only a question for a *begged musgar* and not *begged muchlat* is because since a *begged muchlat* must be burnt, it cannot be sold. Any attempted sale is null and void (see the *Mishnah Achrone*).

deemed it *tahor* – then perhaps it is still *tameh*. The *Minchat Chinnuch* leaves the question unresolved.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> The *Mishnah Achrona* cites a debate in the *Tosefta* regarding a *hesger* garment that is sold to a *goi* and remains in his possession. There the *Chachamim* hold that the garment is *tahor* while *R' Eliezer ben R' Shimon* maintains that it is still in its state of *hesger*. The debate seems to closely follow the two sides of the doubt of the *Minchat Chinnuch*. Nevertheless, while it seems clear that *R' Eliezer ben R' Shimon* would rule in the case of the *Minchat Chinnuch* that the garment is *tameh*, it is not necessarily true that *Chachamim* would rule that the garment is *tahor*. It might be argued that they hold that it is *tahor* only whilst in the possession of the *goi*. Once transferred to the ownership of the *Yisrael* it may return to its state of *tumah* and not restart from the beginning.

## “Something like” *Tzara’at* on Houses

Negaim (12:5)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

...The one to whom the house belongs shall come and declare to the *kohen* saying: Something like an affliction has appeared to me in the house.

*Vayikra* 14:36

The *Mishnah* (12:5) learns from the above *pasuk* that even if one is a *Torah* scholar and knows with certainty that a *nega* has indeed appeared on his house, he should nonetheless not say that a *nega* has appeared, but rather “something like a *nega*” (*k’nega*) has appeared. Why?

The *Tosfot Yom Tov* brings a number of reasons for this law. Firstly, it fits with the general rabbinic instruction that one should train themselves to say “I am not sure” in order to develop the trait of modesty. Secondly, it is inappropriate to rule in front of the *kohen* in the same manner as it is prohibited to rule in front of one’s rabbi or teacher. Thirdly, the owner’s direct statement may end up rushing the *kohen* into ruling that the house is *tameh*. Another reason is that a person stating that a *nega* appeared on his house, implying a *tameh nega*, is tantamount to lying, as it is only *tameh* upon the *kohen*’s declaration. Finally, one should not declare it, so as to “not open the mouth of the *Satan*”, for it is possible that the *nega* would have disappeared prior to the *kohen*’s inspection. The admission of guilt, that a *nega* has appeared, might be incriminating and thus ensure the *nega* stays.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> The *Oznayim La’Torah* adds that another reason is that one is not allowed to incriminate themselves. As we have learnt (2:5) a person bearing a *nega* on his house is considered a *rasha* (due to the sins that brought the *nega* about). Consequently one cannot declare that his house has a *nega*.

The *Tosfot Yom Tov* adds that he understands that the law would apply to other forms of *negaim* as well. Therefore, if one had a *nega* on his clothing or skin, the same wording must be used. The *Tosfot Anshei Shem* argues that the ruling only applies to a house since it is not movable and the *kohen* would need to be invited. Everything else could be brought to the *kohen*.

The *Oznayim Le'Torah* however understands that there is a greater scope to the position of the *Tosfot Yom Tov* rather than the practicalities. He suggests that the homeowner is considered a “*karov*” to himself and therefore unable to testify or rule about his house. Consequently, even though we have learnt that a *Yisrael* can prompt an unlearned *kohen* to declare a *nega* as *tameh* or *tahor*, the homeowner cannot. This, he continues, explains the wording of an earlier *Mishnah* (2:5): “All *negaim* a person” – not kohen - “can inspect, excluding his own.”

The *Ohr Ha'Chaim* explains that the above law is not learnt from the word *k'nega*; had the *Torah* stated only “*nega*” one might have thought that the *kohen* is only summoned when one is certain that a *nega* has appeared. Instead it is learnt from the superfluous word “saying” (*leimor*) that precedes “*k'nega*”. Interestingly the *Torat Kohanim* learns from this superfluous word that the kohen provide the homeowner words of admonition. One opinion is that he should be told that *tzara'at* arise as a result of *lashon ha'rah*. *R' Shimon ben Eliezer* explains that he should be rebuked that *tzara'at* come due to haughtiness. How does the *Torat Kohanim* learn this new ruling from this word?

The *Binyan Ariel* (*Chadrei Torah*) explains that the rebuke comes about through the limit on how the homeowner must approach the *kohen* – stating *k'nega* and not *nega*. Firstly stating *nega* would be (like) speaking *lashon ha'rah* about the stones of his house (see *Erchin* 15a); he is deliberately prevented from doing so. Secondly, as state above, he is prevented from ruling openly in front of the *kohen*, which would indeed be a haughty act.

# Hesger

## Negaim (13:12)

### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

What is *hesger*? We have learnt that the term refers to a specific period or a status of an unconfirmed *metzarah*. For example, regarding a skin *nega*, this term has been applied to one that has a *nega* that has not yet developed two white hairs, a *michya* or spread. But what does *hesger* mean?

Translations offered in previous articles have been isolation or quarantine. Such translations, taken at face value can lead to confusion. Particularly as one *Mishnah* (13:12) discusses ways in which a *metzarah* can come to shul while not causing other congregants to become *tameh*. Clearly the *metzarah* is not literally locked away in this period.<sup>63</sup>

Indeed the *Rosh* explains that it is not the *metzarah* that is quarantined, but rather the *nega* (cited by the *Tur*, *Vayikra* 13:5). The *kohen* draws a mark around the *nega*, which is later used to discern whether the *nega* has spread. Indeed, this explanation fits with the simple wording of the *pasuk* (*Vayikra* 13:5): "... and the *kohen* quarantines the *nega* for seven days."

The *Minchat Chinnuch* however points out that the *Rambam* does not seem to agree with the *Rosh*: "...If the *kohen* who initially inspected the *metzarah* died or fell ill, another *kohen* cannot rule that the *metzarah* is *tameh* due to the *nega* spreading, because only the first *kohen* knows whether the *nega* has spread or not."

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<sup>63</sup> The solution provided by the *Mishnah* is to make partitions 10 *tephachim* high in an area (according to the *Rambam* at least) 4 by 4 *amot*. The *metzarah* should then enter and leave when there is no one else in the shul. The *Trumat HaDeshen* (2:95) explains that the even though everyone would be under one roof, the *tumah* of *tzara'at* is not as extreme as *tumat ha'met* (see for example the end of 13:12). Consequently partitioning off the *metzarah* in the manner would be sufficient to contain the *tumah*.

(*Tumat Tzara'at* 9:4) Had the *nega's* original size been marked, this would not be a problem.

Furthermore the *Ktav Ve'Kaballa* cites the *Mishnah* learnt in the ninth *perek* regarding a case of doubt regarding which of two *negaim* had spread. If they were initially marked, what could possibly be the doubt? The *Ktav Ve'Kaballa* suggests with difficulty that perhaps the *Mishnah* is only referring to a case where the markings on both *negaim* rubbed off.

In contrast to the position of the *Rosh*, *Rashi* (ibid.) explains *hesger* as follows: "He shall shut him up in one house, and he shall not see him again until the end of a week." With this understanding of *Rashi* the original question is ever stronger.<sup>64</sup> If the *metzora* is enclosed in his house, how can the *Mishnah* be discussing the possibility of him coming to shul?

The *Ktav Ve'Kaballa* suggests *Rashi* is not to be understood as maintaining the *metzora* is locked up in his house never to leave. Instead the doors of the *metzora's* house are to be closed and kept that way. He sits in the house alone.<sup>65</sup> This is in contrast with the regular manner in which the doors were left upon for people to come and go as they pleased. That is the situation that is being prevented.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> The *Ktav Ve'Kaballa* explains that this understanding can indeed be gleaned from the simple reading of the verse as we regularly find that a person is referred to by his actions. He continues that when the *Torah* refers to *hesger* with respect to a *michva* it still uses the masculine tense, thereby supporting the position of *Rashi* that *hesger* must be referring to the person.

<sup>65</sup> The *Daat Zekeinim* explain that it is important for the *kohen* not to see the *metzora* for the week as gradual change is not noticeable if it is seen observed regularly.

<sup>66</sup> Also see the *Minchat Chinnuch* who appears to maintain that *hesger* only refers to the *metzora's* *halachic* status, i.e. in contrast to a *metzora muchlat*. He is not locked up in a room, nor is the *nega* marked.

## Parah

### A Flying *Ohel*

Parah (3:2)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

This *masechet* deals with the *para aduma* – the red heifer – ashes of which were an essential ingredient in the water used to purify one that came into contact with a corpse. In the third *perek* we learnt about the full process from the earliest preparation through to the completion of the ceremony. Indeed this process involved many stringencies.

One of these requirements (which was the subject of debate) is that the children that went to collect the water would travel on an ox while seated upon large doors or boards that lay horizontally on the back of the ox. This measure was to ensure that the children, who were raised in an environment protected from any impurity, would not become *tameh* if any part of their body extended outside the animal and passed over an unmarked grave. Presumably the door served as an *ohel*, and thereby acted as a barrier preventing any *tumah* from reaching the child. *R' Yehuda*, cited in the *Tosefta* (*Para* 2) however argued that this was not necessary. An ox that was sufficiently wide would be enough as the animal itself could serve as a protective *ohel*.<sup>67</sup>

The question raised on this *Mishnah* is that the *Gemara* (*Gittin* 8b) rules that a “thrown-*ohel*”, or an *ohel* in motion, cannot serve as an *ohel*; it cannot serve as a protective barrier. The door resting

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<sup>67</sup> The above explanation follows the opinion of the *Bartenura* that the doors were used due to the concern that the child would extend its arms outside the animal. The *Tifferet Yisrael* however explains that the *Chachamim* argue that the door could be relied upon to alleviate the requirement of having a rotund bovine. According to this understanding it is *R' Yehuda* that is being more strict in not allowing the door to be relied upon and instead requiring a large ox.

on the back of the animal seems to qualify as a thrown-*ohel*, so what benefit could it serve?

The *Tosfot* (*Sukkah* 21a) explain that the *Gemara* must be ruling like the opinion of *R' Yehuda* who maintains that the door was not, or more accurately, could not be used. Consequently, the *Tana* cited in our *Mishnah* must rule that a thrown-*ohel* can function as an *ohel*.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* however disagrees. Firstly, the *Gemara* (*Eiruvim* 30b) states that a thrown-*ohel* cannot function as an *ohel*. Furthermore, the contradiction remains in *Halacha*: we rule that a thrown-*ohel* cannot function as an *ohel* (*Rambam Tumat Ha'Met* 11:5) and we rule like our *Mishnah* that the doors were placed on the ox (*Rambam Para* 2).

The *Tifferet Yisrael* therefore presents a different answer. The case referred to from which we learn the law of a thrown-*ohel*, refers to one that travels in a chest (above the ground) through areas outside Israel. Due to the uncertainty regarding places of *tumat met*, areas outside *Eretz Yisrael* were deemed *tameh* by rabbinic decree. The *Beraita* records the debate regarding this case and *Rebbi* rules that the occupant of the chest is *tameh* as the chest cannot act as the protective barrier. This rule is despite the fact that the chest is large enough such that it is not susceptible to *tumah* and that the chest was elevated off the ground. Nonetheless, the moving *ohel* does not serve to protect the person inside the chest.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that in those cases the object which is attempting to act as an *ohel* is a *kli*. *Keilim* in general cannot act as an *ohel* to protect against *tumah*, but can act as an *ohel* to spread *tumah*. Now even though such large utensils (greater than forty *seah*) can act as an *ohel* when stationary, when in transit they are treated like all other *keilim*.

Our case of the door is different. It is not a *kli*. Granted that if it was supported by people or other *keilim* it would share the same rule as *keilim* (i.e., spread but not protect), but when placed on the back of animal it can function as an *ohel* and protect the child rider. Consequently we find that according to the *Tifferet Yisrael* the rule that a thrown-*ohel* cannot function as an *ohel* only applies to objects that are *keilim* or objects that are supported by people or *keilim*.

## More Lenient than the *Tzedukim*

Parah (3:7)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

After stringency upon stringency preventing even a hint of *tumah* at every preparatory step leading to the slaughter of the *para aduma*, the final step is quite surprising. The *kohen gadol* was deliberately made *tameh*. Why?

The *Mishnah* explains that this was motivated by a debated between the *Chachamim* and the *Tzedukim*. After one immerses in a *mikvah* to purify themselves from *tumah*, they have a status of *tevil yom*. The person must then wait till nightfall in order to become completely *tahor*<sup>68</sup>. Before that time, for example, a *kohen* may not eat *trumah*. The *Tzedukim*, who disregarded the oral tradition, understood that a *tevil yom* cannot perform the *para aduma*. They interpreted the *pasuk*, “A pure (*tahor*) man shall gather the ash of the cow” to mean that the *kohen* must be completely *tahor*. We however have a tradition from *Moshe Rabbeinu* that a *tevil yom* could engage in the *para aduma* activities. Consequently, prior to the *kohen gadol* beginning, he would be made *tameh* and immerse in the *mikvah*, making him a *tevil yom* and thereby act in accordance with the opinion of the *Chachamim*.

The *Mishnah Achronah* asks, what is to be lost if they acted stringently in accordance with the opinion of the *Tzedukim*? There are indeed many instances where the *Chachamim* rule stringently above *Torah* law; why should this be any different?

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<sup>68</sup> This is provided that they do not require a *korban* to follow. In such a case they would have the status of a *mechusar kippurim* until the *korban* is brought. Such a person would not be able to eat from any other *korbanot* until their required *korban* is offered.

The *Mishnah Achronah* explains that there is a big difference. When the *Chachamim* rule stringently, they accept that the *Torah* law is lenient, but for the purposes of “creating a fence around the *Torah*” institute a rabbinic decree. In this case however, the *Tzedukim* disagree with the tradition we have about the *Torah* law itself. Consequently, he explains, we are forbidden to behave according to their opinion for the *pasuk* states “you shall not deviate left or right” – be that lenient or strict.

One may still ask, if those engaged in the *para aduma* did not submit to the opinion of *Tzedukim* why can they not still act in the stringent manner. The *Mishnah Achrona* cites a *Tosefta* which describes a case where *R' Yishmael ben Piabi* ensured that a *para aduma* was performed by a *kohen* that was *tahor* and not a *tevul yom*. They wanted to rule that the *para aduma* was valid since it was already performed. The *Chachamim* ruled in that case that it was nonetheless invalid otherwise it would appear to be an outward demonstration that all previous *parot aduma* were invalid. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that the *Chachamim* knew that *R' Yishmael's* intentions were pure and he agreed that it could have been performed by a *tevul yom*. Furthermore their ruling was for a case that was after the fact – *bedi'eved*. Ideally however we find that no matter the intention, in our case of *para aduma*, one cannot act stringently in order not to emulate these heretics.

## Pumkin-Shell for *Mei Chatat*

Parah (5:i)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The fifth *perek* begins discussing different *keilim* that can be used to fill water for *mei chatat*; earthenware utensils, metal utensils and even the pumpkin-shell. The latter of the three is discussed separately since food readily expels absorbed liquids more than regular utensils (*Mishnah Achronah*). The first opinion cited in the third *Mishnah* is that if the pumpkin-shell was immersed in water that is not valid to be used for *mei chatat*, once it has been dried, it can still be used to contain the water for *mei chatat*. If however the pumpkin-shell became *tameh* and was then immersed it cannot be used. *R' Yosi* however disagrees, arguing that both the above cases should share the same ruling as there is no need for distinction. We shall try to understand the first opinion.

The *Eliyahu Raba* explains that in the first case, even though the invalid water might be expelled from the shell and mix with the acceptable water, it will occur at a slow rate – drop by drop. Those drops will be *batel* (annulled) in the majority acceptable water. Therefore there is no problem using the pumpkin-shell in that case to fill water for *mei chatat*. In the second case however, where the pumpkin-shell first became *tameh* and was then immersed, we are concerned that a single drop of *tameh* water might be expelled and even that small amount will cause the remaining water to become *tameh*.

The *Mishnah Achrona* explains *R' Yosi's* argument against the above distinction. It is true that in the first case, if a drop of invalid water is expelled and mixes with the other water, on a biblical level it is annulled in the majority. Even though ordinarily, for *mei chatat* we rule more stringently, since it is a doubtful whether any of the water will be expelled, it is

permissible to use the pumpkin-shell. The same rationale is applicable to the second case as well. The ability of *tameh* water to cause other water to be *tameh* is a rabbinic law! Consequently *R' Yosi* sees no reason to differentiate. The pumpkin-shell should not be used in either case.

The first opinion, explains the *Mishnah Achronah*, argues that in the first case, the rabbinic stringency on not allowing the invalid water to be annulled in the valid water, is part of a broad sweeping stringency applied to anything involved in *mei chatat*. Consequently in our cases, the stringency is alleviated. The “stringency” that *tameh* water can affect other water is a stringency in the laws of *tumah* and *tahara*; it is rabbinic law. Consequently the first *Tana* does not rule leniently in that case.

Another point worth noting is that the *Rambam* appears to have a different text of our *Mishnah* (see *Tosfot Yom Tov*). In his it reads that if one immersed the pumpkin-shell in water appropriate for use for *mei chatat*, then the shell be use to fill water for *mei chatat*. According to what was learnt above, such a ruling would appear obvious. Why would one think otherwise?

To this the *Mishnah Achrona* explains that we learn that the water must be collected inside a *kli*. One might have thought that since the water became absorbed in the shell itself, it is as if the water has not been collected inside a *kli* and therefore invalid. The *Mishnah* is therefore teaching that even though the water is inside the walls of the *kli* it is still considered as if it is in the *kli* itself.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> See the *Mishnah Achrona* for further analysis.

## Invalidating another's *Mei Chatat*

Parah (7:i)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

With the beginning of the seventh *perek* we learn that interrupting with an unnecessary activity (*melacha*) between filling the water for *mei chatat* (*milui*) and sprinkling the ashes of the *para aduma* into the water (*kiddush*) would invalidate the water for *mei chatat*. One case discussed in the first *Mishnah*, for example, is that if one had five containers of water valid and ready for *mei chatat*<sup>70</sup> and then performed *kiddush* on each one, only the first would be valid as the first *kiddush* would constitute *melacha* with respect to those that follow it.

The *Mishnah* then continues by explaining that if one asked another to perform *kiddush* for him depending on how he asked, all five could be valid. If he said “perform *kiddush* for you” then it is no different to the owner performing the *kiddush* himself. The statement “for you” effectively makes it as if the original person filled the water himself (*Bartenura*). If however he said “perform *kiddush* for me” then all are valid. The *Bartenura* explains that the one that filled water did not perform *melacha* and the water did not belong to the one that performed *kiddush*. This ruling is based on the principle that one cannot make *assur* that which does not belong to him.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Such a case would arise if all the water was originally collected for one *kiddush* and then the person changed their mind wanting to use the water for five separate *kidushin*. Were this not the case, each subsequent filling of water would constitute a break for the preceding one, thereby leaving only the last one valid.

<sup>71</sup> The *Tifferet Yisrael* (*Yachin* 18) explains that this rule only applies when the *issur* is dependent on the will of the owner. If the result would be prohibited when the action occurred on its own, for example, if forbidden fats (*chelev*) fell into food, then it would become prohibited even if another person performed that action.

Not doubting the above principle that one cannot make *assur* another person's *mei chatat*, this case appears to be different. In this case the owner of the water expressly asked the other person to perform *kiddush* – he is his *shaliach*. Applying the principle that a *shaliach* of a person takes his place, why does the second person not invalidate the remaining water after performing *kiddush* on the first container of water?

The *Tifferet Yisrael* poses this question and provides an answer that sheds light on the principle that a *shaliach* takes the place of the sender – *shlucho shel adam k'moto*. Firstly he explains that we apply this principle when the sender himself must perform the task to which the *shaliach* is being sent to perform. This is not the case for *kiddush*. Even if it was performed without the knowledge of the owner it is valid. Furthermore, the *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that *shlucho shel adam k'moto* only applies to that specific activity. For anything else, it is not as if the sender is performing it. Consequently the principle that one cannot make *assur* that which does not belong to him come into play and all the water is valid.

Another difficulty raised is that in *Gemara Gittin* (53a) we learn that if someone performs *melacha* with another's *mei chatat* he is not liable in the earthly court, but is liable in the heavenly court. Consequently it appears that one can invalidate another's *mei chatat*. The *Tosfot* there answers that in that case, the owner was happy with the *melacha* that was performed. Based on this *Tosfot*, the *Mishnah Achrona* explains that perhaps the second case is valid since the owner stated perform *kiddush* “for me”, thereby defining the second person's actions as being dependant on the *da'at* of the owner who would not wish to invalidate the remaining water in the manner that it was performed.

The *Mishnah Achrona* however prefers a different explanation of our *Mishnah*. He explains that at the core of what invalidates the water in this *Mishnah* is *hesech ha'daat* – the diversion of attention – and not *melacha* per se. In the first case where he

states “perform *kiddush* for you” there is complete *hesech ha'daat* on the part of the owner. He has handed the water over and the second person neglects *shmirah* of the remaining water when perform *kiddush* on the first. If however the owner states “perform *kiddush* for me” the owner has not divested himself from guarding the water at any point and all water is consequently valid.

## A Drop of Water in *Mei Chatat*

Parah (9:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (9:1) records the debate regarding a situation where a drop of water falls into *mei chatat*. *R' Eliezer* maintains that one should perform *hazaya* (sprinkling) twice, instead of once and the water is valid. The *Chachamim* however explain that all the *mei chatat* is invalid and may not be used for purification from *tumat met*.

The *Tosfot* (*Zevachim* 79b) explain that on a biblical level, with respect to *mei chatat*, the invalid water would be *batel* (annulled) in the overwhelming majority of valid water. Consequently they explain that this debate is regarding the extent of the rabbinic imposed stringency on *mei chatat*.

The *Gemara* (*Zevachim* 80) discusses this debate in great detail and the opinion of *R' Eliezer* in particular. *Rava* understands that *R' Eliezer* maintains the concept of “*bila*”; meaning that one treats the foreign drop is if it as has mixed evenly throughout the water. Furthermore, *R' Eliezer* maintains that there is no minimum *shiur* (measure) of water that must come into contact with the person undergoing the purification. Consequently, one *hazaya* would be enough. Nevertheless the *Chachamim* instituted a *knas* (fine) requiring sprinkling twice in order that one should not benefit from mixing in the foreign water.

*Rav Ashi* however understands that *R' Eliezer* does not hold by the principle of *bila*. Consequently there is a concern that the first *hazaya* will consist completely of the foreign water. Therefore two *hazayot* are required guaranteeing that some *mei chatat* will fall on the person at least once.

One may be tempted to ask that performing *hazaya* on a *tahor* person would cause them to be *tameh*. Consequently, according to both answers, it is possible that the extra *hazaya* would cause the person to be *tameh*. The *Tifferet Yisrael* pre-empts this question and answers that indeed the person would be required to immerse in a *mikveh* following the *hazayot* to rid himself of this lower level of *tumah*.

The *Chachamim* however argue that the water is invalid. The *Bartenura* explains the *Chachamim* require a full *shiur* in one *hazaya*. Maintaining the principle of *bila*, this would not be possible.

Returning to the opinion of *R' Eliezer*, the *Rambam* explain that the two *hazayot* are not placed on the person, but rather cast on the ground prior to performing *hazaya*. After that, all the remaining water would be valid. The *Bartenura* is at a loss for the source of the opinion of the *Rambam*, as he understands the *Gemara* as it was explained above.

The *Tosfot Yom Tov* explains that the *Rambam* is holding like the opinion of *Rav Ashi* who does not hold by the principle of *bila*. Consequently once the two drops are cast aside, the foreign drop is assumed to be removed and the remaining water is valid (*talinan*). The *Mishnah Achrona* explains further. Since *R' Eliezer* does not by the concept of *bila*, it is comparable to a case of mixed dry product (*yavesh b'yavesh*) and the foreign drop is really *batel* in a majority (as mentioned above). Now ordinarily the concept of *talinan* is not employed from the outset. It is only used in specific situations, after the fact, for example if part of the mixture fell in the ocean (see *Shulchan Aruch YD* 140). This case is different. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that since this case does not involve food or items offered in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, *R' Eliezer* employs a leniency within the law of *talinan*.

The *Tosfot Chadashim* however explains that the *Rambam* holds like *Rava*. *Rava* maintained that the two *hazaya* requirement was

simply a *knas* preventing one from benefitting from the mixture. Consequently casting the water to ground would satisfy. Note that that solution would avoid the requirement of following the *hazaya* with *tevilah* mentioned earlier in the name of the *Tifferet Yisrael*.

## A *Kalal* Resting on a *Sheretz*

### The Stringency in *Mei Chatat*

#### Parah (10:3)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

A dead *sheretz* is a source (*av*) of *tumah* and can cause both people and utensils to become *tameh*. Recall that an earthenware utensil is unique in that it cannot attract *tumah* if the source of *tumah* makes contact with its outer side. With these two points in mind, it is not surprising when the *Mishnah* teaches that if an earthenware *kalal* (flagon) containing *mei chatat* comes into contact with a *sheretz*, the contents would remain *tahor* (10:3). However when the *Chachamim* rule that if the *kalal* is placed on top of the *sheretz* the contents are *tameh*, it is a cause for pause. A priori, one would feel more comfortable with the position of *R' Eliezer* that in this case as well the contents are *tahor*.

The *Mefarshim* explain that the argument is based on the following *pasuk*: “And the *tahor* man shall gather the ash of the cow and place it outside the camp in a pure place...” (*Bamidbar* 19:9).<sup>72</sup> Both *R' Eliezer* and the *Chachamim* agree that there appears to be a requirement that the *kalal* be placed in a *tahor* location. However *R' Eliezer* maintains in our case that since the contents would remain *tahor*, this satisfies the requirement. The *Chachamim* however argue that since the spot on which the *kalal* stands is *tameh*, it does not satisfy the requirement of being in a “*tahor* place”.

An interesting corollary of this explanation is presented by the *Rash* who cites the *Sifri*. If the *kalal* was placed on the *sheretz* it is not considered a *tahor* place. If however the *sheretz* was placed on top of the *kalal* then the contents would remain *tahor*. The

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<sup>72</sup> The *Kesef Mishnah* (Para 14:1) cites the *Sifri* as the source for this which the *Rambam* also provides.

reason is that the spot on which the *kalal* is resting is *tahor*, thereby meeting the above stated requirements.

While *pesukim* have been brought in the above explanation, the *Rosh* explains that the rule is a rabbinic one. The *pesukim* are therefore not the source of the law but utilised as an association to the rabbinic decree. We therefore find another instance where *mei chatat* is treated stricter than anything else. Why?

The *Mishnah Achrona* asks this question in more detail. The *Mishnah* (10:1) had ruled that *tahor* items that were not kept *tahor* for the purpose of *mei chatat* would cause the person that is to engage in its preparation to be *tameh*. This is the case even if that item was kept *tahor* for the purpose of *kodesh* (*korbanot*, etc). Why should *mei chatat* be treated in a stricter manner than *kodesh*? Since the *Torah* refers to it as a “*chataf*” (sin offering) it can be granted as equal, but not harsher. True, there are *halachot* that apply to *mei chatat* that do not apply to *kodesh* (e.g. the *psul* of *melacha*). Nonetheless these cease after the *mei chatat* is prepared.

The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that the function of *mei chatat* is to purify people and items that are *tameh*. Consequently the purity of everything, including *trumah* and *kodesh*, depends on it. Consequently the severity and safeguards that are placed around *mei chatat* should really be no surprise.

## Is knotting considered *chibur*?

Parah (12:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

As part of the purification of a person or *kli* that was *tameh met*, the *eizov* (hyssop branch) was dipped in the *mei chatat* and used to sprinkle the water on the subject. The *Mishnah* discusses a case where the *eizov* was too short to dip in the *mei chatat*. *Rashi* (*Sukkah* 37a) explains that they would store the *mei chatat* in long narrow red containers making this situation possible.

A debate is recorded regarding how such a case can be resolved. The first opinion is that the *eizov* can be tied to a thread and then lowered down into the *mei chatat*. The *Bartenura* explains that even though the *Torah* states that the *eizov* must be taken (*ve'lakach*) and dipped into the *mei chatat*, taking something via an intermediary (as in this case) is halachically considered taking – *lekicha al davar acher shema lekicha*. When however it comes to sprinkling the *mei chatat* (*hazaya*) the *eizov* must be taken by hand. The requirement here changes for practical reasons. The *Tosfot Yom Tov* explains that this is to ensure that the *hazaya* is performed accurately.

*R' Yehuda* and *R' Shimon* however argue. They explain that just as the *hazaya* must be performed by hand, so too must the dipping (*tevilah*). This opinion requires analysis. If the requirement that *hazaya* be performed by directly holding the *eizov* was purely for practical reasons, why should the requirement also apply for *tevilah*?

The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that the connection is based on the fact that *tevilah* and *hazaya* are written in the *Torah* close to one another (*Bamidbar* 19:18-19). The *pesukim* connect the two together teaching that just as *hazaya* must be performed by hand, *tevilah* must as well.

The *Mishnah Achrona* also deals with this question. He first rejects the possibility that *R' Yehuda* and *R' Shimon* disagree with the concept of *lekicha al davar acher shema lekicha* and thereby require *tevilah* to also be performed by hand. The reason is that in *Gemara Sukkah*, the subject of *lekicha al davar acher shema lekicha* is debated. Our *Mishnah* is brought as potential evidence. The *Gemara* rejects our *Mishnah* as having no bearing on the issue since the *eizov* is tied to the string and tying is considered as being a strong attachment – *keshira havei chibur*. Consequently holding the string is holding the *eizov*. The *Mishnah Achrona* therefore argues that *lekicha al davar acher shema lekicha* does appear to be relevant.

Instead the *Mishnah Achrona* suggests that the debate is regarding *keshira havei chibur* and cites an earlier *Mishnah* (*Negaim* 11:8) as proof. We learnt that a coil of thread is susceptible to *tzara'at* provided it is a minimum length. A coil of short threads would not satisfy. There, *R' Yehuda* and the *Chachamim* argue whether if the short threads were tied together they would be susceptible to *negaim*. *R' Yehuda*, in line with the above reasoning, argues that it would not. This is indeed how the *Magen Avraham* also understands that debate (*Orach Chaim* 14:1 - also cited by the *Mishnah Achronah*).

As the *halacha* follows the opinion of the *Chachamim*, the principle of *keshira havei chibur* applies (with *Tefillin* being an exception – see the *Magen Avraham*). The *Magen Avraham* therefore rules that if a *tzitzit* thread snaps, one would be allowed to tie it together again. Once tied it would be considered a single thread.

## Taharot

### Machshava

#### Taharot (1:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The first *Mishnah* in the new *masechet*, *Masechet Taharot*, discussed the special laws that apply to a *neveilat ohf tahor* – the carcass of a bird from a *kosher* species. One such law is that in order for parts of the carcass to be susceptible to *tumah* it requires *machshava* – intent for human consumption. What is the requirement for *machshava*?

Ordinarily food does not require *machshava* to become susceptible to *tumah* (as opposed to *hechsher*). In *Masechet Uktzin* (3:3) the *Tana* clarifies our *Mishnah* stating that the requirement for *machshava* for *neveilat ohf tahor* is only in the villages where they were not eaten. In the cities however *machshava* was not required. The *Bartenura* explains that since *neveilat ohf tahor* is prohibited it is not assumed ready to be eaten and therefore requires *machshava*. In the cities, where a majority of people consumed them, *machshava* was not required. The *Mishnah Achrona* however argues that the main issue is whether the birds were eaten and not whether they are *assur*. Note that the *Mishnah Achrona*, based on *Rashi*, understood that in the villages they did not eat birds at all, whether *neveilah* or slaughtered, due to their poverty.<sup>73</sup>

*Rav Aharon Lichtenstein shlita* explains that there are two points to consider: there is food that is edible and there is food that is for

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<sup>73</sup> The *Mishnah Achrona* adds that the reason why the *Mishnah* only includes *neveilot* and not slaughtered birds is that slaughtering the bird would be equivalent to *machshava*. Note that the *Mishnah Achrona* suggests another explanation that combines both reasons. In other words the requirement of *machshava* is when the food is both *assur* and not eaten in general.

eating. If a particular object, like a stone, is neither, then *machshava* will never help. If a food is both, for example an apple, then there is no requirement for *machshava*. If however the object is edible but not eaten, like in the case of *neveilat ohf tahor*, then *machshava* is required.

*Rav Lichtenstein* continues that this requirement is learnt from the *pasuk* from which we learn about the susceptibility to *tumah* of food: “of any food, that is edible...” (*Vayikra* 11:34). There are two ways to understand the above derivation. The first is that the *pasuk* begins by including anything that is defined as food – “of any food” – even if it is animal feed. It then continues to limit the scope to only that food that is eaten by people - “that is edible”. Importantly, the *pasuk* takes the definition of food that is shared elsewhere and then restricts it.

The second way of understanding the *pasuk* is that the second part, “that which is edible”, comes to define the first, “of any food”. In other words a functional definition of food is being applied to the word of *tumah* and *tahara*. Indeed the definition of food could also be restricted according to this understanding. Yet for some cases the *Torah* could be even be expanding on the regular definition of food.

*Rav Lichtenstein* explains that a practical difference between these two understanding is possibly expressed in another debate regarding food of poor quality. Just as foodstuff must be defined as food in order to be susceptible to *tumah*, food that is *tameh* can lose its *tumah* if it degrades to a state of no longer being defined as food. According to the *Rambam* there are separate definitions of food for each of the above two laws. For food to be susceptible to *tumah* it must be edible to humans (*Tumat Ochlin* 2:14). It can only lose its *tumah* however if it degrades to being inedible for animals (2:18). The *Ra'avad* however does not differentiate between when the food becomes susceptible and when it loses its *tumah*. The distinction he draws is instead regarding the original definition of that food when it became *tameh*. If it is animal food

then it is not susceptible to *tumah* even if a dog is licking it. If however it is food for humans, then the point at which it becomes susceptible or loses its *tumah* is when it is fit for animal consumption.

*HaRav Lichtenstein* explains that *Rambam* may understand the derivation the way it was first explained. The definition of food for *tumah* and *tahara* is the same as other categories of law. However the *Torah* restricted this definition when discussing the susceptibility to *tumah* (“it is edible [to humans]”). The *Ra’avad* may however understand the derivation in the second way. In other words, the *pasuk* does not use the objective definition of food when dealing with *tumah* and *tahara*. Instead the definition used is “that which is edible” which can be expanded to food that is only fit for a dog to eat.

## The Status of Juice inside Fruit

Taharot (3:1)  
Yehuda Gottlieb

The *Mishnah* in the third *Perek* discusses the contamination of food by its own juices. It emerges from there that if juices comes out from a *tamei* food that was exactly a *beitzah*, the liquid does not contract *tumah* as the food itself cannot transmit *tumah* (as it is then less than the required *shiur*).

The *Gemara* in *Pesachim* (33b) mentions a *machloket* between *Amoraim* whether the liquid contained within a grape are absorbed within the fruit, or whether they are contained within it. The practical difference is that if the liquid is seen as only contained within, then they are not connected to the external skin – it is like liquid that fills a container. Therefore, the liquid itself can never become *tamei* while it is still within the fruit. This is because the juice is judged to be contained within the fruit's skin, and considered to be a food distinct and separate from the fruit itself.

A difficulty arises since, as we have learnt, liquid acquires *tumah* no matter their measure. Now in the case of the *Gemara* in *Pesachim*, the skin of the fruit is *tamei* and the juice inside the fruit is in contact with the skin surrounding it. The logic should follow that the juice should become *tamei* from being in contact with the skin. However, we learn from here that since the juice has not yet emerged from the fruit, it is not yet legally viewed as a liquid, and therefore, cannot be made *tamei*.

Even if this juice inside the grape would be considered a liquid before extraction, it still would not be rendered *tamei* by the fruit skin as the grape possesses a far smaller volume than a *beitzah*. It therefore cannot render the juice it contains *tamei*, since food that is less than a *beitzah* does not transmit *tumah*. Even if this grape

is in physical contact with other grapes which together measure more than a *k'beitzah* it does not combine to make the required *shiur*. This is because, with regard to generating *tumah*, individual food items do not combine unless they become a single unit or mass<sup>74</sup>.

Interestingly, even though the liquid contained within a fruit is seen to be a distinct food with regard to contracting *tumah*, we find it is treated differently in terms of measuring the volume of the fruit. *Rashi* (*Pesachim* 33b) explains that indeed, even though the juice of a grape is seen as a food distinct and separate from the grape itself (with regard to *tumah*) it is nonetheless subordinate to it and is included in its required measure for the overall grape. *Rashi* brings another example to illustrate this point from our *perek* in *Taharot*. In *Mishnah* 4 we learn that if one left a measure of food in the sun and it shrunk, or alternatively in the rain and it expanded, then the food is viewed as its current (and not original) *shiur*. For example – if one left a *kezayit* of *cheilev* in the sun and it shrunk, one is not *chayav* for its consumption. If he left less than a *kezayit* in the rain and it expanded to more than a *kezayit* – then one who eats it will be *chayav* for its consumption. The difference between these two volumes is not the forbidden item (in this case *cheilev*) itself – rather it is water. In fact *Rashi* mentions if one was to squeeze out all the water from this item, it would decrease to a permitted *shiur*. However, since at the time it was consumed it was more than a *kezayit* – one is forbidden to eat it.

*Rashi* says that the same applies for the juice contained within a fruit. Even though this juice is not connected to the fruit with regards to receiving *tumah* from the skin of the fruit – it is still not viewed as completely separate to the fruit and is viewed as part of the fruit to complete its required measure.

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<sup>74</sup> This is the subject of a *machloket* – the *Rambam* rules that a single mass is required; this is disputed by the *Raavad* (see *Rambam Hilchot Tumat Ochlin* 6:17).

## Tumah in Reshut HaRabim – Exceptions

Taharot (4:5)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* discusses the laws relating to cases of doubt involving *tumah*. For example we learnt that the location of where the doubt originated can have a significant impact on the ruling. To generalise, if the doubt originated in the public domain, then the ruling would be *tahor*. If however the doubt originated in the private domain in many cases the ruling would be *tameh*.<sup>75</sup>

The *Mishnah* (4:5) however teaches that there are six cases of doubt in which even if they occurred in the public domain, would be ruled as *tameh*. Moreover, in such cases, if the doubt involved *tumah*, it could be burnt. Note that ordinarily, one is not allowed to burn *trumah* in a case of doubt as only *trumah* that is certainly *tameh* can be burnt. The ruling is a rabbinic enactment, but why were these cases specifically chosen?

The *Mishnah Achrona* cites a number of commentaries to explain our *Mishnah*.<sup>76</sup> The six cases of doubt are ones that may involve *tumah* on a biblical level. Now there may be many other cases that at first appear to satisfy this definition. One such case would be if one was not sure whether they touched a *sheretz*. The *Rash* however explains that in our cases, the doubt is in the item itself. For example, in the case of spittle, there is a doubt that it may have originated from a *zav*. The doubt is in the item itself. With the distinction in hand, what is the reason for making it?

*Tosfot* explains that these cases are worse. In other cases, where the doubt is whether one touched something that is certainly *tameh*, people will be more cautious in future. This may not be

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<sup>75</sup> We have learnt for this to be true, the *tumah* must apply to a person that has *da'at* and the *tumah* must have a “place”.

<sup>76</sup> See the *Mishnah Achrona* inside for all the sources that follow.

the case where one certainly touched something whose status was in doubt.

Alternatively the *Ritva* explains that in general, in the public domain, when the doubt is about whether something touched certain *tumah* objects, the ruling is *tahor* since we maintain the item on its *chazakah* – it previously established status. In these cases, since the item definitely made contact – the doubt is with the potential source of *tumah* – the item loses its *chazakah* since it now shares that status as the object it made contact with.

The *Mishnah Achrona* however cites other cases where the doubt is with the potential source of *tumah* and did not make the list. One such of the cases is from the *Mishnah* in *Mikva'ot* (6:7) where the doubt involves whether part of a *neveilah* was the minimum *shiur* of a *kezayit* and is treated as *tameh*. (He explains that this must be referring to a case where the *kezayit* was subsequently lost otherwise the lack of expertise to make the accurate measurement does not constitute a doubt.)

Nevertheless the *Mishnah Achrona* explains that in those cases of doubt that made contact with *trumah*, where the doubt is in the object of potential *tumah* itself, the *trumah* could also be burnt. He however explains, citing the *Tosfot*, that the *Mishnah* only lists the case on which the *Chachamim* ruled in *Usha* where the decree was formulated.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> See the *Tifferet Yisrael* that cites other cases that are not included in this *Mishnah* even though they also share the same ruling by rabbinic decree. Those cases however, he explains, are not cases that stem from doubt.

## Shnei Shvilin - Two Path

Taharot (5:3)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

In the fifth and sixth *perakim* we dealt with more complex cases involving doubt regarding *tumah*. Some of these are the well known cases of *shnei shvilin*. These cases involve two paths, one of which contains *tumat hamet* and the other is *tahor*. The problem is that we are unsure which of these paths contain the *tumah*.<sup>78</sup>

If one had walked on one of these paths, since they are in the public domain, this is no different to any other case of doubt arising in the public domain and the ruling should be *tahor*. However one case brought is where one person travelled on both paths. If he did not purify himself in between journeys then he is certainly *tameh* by the end. Conversely the *Mishnah* teaches that if he does purify himself in between and the *taharot* (*trumah* or *kodshim*) that he touched after the first journey were consumed prior to the second, then each journey can be treated independent and everything remains *tahor*. The case which we will focus on is where he purified himself prior to the second journey, but all the *taharot* that he touched after both journeys are present when he poses the question for ruling.

The *Mishnah* rules that the *taharot* are both *tluyot*. This means that they effectively remain in limbo. They cannot be consumed as they might by *tameh* and they cannot be burned in case they are *tahor*; both possibilities forbidden for the *kadosh* items. Let us probe further asking why they are deemed *tluyot*?

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<sup>78</sup> See the *Mishnah Achrona* who explains that it cannot be that the location of the *tumah* is known but one is unsure which path they travelled on in the later cases of *shnei shvilin*.

The *Tosfot* (*Pesachim* 10a) explains that this rule is rabbinic since on a biblical level they would both be *tahor*. The reason is because we do not know which of the two sets of *taharot* are *tameh*. Consequently, the *Torah*-solution is to maintain each of them on their *chazakah* – their established and presumed status – which is *tahor*.

The *Tosfot Ha'Rosh* (*Nazir* 7a) explains that the reason for the decree is that since both *taharot* are still present in the world, there is a concern that if we deemed them both *tahor*, then one person might eat both sets (or *trumah* might touch both sets) and would definitely, yet unknowingly, be *tameh*. Even though above we explained that we can rely on the *chazakot* to deem them *tahor*, the *Rash MiShantz* explains that if *tumah* becomes a certainty (egg, where one person eats both sets) then one can no longer rely on the *chazakah*.

The *Raavad* (*Pesachim* 5a) however argues that this ruling has implications on a biblical level as well.<sup>79</sup> He explains that since the two sets are present, one is certainly *tameh* and the other is certainly *tahor* and they are therefore “as if being certainly *tameh*.” The *Mishnah Achrona* explains further in a similar manner. They must be ruled as *tluyot* since there is nothing swaying us to make one set *tahor* over the other, and we are not allowed to burn both.

We have therefore seen two different directions as to why, if both *taharot* are present when the question is posed, the ruling is that they are *tahorot*. The first is that there is an external concern that motivated the *Chachamim* to enact a stricter ruling. The

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<sup>79</sup> See inside as the *Raavad* argues against the *Baal HaMeor* who claims the *Gemara* in *Pesachim* is only learning from our case to *bedikat chametz* (which is rabbinic) but does not have any bearing on the question of *bitul chametz*.

second is that this is essentially the only possible result in order not to present a contradiction in the final ruling.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> For further learning see the *Shita Mekubetz* to *Ketubot* (27a) for an explanation of the debate later (5:5) between *R' Yosi* and *R' Yehuda*.

## ***Am Ha'aretz* Collectors**

Taharot (7:6)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* moves from doubt regarding actions to doubt regarding people with respect to *tumah*. The personalities that catch most of our attention are the *chaver* (a person particular with the laws of *tumah* and *tahara*) and the *am ha'aretz*. It is important to note that unlike the more familiar colloquial meaning, the *am ha'aretz* can refer to one that is observant in *Torah* and *mitzvot* (*Rambam Mishkav U'Moshav* 10:1). The problem is that since he is not proficient in the laws of *tumah* and *tahara* he is assumed to be *tameh*. Consequently many of the cases involve an *am ha'aretz* left unattended in a *chaver's* house in varying capacities.

One case concerned an *am ha'aretz* tax collector. The *Mishnah* teaches that if the collector enters the house (for the purpose of taking a guarantee) a fair portion<sup>81</sup> of the contents around the entire house would be *tameh*. The *Mishnah* continues stating that if the collector was accompanied by a *goi*, then the *am ha'aretz* is believed to say that he did not enter the house, but is not believed to say that he entered the house but did not touch anything.

The *Rash* and *Rosh* explain that the *goi* acts as a supervisor so that the *am ha'aretz* will be frightened, perform his job correctly and search thoroughly. Consequently if the *am ha'aretz* admitted he entered the house, he certainly would have touched items within it.<sup>82</sup> If however the *am ha'aretz* enters alone, then he could be believed.

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<sup>81</sup> See the continuation of the *Mishnah*.

<sup>82</sup> The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that because of this certainty, the *am ha'aretz* does not have the benefit of applying a *migo*.

Two questions arise according to this explanation. The *Mishnah* initially taught that if the collector entered the house, the contents are *tameh*. Since the *Mishnah* only then added that the case is where he was accompanied by the *goi*, it suggests that the opening case is referring to the collector alone. The *Tifferet Yisrael* therefore combines both parts of the *Mishnah* and teaches that it should not be read “if the collector is accompanied by a *goi*...” as introducing a new case, but rather “even if” thereby adding a further detail to the first case.

The second problem is that in many of the other cases cited previously the *Chachamim* ruled that everything within arm’s reach of the unattended *am ha’aretz* is *tameh*. Why in this case do we simply trust the *am ha’aretz* if he says he did not touch anything. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that in the previous cases the *am ha’aretz* was not allowed to touch anything. Consequently the *am ha’aretz* would be reluctant to admit that he was freely touching the *chaver*’s property. In this case however, since he was allowed to enter by government authority, such a concern does not exist.

The *Rambam* however, based on the *Tosefta*, provides a different reading of our *Mishnah*. He explains that it is only in the presence of *goi* that collector is believed that he did not touch anything. According to this understanding, the fear inflicted by the presence of this supervisor ensures that the collector does not touch anything he should not. If however the collector was alone he would feel free to roam around the house and everything should be assumed *tameh*.

The *Rambam*’s understanding does require a change in the text of our *Mishnah*. Nevertheless it preserves the separation between the first and second parts of the *Mishnah* (the first problem above). Furthermore, why the unattended collector is treated harsher than the previous cases is readily understood.

The *Rambam* however adds that if the collector was not witnessed entering the house, then he is believed when he says that he entered the house but did not touch anything. The reason is based on the principle known as *migo*. To explain, since if the collector wanted to lie he could have said he did not enter at all – a better claim – we believe him when he says that he did not touch anything.

The *Mishnah Achrona* notes that we find many cases where an *am ha'aretz* is not believed through a *migo*. One such example is where the *am ha'aretz* says that the fruit went through *hechsher* (made liable to contract impurity) but did not become *tameh*. Even though the *am ha'aretz* could claim that they never went through *hechsher*, he is not believed. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that in those cases the *migo* does not work as they would rely on sufficient knowledge of the law of *tumah* and *tahara*, which the *am ha'aretz* simply does not have.

## Machshava of a Katan

Taharot (8:6)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

Earlier we discussed the requirement for *machshava* (intention for human consumption) for a *neveilat ohf tahor* (the carcass of a bird from a *kosher* species). As we have learnt, a minor does not have *da'at* (intention) of *halachic* value so it is no wonder that the *Mishnah* ruled that they cannot provide *machshava* (8:6). The *Mishnah* does however rule that their actions can have *halachic* implications. If a child collects a *neveilah* bird for the purposes of giving it to a *goi*, then the bird can become (and is) *tameh*. Even though minors do not have *machshava* they do have *ma'aseh*. It appears the requirement of *machshava* is fulfilled through the actions of the minor. Let us analyse how this works.

To better understand our *Mishnah* we shall open with the question posed by the *mefarshim*. The *Mishnah* in *Machshirin* (6:1) teaches that if someone places their produce on their roof in order to remove mites, if dew then fell on it, it is not *huchshar* (susceptible to *tumah*) unless he wanted it to get wet. Recall that produce's contact with dew (or the other six liquids) would need to be pleasing to the owner for it to be *huchshar*. If a minor placed the produce on the roof, even if he wanted it to get wet, it is not *huchshar*. *R' Yochanan* in the *Gemara* (*Chulin* 13a) adds that if the minor turned the produced over so that all sides got wet then it is *huchshar*.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> The *Gemara* continues to explain that there are three levels to consider when referring to a *katan*. *Machshava* alone, as we have learnt, does not apply to a *katan*. The second is *machshava* that is understood through the actions. This level is where the intent of the action is understandable but not crystal clear. At this level, the requirement for *machshava* is fulfilled on a rabbinic level. The third level is *machshava* and *ma'aseh*. The intent of the *ma'aseh* is clearly understood and the requirement for *machshava* is fulfilled on a biblical level. See *Rashi* and *Tosfot* for their differing understandings of the practical definitions of each of these levels.

The *Rash* notes that we find from the above *Mishnah* that since it was questionable why the minor was taking the produce to the roof, the action of the minor did not have any weight.<sup>84</sup> It was not until the *minor* was turning the produce that the action was considered. Likewise in our *Mishnah* the minor may have been collecting the bird for purposes other than human consumption; perhaps to feed to a dog. So why in our *Mishnah* are the minor's actions considered significant? The *Rash* answers that our *Mishnah* must be referring to a case where the *katan* immediately hands the bird to the *goi* so that the intent of the action is clear.

*R' Menachem* (see *Melechet Shlomo*) provides a different solution, explaining that the cases are quite different. In the case of the produce, the general reason why one would place produce on his roof was to remove mites. Consequently, the *katan* would require a further action to demonstrate the intent was for the dew. In our case however, in general the collection of birds is for the purpose of consumption so no further action on the part of the *katan* is required.

The *Mishnah Achrona* however answers that these cases are dissimilar for a completely different reasons. In the case of the produce, the primary intention was to remove mites. Secondary to that was the intention that the dew softens the produce. As this intent is secondary it is considered separate to the action and consequently insignificant for the minor. In our case, the primary intent was to retrieve the bird and hand it to the *goi*. Consequently we have a *ma'aseh* and *machshava* together.

The *Mishnah Achrona* therefore provides a very different understanding of how a *ma'aseh* works with *katan*. According to the earlier understandings, the *ma'aseh* is treated independently.

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<sup>84</sup> The *Meiri* explains that if the *katan* at that point articulated that it was taking the produce to the roof to be softened by the dew then the intent of the action would be considered clear. The *Tosfot* disagree.

The action is considered important if the action alone appears to communicate intent. According to the *Mishnah Achronah* however, the intent of the *minor* is also considered. However it only gains *halachic* force when combined with an action.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> This distinction could perhaps be behind the debate between *Rashi* and *Tosfot* in *Chulin*. According to *Tosfot* the three categories (see footnote 83) are defined by the clarity of the action alone. This opinion appears to align with the earlier ones cited. *Rashi* (with which the *Mishnah Achrona* aligns himself) however explains that the highest level is where the *katan* also articulates its intent. Perhaps the speech equates to the *katan's machshava* that is required to combine with the action. The *Meiri* however understand that the articulation only serves to clarify the action (see previous footnote).

## Mikvaot

### Mei Gevaim

Mikvaot (1:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*Masechet Mikvaot* begins with discussing different bodies of water in the earth and how they differ from one another with respect to *taharot*. The first category is *mei gevaim*. As we will learn a *mikveh* (commonly known as the “ritual bath”) must be at least forty *seah* in volume. *Mei gevaim* is collection of water on the ground that is less than that measure. Water, while inside a *mikveh* is not susceptible to *tumah*. Furthermore, we have learnt recently, that if *tameh* water comes into contact with the *mikveh* water it becomes *tahor*. Something however appears to be different when discussing *mei gevaim*.

The *Mishnah* (1:1) teaches that if someone drinks from *mei gevaim* after someone *tameh* drank from that water, they would be *tameh*. More specifically, it would be considered as if the water they drank was *tameh* and thereby, by way of rabbinic decree, be a *sheni le'tumah*. What is the reason for the *Mishnah*'s ruling and how is *mei gevaim* different to a regular *mikveh*.

One approach taken by many commentaries is that, like a *mikveh*, *mei gevaim* cannot become *tameh* while attached to the ground (e.g. *Rashi Vayikra* 11:36). The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that on a biblical level, only a small amount of water (*revi'it*) is required for a *mikveh* for the immersion of small utensils (see *Pesachim* 17b, *Nazir* 38a). The *Meiri* explains the reason for increasing the measure to forty *seah* was out of concern that people would begin using water that collected in utensils and not in the ground for the purpose of immersing *keilim*; which would be invalid. Consequently our case must be referring to *mei gevaim* whose source was not drawn but naturally collected (*Bartenura*).

Therefore when the *tameh* person drinks from the *mei gevaim* his contact with the water does not make it *tameh*. Why then does the second person become *tameh*?

The concern is that drops of liquid that were removed from the *mei gevaim* by the *tameh* person when drinking would return. Since it is not the volume of a *mikveh*, that liquid remains *tameh*; albeit amongst the *tameh* liquid. Many commentaries continue to explain that we are concerned that the *tahor* person will drink water from the *mei gevaim* that includes that *tameh* drop. Once removed from the ground that *tameh* drop will cause the other water in the person's mouth to be *tameh* and he will be drinking *tameh* liquid.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* prefers however to explain that when the *tameh* drops falls into the *mei gevaim* it is considered as through it is mixed evenly. Therefore when the second person takes a drink he will certainly be taking some of the *tameh* liquid into his mouth. The reason he prefers this variation of the explanation is because otherwise this would appear to equate with a doubtful case involve *tameh* liquids that we learnt previously would be deemed *tahor* (*Taharot* 4:11).<sup>86</sup>

The *Mishnah Achrona* does not like either approach. The question he poses is that in this case the *tumah* should be considered *batel*. (He dismisses the *Raavad* answer that the minority can be “reawakened” when some of the water is removed as another *Gemara* that assesses that concept does not cite this *Mishnah*.) He therefore prefers the *Rambam*'s approach.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> In defence of the other opinions, one could say that there is a difference between a case where one is unsure whether he drank liquid that is definitely *tameh* (perhaps the case referred to in *taharot*) and this case where one is certain they drank the liquid, but is unsure whether it is *tameh*. We have drawn this distinction previously where the latter was ruled in stricter way – see volume 6 issue 46.

<sup>87</sup> See the *Tifferet Yisrael* at length for his treatment of this question.

The *Rambam* disagrees with the first premise. He maintains that the *mei gevaim* is susceptible to *tumah* – much like water that is contained in utensil. The difference is that the *mei gevaim* becomes *tameh* only if one brings the *tumah* in contact with the water willingly. According to this understanding, since the law of *mei gevaim* is not connected to *mikvah*, *mei gevaim* can also be made up of drawn water. Returning to the *Mishnah*, once the *tameh* person drank from the *mei gevaim*, that water is *tameh*. The reason why the second person becomes *tameh* is then readily understood.

## Maayan and Mikveh

### Mikvaot (1:7)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* discusses the definitions of a *maayan*, *mikveh* and all things in between. The *mikveh* is a collection of still, non-drawn water that is forty *seah* in volume. The *maayan* (spring) differs in that it there is no minimum measure (*kol shehu*) and it can also purify while its water flows (*zochalin*). One body of water whose classification is in between the *maayan* and *mikveh* is a *maayan* whose own volume of water has been outweighed by drawn water (or rain water). The *Mishnah* teaches that it is similar to a *mikveh* in that it can only be a source of purification if the water is collected, yet is nonetheless similar to a *maayan* in that there is no minimum volume requirement.

The *Ran* (*Nedarim* 40b) asks that *Mishnah* appears to contradict itself. How can one body of water be considered both like a *mikveh* and like a *maayan*? If it can purify with any volume it should also be able to while flowing? The *Ran* therefore explains that the *Mishnah* must be referring to two different cases; one where it is similar to a *mikveh* and the other where it is similar to a *maayan*.

The *Ran* explains that if the *maayan* was not flowing before the drawn water was introduced then the mixture is classified in all senses as a *mikveh* – it requires forty *seah* and can only purify when the water is collected and still. If however the *maayan* was initially flowing, then despite the fact that its volume is later outweighed by drawn water, its status as a *maayan* is unchanged.

The *Rambam* (*Mikvaot* 9:6) however does not explain that our *Mishnah* is referring to two different cases. Accordingly, what is the basis for the distinctions? *R' Chayim* (*Al HaRambam*) initially suggest that indeed the law of *kol shehu* and *zochalin* can be split.

The *Mishnah* later (5:6) teaches that a wave that detaches from the oceans and lands on someone can cause them to become *tahor* provided that water contains a volume of forty *seah*. We find that once the water becomes detached from the ocean it requires a *shiur*. Nonetheless it appears that it can purify even though it is flowing. Therefore in that single case we find that two laws can be independent of one another (even though the result in this case turns out to be the reverse of our own).

Based on the above case, *R' Chaim* explains that we find that when the water is attached to the *maayan* there is no requirement on the volume. It must however be attached. Consequently, in our case the water, despite containing a majority of drawn water, that water is attached to the *maayan* and therefore a *kol shehu* is enough. The law that *maayan* water can purify while flowing however is not dependant on whether the water is still attached. Rather it is dependent on whether the water is defined as *maayan* water. In our case since the drawn water outweighs the *maayan* water, it is treated as a *mikveh* in that it only purifies when still.

*R' Chaim* however rejects this distinction. The reason is that the *Rambam* (*Mikvaot* 9:18) explicitly states that one cannot immerse an item in a wave while it is in the air, even if it contains a volume of forty *seah*, is because “one cannot immerse in *zochalin*, and therefore even more so in the air.” After some deliberation *R' Chaim* concludes that there is no clear proof that one can differentiate between the laws as described above.

Instead *R' Chaim* offers a different explanation by reassessing the requirement of forty *seah* in a *mikveh*. Initially one might have assumed that the water of a *mikveh* and *maayan* are different. For *mikveh* water to be “potent” enough a volume of forty *seah* is required. *R' Chaim* explains that this is not the case. There is nothing wrong with the *mikveh* water per se; instead there is a technical requirement of a particular volume. A *maayan* however does not have that requirement. Consequently, since *maayan* water of a minimal volume is able to complete its own volume, so

too in our case the water of a *maayan* can complete the required forty *seah* volume. Accordingly in our case, the mixture is not defined as a *mikveh* and *maayan*. The *mikveh* water (defined so since the drawn water is attached to the *maayan*) is in the majority and the mixture is therefore defined as a *mikveh* and can only purify when still. So why can it purify with a minimal volume? Simply because the water of the *maayan* with which it is mixed, can complete the volume requirement.

## ***Maayan Spilling over a Shoket***

**Mikvaot (5:1)**

**Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier**

One cannot use drawn water to fill a *mikveh*. Exactly what constitutes drawn water and other cases that may relate to this law is discussed in the *Mishnah*. For example a *shoket* (stone trough) that was fashioned prior to being attached to the ground would be defined as a *kli* (utensil). Consequently rain water that collects in such a *shoket* would be considered invalid for use for a *mikveh* – either to immerse in (even if it was large enough) or if that water spilled over into a large enough pit (4:5). The water’s presence in something defined as a utensil is enough for it to be considered drawn thereby invalidating it. The *Mishnah* (5:1) extends this example explaining that if the water from a *maayan* (spring) flowed into a pit after passing in and out such a *shoket* it would still be invalid.

The *Rash*, as quoted by the *Tosfot Yom Tov*, finds the ruling of the *Mishnah* difficult for two reasons. The first is that invalid water that is attached to a *maayan* becomes valid. Since in this case the water in the *shoket* remains attached to the *maayan* it should be considered no worse than a mixture of drawn water and spring water. Consequently even though the mixture is not considered fully spring water, it should still be valid to use as a *mikveh* (see previous article). In short, this water, even though inside something defined as a *kli*, is still attached to the *maayan* and should be considered valid.

The second difficulty presented is that we will learn (6:2) that one can immerse utensils inside other immersed utensils. It appears that the question is that there is nothing wrong with immersing utensils in water that is inside a utensil. In general the problem is that water that collects inside a utensil is itself invalid; it is considered drawn as explained above. In this case since the water

should be valid there should be nothing wrong with immersing utensils inside the *shoket* itself.

The *Rash* answers that there is a difference between utensils that are attached to the ground and movable utensils. The reason being that one might place a *shoket* close to a *maayan* relying on a hole to connect them. However this hole might be too small to be considered legally joined and water in the *shoket* would be unknowingly *pasul*. The *Beit Yosef* bring another reason for greater concern here in the name of the *Rashba* who explains that if this case were permitted people might easily misunderstand the *halachic* mechanism in place and begin to use regular baths.

The *Rosh* also differentiates in a similar way explaining that the wall of the *shoket* perceptively acts as a division between it and the *maayan*. Consequently one might think that it is permitted to immerse in such a *shoket* when the water is not flowing at that moment from the *maayan* – which is incorrect. Such a mistake would not occur in the case where one is immersing utensils in other utensils that are themselves immersed in a *mikveh*.

The common thread between these answer is that the water is invalid out of concerns about what people might understand and act upon had these water been permitted.

## Cracks that Combine *Mikvaot*

Mikvaot (6:9)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The ways that bodies of water can combine is important for a number of reasons. For example, it may allow two pits of rain water to combine together to make the minimum quantity for a *mikveh*. Also we have learnt that if a valid *mikveh* is considered connected to a pit of drawn water it can turn that pit into a valid *mikveh*. Ordinarily, the radius of a hole or pipe that connects the two *mikvaot* must be *k'shfoferet ha'nod* (“like the spout of a leather water bottle”) – the width of two fingers. The *Mishnah* that we will focus on however discusses whether a crack, not a hole, in the wall that divides two bodies of water is enough for them to be considered joined.

The first opinion rules that only if the cracks are in the direction of the *sheti* would the pits be considered joined. *R' Yehuda* however rules in the opposite way that the crack must be in the direction of the *erev*. What exactly is the *sheti* and *erev* for a wall is the subject of debate in the *mefarshim*.

The *Rambam* and *Bartenura* explain that *sheti* refers to a vertical crack while *erev* refers to a horizontal one. The *Rash* and *Rosh* however hold that reverse is true. The *Mishnah Achrona* lends support to the first opinion as the *Rash* himself cites a *Tosefta* (see *Ohalot* 6:3) referring to the *sheti* as being in the vertical direction. The *Tifferet Yisrael* suggests that the latter opinion may be borrowing these terms from fabric on a weaving machine, where the *sheti* refers to the long warp threads. This would match the generally larger dimension of the wall – its width.

Continuing with the understanding of the *Rambam*, how should we understand the debate? What difference does the direction of the crack make? The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that there are two ways to understand what the appearance of a crack does. The first

is that there are two separate laws relating to cracks and holes. Holes require a particular diameter or area while cracks do not. This is provided that the crack is substantial and lasts. Consequently according to the first opinion a vertical crack would combine the *mikvaot*. In the presence of a horizontal crack the wall is effectively divided in two, with the top piece resting heavily on the lower one and it is likely to close. *R' Yehuda* however understands that cracks are no different to holes and require a gap. However in the case of a horizontal gap, since the structure of the upper half is unstable it is likely to become comprised and is therefore considered not present. This is consistent with *R' Yehuda's* opinion earlier regarding a comprised wall (6:1).

The *Tifferet Yisrael* however anticipates the following question. According to his explanation the *Rambam's* ruling are difficult. The *Rambam* rules like *R' Yehuda* earlier that a rickety wall does not required a breach *k'shfoferet ha'nod* (*Mikvaot* 5:4), yet rules like the *Chachamim* here that the *mikvaot* only combine in the case of a vertical crack (*Mikvaot* 8:5). Consequently if *R' Yehuda's* opinion here is in line with the earlier *Mishnah* then the *Rambam's* rulings are contradictory. Nevertheless the *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that the case here is different. In the earlier case the wall already could not stand independently. In that case the *Rambam* agrees with *R' Yehuda*. Here however, the wall has only a crack and will eventually become weakened which is not reason enough for the *Rambam*.

The *Mishnah Achrona* explains the opinion of *R' Yehuda* in a different manner, thereby avoiding the problem dealt with by the *Tifferet Yisrael*. He explains that *R' Yehuda* requires the area of crack to be *k'shfoferet ha'nod* (rather than ordinarily requiring the diameter to be so). Moreover the crack must specifically be a horizontal one such that waters combine across the full width. The reason is that wherever anyone immerses, they will be opposite the crack that combines the two *mikvaot* (see also the *Taz* on YD 101:54). (The *Tifferet Yisrael* however finds this explanation

difficult since even with a horizontal crack, one could immerse small utensils without them passing in front of that crack.)

The *R' Yerucham* however explains that both the *Chachamim* and *R' Yehuda* require the area of the (valid) cracks to be *k'shfoferet ha'nod*. If so, about what do they argue? The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that according to this understanding, everyone would agree that the direction of the crack does not matter. They are however concerned that if the water level changes, thereby reducing the water flow through the crack, one will not notice and immerse in an invalid *mikveh*. The *Chachamim* argue that this would not be a concern in the case of a vertical crack as the changes to the water level are visible. *R' Yehuda* however argues that cracks are generally fine and gradual changes would not be as recognisable compared with horizontal crack that completely appears above the water line.

## Stepping out of a *Mikveh*

Mikvaot (7:6)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

A *Mishnah* discusses a fascinating case (7:6). A *mikveh* containing exactly forty *seah* (the minimum volume) is used by one that requires it. As he steps out he will take some of the water with him thereby invalidating the *mikveh* for anyone that would follow him. A debate ensues in the *Mishnah* regarding the second person that enters the *mikveh* as the first person is stepping out. The first opinion is that since he has taken some of the water out with him it is too late for the second person; the *mikveh* is invalid. *R' Yehuda* explains that provided that the first person still has his feet in the *mikveh*, the *mikveh* is valid. The water on the body of the first person is still considered connected to and part of the *mikveh*'s water. How are we to understand the debate?<sup>88</sup>

The *Mishnah Achrona* initially suggests that perhaps the debate could be understood as whether water that flows (*ketafres*), i.e. down the first person's body, can be considered attached. He uses this suggestion to explain another potential question. The next *Mishnah* teaches that if one immerses a bed, and its legs sink into the thick muddy floor, that the immersion is nonetheless valid. One cannot immerse in thick mud and that area should be considered as if it were outside the *mikveh*. Nonetheless the *Mishnah* explains that everyone agrees that it is valid as the *mikveh* water precede the bed legs and surround them as they sink into the mud and that water is considered attached to the *mikveh*. That case appears similar to our own, yet the *Mishnah* does not record a debate. He explains that the difference in this case is that

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<sup>88</sup> Note that the *Gemara* (*Chagigah* 19a) provides two opinions regarding the whether the debate is only regarding one that requires immersion as a stringency or whether it relates to one that definitely requires immersion. This aspect has been neglected in our discussion.

water that is surrounding the person is flowing unlike the water that surrounds the bed leg.

The *Tosfot* (*Gittin* 16) however question this explanation as a *Mishnah* in *Taharot* (8:9) teaches that *ketafres* is not considered an attachment and this point is not debated. *R' Tam* there explains that this case is different in that since the water is destined to fall in the *mikveh* it is considered attached.<sup>89</sup> In other words sometimes *ketafres* is considered attached and this case is one such instance. According to the *Maharik* this is indeed the debate in our *Mishnah*: can water that is flowing but will inevitably land in the *mikveh* be considered attached now?

Nevertheless the *Mishnah Achrona* cites the explanation of the *Rivash* who explains that indeed everyone agrees that *ketafres* is considered attached. What then is the debate? The *Mishnah* continues that if a *sagos* (thick blanket) is immersed in a forty *seah mikveh* and a person immerses in it as it is being removed, that absorbed water is considered attached to the *mikveh*. He understands that this is the universal opinion; *ketafres* in this context is considered attached. But why is this case agreed upon and our earlier case debated? The *Rivash* explains that the *sagos* has completely absorbed a great volume of water. In our case, there is only a thin layer of water that covered the first person as he exits the *mikveh*. Consequently *R' Yehuda* and the *Chachamim* debate whether such a thin layer qualifies as being attached. The *Tosfot Yom Tov* (3:2) explains in a similar manner that the *Chachamim* argue that since as the person exists he may be partially dry, the water on his body cannot be considered attached.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* attempts to answer the earlier question of the *Tosfot* that it is true that *R' Yehuda* agrees with the *Mishnah* in *Taharot* that *ketafres* is not considered attached. Nonetheless, the water in our case is not flowing down a slope – the body is vertical. Consequently we use a different principle of *gud achit*;

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<sup>89</sup> See also the answer of the *Ri* cited in that *Tosfot*.

we conceptually “pull down” the water and consider it already in the *mikveh* below.<sup>90</sup> Accordingly, as explained by the *Bartenura*, the case of the *sagos* cited above must be only according to the opinion of *R’ Yehuda*. That is because the *Chachamim* would maintain that neither *ketafres* nor *gud achit* could apply in that case.

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<sup>90</sup> The term borrowed from, and more familiar in, the law of partitions.

## Nidah

### Backward Rulings about *Tumat Nidah*

#### Nidah (1:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The first *Mishnah* in *Masechet Niddah* deals with a woman that discovers that she is a *nidah*. A woman becomes a *nidah* when the *dam* detaches even if it has not left her body. At that point she becomes *tameh*. Since it is possible that she became a *niddah* some time prior to discovering the fact, a debate ensues in the *Mishnah* regarding the status of the *taharot* that she touched prior to this discovery. Do we assume that they are *tameh*? If so, how far back in time do we make that assumption?

There are three opinions in the *Mishnah*. *Beit Shammai* says that everything that she touched prior to the discovery is deemed *tahor*. *Beit Hillel* takes the opposite positioning that everything that she touched since the last time she did *bedika* is considered *tameh* – even if it was a number of days. The *Chachamim* however rule that anything within the time period of twenty-four hours or since the last *bedika* (whichever is shorter) is *tameh*; anything prior to that is *tahor*.

It has been some time, but with *masechet Nidah* we once again have the fortune of a *Gemara* to enhance our learning. The *Gemara* analyses this debate extensively. Nonetheless we will focus only on the first understanding brought of the debate.<sup>91</sup> The *Gemara* begins by explaining that *Beit Shammai* holds that the

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<sup>91</sup> For example, *Rava* understands that everyone agrees that *m'ikar ha'din* everything is *tahor*. *Beit Hillel* however argues that an extra stringency should be enacted with respect to *taharot*. *Beit Shammai* feels that such a stringency could hinder *priya u'reviya* whereas *Beit Hillel* disagrees as the stringency only applies to *Taharot*.

woman has a *chazakah* that she is *tahor*. Since she was *tahor* previously we make a presumption that she was *tahor* till now.

A question is raised on this understanding of *Beit Shammai*. Recall the (generalised) distinction made when we were learning *Taharot*: a doubt regarding *tumah* in the public domain is *tahor*, while in the private domain it is *tameh*<sup>92</sup>. The latter ruling of *tameh* is despite a *chazakah* in the reverse! The *Ran* provides two answers. The first is that the law of the *safek tumah* in a private domain is *tameh* is learnt from *parashat Sotah*. There the source of *tumah* is a certainty; the doubt however is concerning contact. In our case doubt is with the source of *tumah* itself – when did she become a *nidah*? Consequently our case is different and we can rely on a *chazakah*.

The *Ran* provides another answer. The principle of *safek tumah* in a private domain is *tameh* is a ruling that applies only from the time that the doubt occurs and onwards. Here we are trying to achieve more than that. The question is whether we can retroactively cause all the *taharot* she touched to become *tameh*. Consequently we can rely on a *chazakah*.

How would *Beit Hillel* respond?

The *Gemara* continues that while the principle of *chazakah* would ordinarily apply, this case is different since there is a “*rei’uta*”. *Rashi* explains that in normal cases when an item is *tahor* and we have no reason to assume this item will ever become *tameh*. When faced with a doubt we maintain the status quo. In our case however, she will inevitably become *tameh* as part of the natural cycle. In such cases a *chazakah* does not help.

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<sup>92</sup> Review the various exceptions to this generalised rule.

## Ha'Ba'in min HaDerech

Nidah (2:4)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (2:4) teaches that a husband that is *ba'in min ha'derech*, returning from afar, can assume that his wife is *tahor* – there is no need to ask if she is a *nidah*.

The *Gemara* (15a) discusses exactly when the husband is returning. *Rav Huna* explains that the husband left after she was *tahor*, but is returning prior to her *veset*. The *Gemara* explains that *Rav Huna* maintains that *vestot* is *d'oraita*. In other words, had he returned after the *veset*, the assumption prior to inquiring would be that she is *tameh*.

*Raba bar bar Chana* however argues that even if he returned after the *veset* the rule of the *Mishnah* still applies. The *Gemara* explains that this is because *Raba bar bar Chana* maintains that *vestot* are *d'rabbanan*.

How are we to understand the opinion of *Raba bar bar Chana*? Even if the *vestot* is *d'rabbanan* the requirement to separate near the *veset* should not be affected unchanged? (See 63b.) What difference does the fact that *vestot* are *rabbanan* make?

The *Tosfot* explains that the debate is not about if the husband is returning close to the time of the *veset*, but rather if he returns time enough after the *veset* for *tevilah* as well. Consequently there are two *sfeikot*. The first is regarding the *veset* and the second is regarding the *tevilah*. According to *Rav Huna* if *vestot* are *d'oraita*, then the first *safek* is not considered a doubt at all, but rather a certainty. Consequently a *safek tevilah* will not help in such a case. According to *Raba bar bar Chana* however, *vestot*

are *d'rabbanan*. Consequently the *safek tevilah* has the ability to alleviate that *safek* that there was a *re'iyah*.<sup>93</sup>

The *Mishnah Achrona* notes that one point in the *Tosfot's* explanation needs clarifying. In their explanation we stated that according to the opinion that *vestot* are *d'oraita* it is no longer a doubt, rather a certainty that she is *tameh*. But on what basis can we say that it is a “certainty”. Is it a *chazakah*? If so then there is no room for debate – everyone must agree that husband must assume she is *tameh*. The *Mishnah Achrona* therefore explains that according to the opinion that *vestot* are *d'oraita*, this case is considered a *safek d'oraita*. (The *Mishnah Achrona* points us to *Rashi* who explains this point in a similar way.) In all such cases we have learnt that one acts stringently. It is not that she is definitely *tameh*. Nevertheless, according to *Rav Huna* the husband would be required to act stringently.

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<sup>93</sup> Other explanations are brought in the *Rishonim* without the week extension of the *Tosfot*. The *Rashba* explain that according to the *Raba bar bar Chana* that in truth the prohibition being *d'rabbanan* should not make no difference. However, in the case of *ba'in min ha'derech* the *rabbanan's* rule itself is relaxed. The *Ritva* dismisses this explanation for a number of reasons, one being that such a *heter* is not mentioned anywhere explicitly. The *Ritva* himself suggest that that the debate is regarding a case where the wife did not check on the *veset*. According to *Rav Huna* since *vestot* are *d'oraita*, a later check won't help and she is assumed *tameh*.

## Bnot Kutim

### Nidah (4:1)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*Kutim* were a group of non-Jews that settled in *Shomron* after the exile of the ten tribes. They converted, yet their motives were questionable. Furthermore they were not careful in the observance of many *mitzvot* and therefore questions relating to them appear in the *Mishnayot*.

The story of the *Kutim* conversion is recorded in *Melachim* (2 17). They had seized land and settled in *Shomron*; *Hashem* then sent lions to attack them. Out of fear of the lions they converted. Even though conversion from ulterior motives does not necessarily invalidate a conversion (*Yevamot* 24b), the case of the *Kutim* is different since they never abandoned their idols (*Tosfot*).

The *Tanaim* debate whether the *kuti'im* are true converts. *R' Meir* argues that they were true converts. The *Tosfot* explain that such opinions must understand that they later converted properly. *R' Yosi* however maintains that they never truly converted – “*gerei arayot hem*” (*Menachot* 66a). The *Rambam* (on our *Mishnah*) explains that the debate is only at a “first teaching”, however now it is accepted that they are not Jewish.

The *Mishnah* (4:1) teaches that the daughters of *Kutim* are considered *nidot* from birth. Why? The *Gemara* (*Niddah* 31b) explains that the *Chachamim* learnt that *tumat niddah* can apply to women even if they are *ketanot*. The derivation is made from the extra inclusive “*vav*” in the word “*ve'isha*” in the *pasuk* from which we learn *tumat niddah* (*Vayikra* 15:19). The *Kutim* disregarded this derivation. Consequently the *Chachamim* considered all *bnot Kutim* to be *tameh niddah* as they would not be concerned about *dam* of *ketanot*. The *Gemara* explains further that this reasoning would not ordinarily be enough. The reason

being is that only a minority of *ketanot* would see *dam*. Nevertheless, the *Gemara* explains that the opinion cited in our *Mishnah* is the opinion of *R' Meir* who gives weight to a minority concern.

Note that the concern that they are *tameh* can only be in line with *R' Meir* as he maintains that the *Kutim* are real converts and *nidah d'oraita* only applies to *Bnot Yisrael*. According to *R' Yosi* who maintains that *Kutim* are *gerei arayot*, certain *nidah* would be *d'rabbanan* and the ruling in a case of doubt would be *tahor*.

Many of the *Rishonim* ask why the *Gemara* was forced to say that the *Gemara* was only the opinion of *R' Meir*. The *Gemara* in *Shabbat* (13b) lists the eighteen laws that were decided upon when *Beit Shammai* outnumbered *Beit Hillel*. Amongst the list of *halachot* is the one mentioned in our *Mishnah*. The *Gemara* raises this law as one of the eighteen explicitly stating that it is in line with the opinion of *R' Yosi*! The *Ran* answers that the law there is framed as a decree and understood to be a measure preventing intermarrying with *Kutim*.

The *Ritva* answers (first answer) that that the *Gemara's* explanation in *Shabbat* that the law is a *gezeirah* is according to *R' Yosi* yet our *Mishnah* is like *R' Meir*. The *Tosfot* however argue that the *Gemara* in *Shabbat* implies that the law is universally agreed upon and not held only by *R' Meir*. Therefore it would have been far simpler to explain that our *Mishnah* is based on the *gezeirah* mentioned in *Shabbat* and shared by all. What forced the *Gemara* to explain that our *Mishnah* is like *R' Meir*?

The *Tosfot* answers that since the *Mishnah* continues with a further concern regarding their *re'iat dam* (“*hen yoshvot al kol dam*”) our ruling is based on a concern regarding *dam* and not intermarrying. Similarly the *Rashba* and *Ritva* (second answer) derives the same point for the fact that the *Mishnah* closes with the statement that their *tumah* is based on a doubt (and not “by

rabbinic decree”). That explanation can only make sense according to *R' Meir*.

A question remains on *R' Yosi*'s position on this law. We have explained that he maintains that *Kutim* are *gerei arayot* – they did not effectively convert. If that is the case *bnot kutim* should be not be different to a *goya* where the *gezeirah* of *tumah* only applies from the age of three. The *Tosfot* explains that there was need for more excessive measures as the *Kutim* kept some *mitzvot*; consequently there was less of a natural separation.

**Mufla Samuch L'Ish**  
**Nidah (5:6)**  
**Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier**

The *Mishnah* teaches us about the laws that apply to girls and boys at various ages below twelve and thirteen years respectively. One *Mishnah* (5:6) discussed the novel law that applies to a girl and boy in their twelfth and thirteenth years (prior to turning twelve and thirteen). The *Mishnah* teaches that if the minor makes a *neder* (vow) in that year, one must assess if the minor fully understood “for Whom she made the *neder*”. If the minor demonstrates a satisfactory level of understanding then the *neder* is binding on a biblical level (see *Bamidbar* 6:2). The *Mishnah* then adds that “we recheck [her] the entire twelfth year.” What is the meaning of the *Mishnah* and what is it teaching that we would do not already know?

The *Gemara* (*Nidah* 45b) explains that the *Mishnah* had to teach that there is a requirement to continually assess whether she understands when making *nedarim* throughout the year. In many *halachic* contexts a month is considered a year. Therefore if she failed in our assessment in the first month, one might have thought that no further checking would be required. *Rashi* explains that one might have thought that the *chazakah* is formed in the first month and none of her further *nedarim* would be considered till she turned twelve.

The *Mishnah Achrona* question the above explanation of the *Gemara*. How could the *Gemara* explain that one might think that such a leniency could be based on the *chazakah* formed in the first month of the twelfth year? Firstly, there is a principle that one cannot rely on a *chazakah* if it is possible to check and clarify the matter – as in our case. Furthermore, it is a bad *chazakah* as it is likely to change. There is a good possibility that as she develops during the year her intellect will mature.

Based on these difficulties the *Mishnah Achrona* cites the *Rambam's* version of the *Gemara* which is the complete opposite understanding. He explains that one might have thought that if she passed the test then no further checking would be required and all her *nedarim* would be binding. The *Mishnah* therefore teaches that even if in the beginning of the year she has passed the test, nevertheless checking is required for the remainder of that year. The *Meiri* explains that we are concerned that the earlier result was successful by chance.

The *Meiri* indeed combines both understandings. In other words, irrespective of her past performance, whether pass or fail, the *Mishnah* requires continual checking during that year.

## Searching for *Chametz*

Nidah (7:2)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

Cases of doubt regarding *tumah* appeared once again in our *masechet*. The *Mishnah* (7:2) discussed the question of how one should treat the items in a *mavoi* (laneway) if a dead *sheretz* (a source of *tumah*) is found there. The issue is that perhaps some items touched the *sheretz* and became *tameh* unknowingly. The question is particularly important as a *mavoi* has the status of a private domain making the ruling for any cases of doubt inside it *tameh*. Indeed the *Mishnah* rules that way. Nevertheless how far back in time do we rule that all the contents became *tameh*? The *Mishnah* explains that we assume the *sheretz* has been there since either a time when one can state that they checked the *mavoi* or since “sweeping time”.

The *Gemara* asks, what assumption is the *Mishnah* making stating that one can assume that the *mavoi* was empty of the *sheretz* after sweeping? Is it that we assume that the *mavoi* was also adequately checked at the time of sweeping? Or do we simply assume that sweeping alone would have collected the *sheretz*?

The *Gemara* (*Nidah* 56) provides two cases that illustrate the difference between these explanations. The first is that if the person that swept the *mavoi* said he swept but did not check. According to the first understanding this would not be adequate and even items that were in the *mavoi* prior to that sweeping would be *tameh*. The second case is if the *sheretz* was found in a crack. Since sweeping without checking would not collect the *sheretz*, items in the *mavoi* prior to then would also be *tameh*.

After some deliberation, the *Gemara* concludes that the assumption is that checking was performed at the time of

sweeping. Consequently, if the sweeper did not say that he did not check, even if a *sheretz* is found in a crack, any items that were in the *mavoi* prior to sweeping are *tahor*.

The *Mordechai* in *Pesachim* (536) derives two important conclusions from our *Mishnah* that apply to searching for *chametz* prior to *Pesach*. The first is that sweeping alone is not enough as there is a concern that it will not collect the *chametz* in the cracks. One must also search for *chametz* in those swept rooms. This ruling is brought down by in the *Shulchan Aruch* (433:11) to which the *Magen Avraham* adds that if one swept every room but only inspected some, then they have not fulfilled the obligation for checking the remaining rooms (also the *Bach*, citing the *Trumat HaDeshen*).

The second conclusion drawn by the *Mordechai* is that one must sweep prior to checking – checking cannot be performed without it! This ruling is also brought down by the *Rama* (*ibid*).

While the first conclusion that sweeping alone is not enough appears to be explicitly stated in the *Gemara*, from where does the *Mordechai* derive that sweeping is necessary for proper checking? The *Bigdei Yesha* (31) explains that the answer lies in our *Mishnah*. Recall that the *Mishnah* states that there are two options: where someone stated they checked the *mavoi* or when it was swept. If sweeping requires checking as the *Gemara* concludes, why was it necessary to include both options? Just include the first: “I checked it”! The *Bigdei Yesha* explains that the *Mordechai* understood that the *Mishnah* included both as it was accepted that the only way of thoroughly checking was to sweep first. Consequently if they swept, it could be assumed that they were checking (second case in the *Mishnah*) otherwise they would be required to explicitly state that they checked extremely well (the first case).

## Mixed Pile

### Nidah (9:5)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (9:5) draws similarities between a case of doubt relating to *tumat nidah* and the following case. There was a pile of stones, amongst which was a *kezayit* of flesh from a corpse – a source of *tumat met*. The identity of this *tameh* pile became confused with two other piles of stones that were *tahor*. The *Mishnah* taught that if one or two of the piles were inspected and found not to contain the *tumah*, then only the remaining pile or piles are deemed *tameh*. What is the law if all three piles are searched and the missing *tumah* is not located?

The *Mishnah* records a debate. *R' Meir* maintains that all three are *tameh* while the *Chachamim* maintain that all are *tahor*. Even though the *Chachamim* effectively agree with *R' Meir* in the comparable case concerning *tumat niddah*, the *Gemara* (*Nidah* 61a) explains that in this case they argue that one can assume a crow came and took away the *tumah*. How do we understand the opinion of *R' Meir*?

The *Mishnah* itself provides the reason: "... *R' Meir* understands that anything that has a *chazakah* of *tumah* is always *tameh* until it is known [with certainty] where the *tumah* went." Since in our cases the whereabouts of the *tumah* is unknown all the piles remain *tameh*.

The *Mishnah Achrona* questions *R' Meir's* ruling. We have learnt in *masechet Parah* (9:7) that if regular ash is mixed with *eifer Parah* (a source of *tumah*) and the regular ash is in the majority then the mixture is *tahor*. Here the *tameh* pile is in the minority. We should therefore consider the *tameh* pile as annulled (*batel*) in the majority - all should be *tahor*! Granted that prior to inspection the laws of *bitul* do not apply as means of clarifying the doubt are

still available, nevertheless after nothing is found the *tumah* should be *batel!*<sup>94</sup>

The *Mishnah Achrona* provides two different solutions. First we find that *bitul* does not apply to items that are attached to the ground. For example the *Mishnah* in *Orlah* (1:6) teaches that saplings of *orlah* or *kilei kerem* that become confused with regular saplings are all *assur*.<sup>95</sup> Consequently perhaps this case of the piles of stones is treated as attached to ground for these purposes.

The second answer of the *Mishnah Achrona* is as follows. Initially, as was explained earlier, since the piles were not checked, *bitul* could not be applied. Consequently all the piles were treated as *tameh* – they had a *chezkat tumah*. According to *R' Meir* once the *chezkat tumah* is applied, even momentarily, it stays until it can positively be removed.

The *Mishnah Achrona* adds that the second answer explains a number of points. Firstly we now understand we the *Mishnah* went at length to explain the opinion of *R' Meir*: "... *R' Meir* understands that anything that has a *chazakah* of *tumah* is always *tameh* until it is known [with certainty] where the *tumah* went." In other words this *chazakah* is established and stands in the face of the possibility of *bitul b'rov*. Furthermore, the same debate between the *R' Meir* and the *Chachamim* could have been recorded regarding a case where *tumah* was lost in a single pile, searched for and not found. Nevertheless stating the case in the way it does, the *Mishnah* is able to also teach that according to *R' Meir*, *bitul b'rov* does not help after this *chezkat tumah*.

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<sup>94</sup> He clarifies the question further that the piles are not considered *kavua* (fixed) such that the principle of *rov* does not apply. *Kavua* is only when the location of the *issur* and *heter* sources is know and the question is regarding an item that has separated from one of those sources.

<sup>95</sup> He also cites *Trumot* 6:5. Based on the question of the *Pri Chadash* (YD 110) he explains that this is a rabbinic stringency. See inside for more detail.

## Machshirin

### Hechsher – Willingly

#### Machshirin (1:1)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The laws presented in this *masechet* are mostly based on the following *pasuk* (*Vayikra* 11:38):

But if water has been placed (*v'chi yutan*) upon a seed then their *neveilah* falls upon it, it is *tameh* to you.

We learn from the above *pasuk* that for food to become *tameh* it must undergo *hechsher*. In other words it must come into contact with one of the seven liquids (as we will learn further 6:4).

We soon learnt of a number of prerequisites for *hechsher*. One is that the food must be detached from the soil. Another is that the (*tahor*) liquid (which also must be detached) must have come into contact with the *ratzon* (approval) of the owner of the food. What constitutes *ratzon* is discussed in the first *Mishnah*.

The *Mishnah* (1:1) teaches:

Any liquid that fell initially *l'ratzon*, even though at the end it was not *l'ratzon*; or if in the end it was *l'ratzon* even though in the beginning it was not *l'ratzon* – qualifies for *v'chi yutan*.

The *Mishnah* explains that even partial *ratzon* is enough for the water to enable *hechsher*. What is not immediately clear is what the “beginning” and “end” is referring to in the *Mishnah*.

Most of the *mefarshim* explain that the beginning refers to the time the water was detached. An example where there is *ratzon* in the beginning is where it is raining and the owner wish to use the water for a particular us, e.g. washing *keilim*. *Ratzon* in the end is when the water fell on the food.

The *Rambam* (*Tumat Ochlin* 12:2-3) however explains that the beginning refers to the beginning of when the water fell on the

food, and the end refers to the point when the food is still wet. If however the water that was detached without *ratzon*, it cannot perform *hechsher*. The *Ra'avad* argues with the *Rambam* there maintaining the previous understanding. How do we understand the debate?

*R' Chaim (al HaRambam)* explains as follows: The *Rambam* understands that there are two requirements for *hechsher*. The first is that water must be willingly detached for a detached purpose. The *Sifra* learns this requirement from the earlier *pasuk* (11:34): "...and any beverage that can be drunk..." The second requirement is that the water must also fall, or be on the fruit with *ratzon* – learnt from the above quoted *pasuk*. This derivation is as follows. The word in the *pasuk* "was placed" (*yutan*) is written in the *Torah* as *yiten* – "he will place". Just as one actively placing water is with *ratzon*, so too must the water now on the fruit be with *ratzon*. Therefore according to our *Mishnah* the second requirement is fulfilled either if the water is placed on willingly or if there is *ratzon* while the fruit is wet.

The *Ra'avad* (amongst other *mefarshim*) however understands that fulfilling one of these requirements is enough. But how does he deal with the two *pesukim*? He understands that second *pasuk* also refers to the "detaching" (*telisha*) of water. Consequently the *pesukim* are teaching that there is a requirement of *ratzon* at the time of *telisha*; yet there are two types of *telisha*. One *telisha* is when it is detached from the ground (referred to in the first *pasuk*). The second *telisha* is the subsequent *telisha* for placing the water on the food (learnt from the second *pasuk*). Consequently the *Mishnah* teaches that the requirement for *ratzon* at the time of *telisha* can be fulfilled in one of two ways: either at the time of detaching it from the ground (or when raining); or at the time it makes contact with the food.

## Using the Bathhouse after *Shabbat*

Machshirin (2:5)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (2:5) teaches:

A city that is populated by *yisraelim* and *nochrin*, and there is a bathhouse that was used on *Shabbat*, if the [population] is majority *nochrin* then a *yisrael* can use it immediately after *Shabbat*. If there is a majority *yisraelim* then one must wait for the time it would take to heat the bath [before using it]. If it is half-half, then one must wait for the time it would take to heat the bath. *R' Yehuda* says, that if the bath is small and the authorities have rights [to use it as they wish], then one can use it immediately after *Shabbat*.<sup>96</sup>

How do we understand the *Mishnah*?

When there is a majority of *yisrael*, it is presumed that the water was heated for the *yisraelim* – consequently it cannot be used immediately after *Shabbat*, rather they must wait the time it would take to heat the bath. The *Mishnah Berurah* explains that this is so that no benefit is derived from the *nochri* performing the *melacha* for them on *Shabbat* (*Rashi, Ran*). Furthermore it is a *gezeirah* to prevent one from asking a *nochri* to perform *melacha* on *Shabbat* (which is forbidden) in order that he can use the product immediately after *Shabbat* (*Tosfot, Rambam*).

The *Mishnah Achrona* points out that there are times that the product can be *assur* indefinitely. Unlike this case, it is where the *melacha* is performed public. This law is learnt from the *Gemara Shabbat* (151) where a coffin or grave site was constructed in a public manner. The *Mishnah Berurah* however cites the *Ran* that explains that the indefinite *issur* is only in the case of a grave site

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<sup>96</sup> Whether *R' Yehuda* is arguing or adding to the first opinion is debated in the *Rishonim*. The *Rashi* implies that *R' Yehuda* is adding to the first opinion, while the *Rambam* understand that the point that *R' Yehuda* raises is debated. A discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this article.

where it would be a disgrace to the deceased to be buried in place where it is known publicly that *Shabbat* desecration occurred. (He rules that that opinion can be relied on in cases of great need.)

Returning to the *Mishnah*, when there is a majority of *nochri* citizens, it is presumed that the water was heated for the *nochrin* and it can be used immediately after *Shabbat*. The *Mishnah Achrona* adds that the water cannot however be used on *Shabbat* itself. He continues noting that we learn in *Gemara Shabbat* (122a) that if there is a group with a majority of *nochrin* and a *nochri* lights a candle, all can benefit from the light. Why is this case different? The *Tosfot* explains that the *Chachamim* understood that there is an extra concern by food that one might perform the *melacha* themselves, as one is naturally drawn to food. Such a concern does not apply to candle light. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that since bathing also benefits the body, it too shares the same concern.

One question that was asked is that even in a city where the majority of the population are *nochrin*, it is quite possible that the majority of the people that will use the bathhouse after *Shabbat* will be *yisraelim*. Consequently does that impact on our understanding of the *Mishnah*? The *Mishnah Berurah* (326:38) explains that the majority that is referred to in the *Mishnah* is not referring to the dwellers but rather the people that would use the bathhouse *motzei Shabbat*. The reason is that if the majority of the users at that time are *yisraelim*, even though they might be the minority of the population, it can be safely assumed that the heating performed towards the end of *Shabbat* was for them.

## Whose *Ratzon* is needed for *Hechsher*?

Machshirin (4:7)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

Earlier we discussed the requirement of *ratzon* (approval) for *hechsher*. Then the discussion was focused on the when *ratzon* was required. It was however assumed that the person that had to provide the *ratzon* was the owner of the food. The question of whether the *ratzon* of another person is significant is the subject of debate.

The *Rambam* (*Tumat Ochlin* 12:1) rules that the approval must be supplied by the owner. The *Rashba* (*Chulin* 32b) however cites a *Tosfot* that argues that the *ratzon* of anyone could satisfy the requirement when placing one of the liquids on food. One such proof is one of the *Mishnayot* (4:7): “Fruit that falls into a stream, and one whose hands are *tameh* (*mi she’hayu*) retrieved them...” The implication from the wording of the *Mishnah* is that it could be referring to anyone and not specifically the owner. The *Kesef Mishnah* however argues that it is illogical that the approval of one person could cause *tumah* to another person’s property and argues that the proofs or implications provided are not strong enough.

Another *Mishnah* could at first provide a difficulty to the *Rambam*’s position. The *Mishnah* (5:1) teaches that if one playfully pushes another person into the water, the water that comes off the victim after he exits is considered *b’chi yutan* – it would be able to affect *hechsher* if it came into contact with food. The difficulty is that the water certainly did not become detached from the river with the approval of the victim; it was only with the *ratzon* of the person who pushed him in. The *Chazon Nachum* notes that the debate regarding the requirement for *ratzon ba’alim* is not relevant here. Why?

The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that there is a significant difference. The debate regarding *ratzon ba'alim* is only regarding where the food itself fell into the water or where the water fell on the food. As mentioned in the earlier article, that law is learnt from the difference in the way we read (*yutan*) and the way the word *yiten* is written in the following *pasuk*: “But if water has been placed (*v'chi yutan*) upon a seed then their *neveilah* falls upon it, it is *tameh* to you” (*Vayikra* 11:38). The derivation is that just as one actively placing water is with *ratzon*, so too must the water now on the fruit be with *ratzon*. Just whose *ratzon* is required is debated. This later case of the friend joking around is regarding the requirement that the water be detached from its source with *ratzon*. All would agree explains the *Mishnah Achrona*, that the requirement can be satisfied by anyone.<sup>97</sup>

But why then is the requirement for *ratzon* when detaching the water more relaxed? Perhaps this can be answered again based on the earlier article (in which we cited *R' Chaim HaLevi al HaRambam*). We had explained that the requirement that the water be detached with *ratzon* is learnt from a different *pasuk*: “...and any beverage that can be drunk...” (11:34). This *pasuk* appears to make a far broader statement regarding the nature of the liquid. Consequently just as we had learnt there are two points in time where there is a requirement for *ratzon*, here we learn that according to some opinions, who can supply that *ratzon* at both times can be different.

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<sup>97</sup> The *Eliyahu Raba* however provides a different distinction. He explains that in a case where the provision of *ratzon* is dependent of *machshava* (thought) alone then that can only be provided by the owner. This case is different since the “friend” performed an action as well. If one performs an action, then they are able to cause *hechsher* to another person’s fruit.

## Nitzuk

### Machshirin (5:9)

### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (5:9) taught that if one poured liquid from a *tahor* utensil into a *tameh* utensil, the liquid in the first utensil remains *tahor*. In other words the concept of *nitzuk chibur* does not apply; the stream does not connect the liquids in both utensils.

The *Gra* (*Eliyahu Raba, Taharot* 8:9) asks an important question. Granted that the stream does not connect the liquid to make them one, nevertheless each drop in the stream should cause the next drop above it to become *tameh*. Recall the rabbinic decree regarding liquids that become *tameh*, that even if they came in contact with a *sheni le'tumah* they would be considered a *rishon le'tumah* and be able to pass on *tumah* (see *Para* 8:7). Consequently each drop should cause the next to be *tameh* until the liquid in the upper *kli* would be *tameh*!

The *Gra* therefore explains that this case must be where the lower utensil contained *trumah* liquid that became *tameh* through a *tevil yom*. A *tevil yom* is one that was *tameh*, immersed in a *mikveh* and is waiting for nightfall to become *tahor*. During that time this person is a *sheni le'tumah*. Importantly for our discussion, *trumah* that came into contact with a *tevil yom* is the exception to the above described *gezeirah* and the *trumah* cannot transmit *tumah*. The only way for the liquid in the upper *kli* to become *tameh* would be if it were considered connected to the *tameh* liquid in the bottom one.

The *Rambam* (*Tumat Ochlin* 7:1) however explicitly rules that even if liquid was poured directly onto a *sheretz* – an *av ha'tumah* – we still do not rule *nitzuk chibur* and the stream itself is *tahor*. How can the question of the *Gra* be answered?

The *Sha'arei Yoshav* (3:27) answers that in this case the *tumah* cannot be transferred from drop to drop. The reason is that the case is considered *tumat beit setarim*. In other words, the *tumah* is concealed and therefore cannot be a source of *tumah*. The *Mishnah* in *Keilim* (27:10) discussed a small patch that was *tameh midras* and tore in half making each half less than the minimum size to be susceptible to *tumat midras*, *R' Yosi* ruled that each half would *tahor* even though they are large enough to contract other forms of *tumah*. The reason is that the point of contact of the two parts when the patch was complete was not visible. In this case as well, since the point where the drops connect is not recognisable, *tumah* is not transferred.

The *Chazon Ish* (5:10) however provides a different answer. He explains that the reason for the *gezeirah* is that if we made liquid that touched a *sheni le'tumah tahor* (as it should) then one might make a mistake and consider liquid that touched a *sheretz* also *tahor* when it is really *tameh m'de'oraita*. Consequently the *gezeirah* was made making liquids that came into contact with *tameh* food considered *rishon le'tumah*. In this case however, since there is a constant stream and each drop is never isolated there is no room for error and the *gezeirah* does not apply.

## Zavim

### Bein Ha'Shmashot and Zavim

#### Zavim (1:6)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

A *zav* refers to a man who has had an unusual emission. Such an emission on one occasion would not make him a *zav* (instead he would be considered a *ba'al keri*). Having seen two sightings he would be considered a *zav* and three would make him a *zav gamur*. Unlike a *zava* these sightings may all be on the same day. However, as learnt in the first *Mishnah* a day's break in between sightings prevents them from combining to make one a *zav* or *zav gamur*. Both a *zav* and *zav gamur* are sources of *tumah* (for seven days) and can transmit *tumah* in more ways than other forms of *tumah* (*maga, heiset, mishkav u'merkav, even mesama*). The difference between a *zav* and *zav gamur* is that a *zav gamur* is required to bring a *korban* at the end of the purification process.

The *Mishnah* (1:6) discusses various cases involving sightings during *bein ha'shmashot* – “twilight”<sup>98</sup>. One case for example is where a *zav* had two sightings in consecutive *bein ha'shmashot*. The *Mishnah* rules that in such a case there is a doubt whether the person is obligated to bring a *korban* and whether he is *tameh*. In other words there is a doubt whether he is a *zav gamur* or not *tameh mishkav* like a *zav*.

To explain, *bein ha'shmashot* is a period of time where it is doubtful whether it is day or night (i.e. *halachically* the next day). The entire period could be day or night, or the transition some time during it. Another important law to consider is that if an emission bridges two days, no matter how small the duration, it is considered like two sightings. If we assume that the sightings

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<sup>98</sup> The exact parameters of *bein ha'shmashot* are the subject of debate and beyond the scope of this article.

were Monday evening *bein ha'shmashot* and the following Tuesday then there are number of possibilities. There were three sightings making him a *zav gamur*: Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. There were only two sightings making him a regular *zav*: Monday and Tuesday or Tuesday and Wednesday. Finally there may have been two sightings with a day's break in between which would mean he is not a *zav* at all – Monday and Wednesday.

The following question is asked. If the person saw at the same time during *bein ha'shmashot* both evening then he would certainly be *tameh*. The status of *bein ha'shmashot* would not change from day to day.<sup>99</sup> Consequently it is impossible to say that there was a day's break in between because that time is either day both times or night. Using the above example, the sightings were at least Monday and Tuesday or Tuesday and Wednesday. He should therefore certainly be considered *tameh zav*.

The *Rash* and *Bartenura* explain that the *Mishnah's* case is where the person saw earlier in the first *bein ha'shmashot* than the second. Consequently it could have been day on the first sighting (Monday) but night on the second (Wednesday). The *Ritva* explaining *Rashi* holds a similar position that in our case the person did not know when exactly during *bein ha'shmashot* the emissions occurred. Consequently it is possible that the second sighting was later in *bein ha'shmashot* than the first.

The *Tosfot* (*Shabbat* 34b s.v. *safek*) brings another solution in the name of the *Rashbam*. The case of the *Mishnah* is where the person saw during *bein ha'shmashot* at the same time on Monday evening and Wednesday evening. Consequently there are only really two outcomes. Either it was day both times or night both times. If that were the case then there would be a day in between

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<sup>99</sup> Even though the *Tosfot* understands that *Rashi* held this position, other commentaries explained *Rashi's* position in different ways. E.g. see *Sfat Emet*, *Pnei Yehoshua* (and the *Ritva* discussed further in the article.)

and the person would not be a *zav*. Alternatively, the emission occurred during the transition between day and night both times and he would have had four consecutive sightings making him a *zav gamur*. According the doubt regarding the *tumah* and *korban* is whether he is a *zav gamur* or not a *zav* at all. In this explanation however it is not possible that he is only a regular *zav*.

## Zav on a Bed

Zavim (4:7)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

One of the unique ways in which a *zav* can transfer *tumah* is *tumat mishkav*. In other words a *zav* can transfer *tumah* to an object usually fit for sitting on by standing, lying, sitting or leaning on it; or by being raised when the object acts as a counter-weight. When *tumah* is transferred, that item becomes an *av ha'tumah* like the *zav* himself. An additional novelty is that if the *zav* sat on a pile of such objects they would all become *avot ha'tumah*. A case that is debated in the *Mishnah* (4:7) is where a *zav* sat on a bed and under each leg of the bed was a cloak. The *Chachamim* ruled that in that case each of the garments is *tameh* while *R' Shimon* maintained that each of them is *tahor*. What is at the core of the debate?

This *Mishnah* is raised in *Gemara Shabbat* (93a) in the context of another discussion. The question raised is regarding the liability of two people that performed one *melacha* on *Shabbat*. More specifically, if one of the men only assisted another that does not need help, then has he transgressed a biblical prohibition? The *Gemara* concludes that a *mesayeh* (one who assists) is exempt (even though rabbinically prohibited).

To elaborate further, the *Mishnah* (*Shabbat* 10:5) explains that if two people perform a *melacha* that each could perform on their own then they are exempt on a biblical level (nevertheless rabbinically prohibited). If however the *melacha* requires both of them (*ze eino yachol ve'ze eino yachol*), for example carrying a large couch, then there is a debate. The *Chachamim* rule that they are both *chayav* since it is as if each of them performed the *melacha* independently. *R' Shimon* however argues that both are exempt since each is considered only as assisting the other and not performing the complete *melacha*.

*Rashi* (ibid.) explains that that argument is behind our *Mishnah*. In other words, in the case of the bed each leg on its own cannot support the *zav* - all are required. Consequently the *Chachamim* maintain it is as if each of them is independently supporting the *zav* while *R' Shimon* understands that each leg is considered as only “assisting the other” and therefore “*patur*” – not assisting at all.

The *Tosfot* sighting the *Rashba* explains that the explanation provided by *Rashi* is not necessary, as this debate merely reflects an early one. The *Mishnah* (4:5) had discussed a case where a *zav* sat on scales and was raised by the weight of a number of items on the other side. The *Chachamim* ruled in that case that they are all *tameh mishkav* while *R' Shimon* disagreed. *R' Shimon* there argues that the reason that they are all *tahor* is because it was only their combined weight that raised the *zav*. *R' Shimon* explains that he requires one of the items to bare the majority of the weight. Consequently in our case as well since none of the garments beneath the bed bares the majority of the weight, none are *tameh*.

The *Sfat Emet* defends *Rashi* explaining that *Rashi* certainly agrees that in our *Mishnah* as well *R' Shimon* requires that one of the garments bare a majority of the weight. Nevertheless had he agreed with the *Chachamim* in the case of *ze eino yachol ve'ze eino yachol* then it would be considered as if each of the garments is bearing the full weight of the *zav*. Accordingly *Rashi* is explaining that *R' Shimon* only deems the clothes *tahor* because he requires them to hold most of the weight, and that even though each cannot hold the *zav* on their own, it is only considered *mesayeh* and not as if they are each independently holding the weight. As a further support to this explanation, perhaps this is why the debate appears to be recorded twice so that both this laws can be taught.

## Tevul Yom

### Mashkin from a Tevul Yom

#### Tevul Yom (2:1)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The new *masechet* discusses the laws relating to a *tevul yom*. After a person immerses in a *mikveh* to purify themselves from regular forms of *tumah*, the purification process does not end there. Granted that he may eat *chulin* (regular food), if this person is a *kohen* he may not eat *trumah* until nightfall (recall *Brachot* 1:1). Until then he is considered a *sheini le'tumah*.

The *Mishnah* (2:1) discusses the status of fluids that were either touched by a *tevul yom* or emitted from him. Ordinarily, if the case involved any other *tameh* person, the fluids that he emits, would be no different to the fluid he touches. They would be a *rishon le'tumah* with the exception of a few cases where they are an *av ha'tumah*. The *Mishnah* explains that in our case the liquids would not make anything else *tameh* (לא מטמאין). Exactly what the *Mishnah* means however is the subject of debate.

The *Bartenura* explains that the liquid would not be able to make *kodesh tameh*, yet it would *pasul* it. In other words the liquids could make *kodesh* into a *revi'i le'tumah*. This would mean that the liquids themselves must be a *sh'lishi le'tumah*. For that to be so, as the *Bartenura* suggests, the liquid that the *tevul yom* is described as touching in our *Mishnah* must be *trumah* since *chulin* cannot become a *sh'lishi le'tumah*. (This is also the opinion of the *Rash* and *Tosfot* in *Chulin* 87b.)

The *Rosh* presents a number of difficulties. Firstly, the *Mishnah* made no mention of *trumah* liquids; it only mentioned liquids. Furthermore why should we consider liquids that come from a *tevul yom* to be like *trumah* and thus become *sh'lishi*? The fluid that comes from a *tevul yom* is *chulin*! Finally the *Mishnah* does

not write that the liquids cannot make *kodesh tameh* – there is no mention of *kodesh*.

The *Rosh* therefore inserts a critical *yud* into one word of the *Mishnah*. The *Mishnah* therefore reads that the above mentioned liquids cannot become *tameh* (לֹא מֵיטְמָאִין). In other words the *Mishnah* teaches that a *tevul yom* cannot make liquids *tameh*, whether he emitted them or touched them. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that this is indeed what we learnt in *Nidah* (10:7) that if spittle drops from a *tevul yom* onto *trumah*, the *trumah* is *tahor* as that spittle is *tahor*.

The *Rambam* in *Hilchot Av Ha'Tumah* (10:4) rules like this second explanation. The liquids that come from a *tevul* are like the *chulin* that he touches (*tahor*) and if he touched *trumah* or *kodshim* they would be *sh'lishi* and *revi'i* respectively.

The *Tosfot Yom Tov* (*Nidah* 10:7) asks that the *Rambam* in *Hilchot Mishkav* (5:4) appears to contradict this ruling. There he rules that a *tevul yom* with respect to *kodshim* only is considered a *rishon le'tumah*. In other words, if the *tevul yom* touch *kodshim* it would be a *sheni le'tumah* and not a *revi'i* as explained above. The *Tosfot Yom Tov* is at a loss why the neither the *Raavad* or *Kesef Mishnah* question the *Rambam*.

The *Chazon Nachum* answers that the *Rambam* in the *Hilchot Mishkav* is referring to a *tevul yom* of a *yoledet* (one that has given birth). Such a case is treated much harsher than a regular *tevul yom*. The reason being is that she is *muchzeket be'damim*. The *Melech Shlomo* answers in a similar manner providing a different reason. A *tevul yom*, as explained at the start of this article, is only until nightfall. The period of time that a *yoledet* is considered a *tevul yom* however is much longer. Thus with respect to *kodshim* the ruling is more strict.

## Trumah in Porridge

### Tevul Yom (2:3)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (2:3) taught:

A thick porridge made of *trumah* mixed with garlic and oil that a *tevil yom* touched - the entire mixture is *pasul*. A thick porridge of *chulin* mixed with *garlic* and oil of *trumah* that a *tevil yom* touched – only the place he touched is *tameh*...

Recall that a *tevil yom* is a *sheni le'tumah* and can transfer *tumah* to *trumah* but not *chulin*. The first part of the *Mishnah* is understood; since the porridge (which is *trumah*) is the main part, the garlic and oil are *batel* towards it.

The *Gemara* (*Nazir* 36a) elaborates on the second case where the porridge is *chulin*. Why is only the part that the person touched *tameh*? If we follow the reasoning provided for the first cases, then the *trumah* garlic and oil should *batel* to the *chulin* porridge and the entire mixture should be *tahor*. The *Gemara* answers that the reason is because if a *zar* consumed a *kezayit* then he would be liable to lashes (*malkut*).

The *Gemara's* analysis requires explanation. Let us first ask a basic question: are the oil and garlic recognisable? If so, then the question of the *Gemara* does not make sense. Had a *tevil yom* directly touched the piece of *trumah* garlic why would anyone think that it should be *tahor*? If however the *trumah* oil and garlic were well mixed into the *chulin* porridge then how could only the place that was touched be *pasul*? It should be all or nothing!

*Rashi* (*Pesachim* 44a) takes the position that the *trumah* additives were well mixed in. He explains that the assumption in the question that everything should be *tahor*, is that a mixture where the ratio of *chulin* to *trumah* is less than one-hundred to one (*meduma*) but greater than a majority, is only rabbinically prohibited yet biblically annulled. Consequently for the purposes

of *tumah* everything should be *tahor*. Inherent in the *Gemara*'s answer that since if a *zar* (non-*kohen*) consumed *kezayit* he would be liable to *malkut*, is that *meduma* is biblically prohibited. Consequently the porridge is given a status of *trumah*. Nevertheless since its status is not as severe as real *trumah* it is only partially *tameh*.

The *Rabbeinu Tam* takes the opposite approach; the oil and garlic are indeed recognisable on top of the porridge. Consequently if they were directly touched, the parts alone would be *tameh* as the concept of *bitul* could not apply to the discernable *trumah* additives. Yet the difficulty with this understanding was how the *Gemara* could even think that everything is *tahor* if direct contact was made with the garlic. The *Rabbeinu Tam* explains that the *Mishnah* implied that the part that was touched was biblically invalid (by stating "*pasul*"). The *Gemara* asked that this cannot be possible since on a biblical level food must be the size of a *ke'beitzah* to become *tameh*. Consequently even the parts that were directly touched should be *tahor*! The *Gemara* then answers that since if a *zar* ate the mixture he could receive lashes, it is evidence that the porridge can combine the pieces together. The pieces can therefore combine also to make the parts that were touched *pasul*.

A further novelty in the position of the *Rabbeinu Tam* is that with respect to the first case where the porridge was *trumah* and the garlic and oil were *chulin*. In that case we find that even if a person only touched the *chulin* garlic, the porridge would be *pasul*. The reason is that the garlic would be acting as a "*yad*" for the porridge through which *tumah* can transfer. Perhaps leaving the last statement not fully explained can act as a good bridge to the coming *masechet*.

## Yadayim

### Two People Washing Hands Together

#### Yadayim (1:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*Masechet Yadayim* discusses the laws of washing hands. There are certain types of *tumah* that if touched, do not cause the person to be *tameh*, yet rabbinically cause their hands to be *sheni le'tumah*. If the person then touches *trumah* he would invalidate it. Similarly, since one is not always conscious of what their hands touch, the *Chachamim* ruled that all hands should be treated as being a *sheni le'tumah* until they are washed.<sup>100</sup> The subsequent washing would rid one's hands of *tumah*.<sup>101</sup> For contact with *kodshim* pouring water over the hands is not enough and they must be immersed in a *mikveh*. The *masechet* initially deals with the laws that relate to washing hands including the details that relate to the act of washing, the required water and the utensil that must be used.

One of the requirements is that a utensil containing a *revi'it* of water must be used (*Chulin* 107a). The *Mishnah Berurah* (OC 160:67) explains that the water should be poured twice on each hand. If the entire *revi'it* was poured on both hands at once then that would be enough. If one only needed to pour the water on one hand, a *revi'it* of water in the *kli* would still be required as

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<sup>100</sup> See the *Rambam's* introduction to this *masechet* who differentiates between *yadayim* that touched *tumah* and *stam yadayim*. Also see the *Mishnah Achrona's* comments on the *Rambam*.

<sup>101</sup> Washing hands prior to consuming bread today stems from this *masechet*. The *Chachamim* instituted that everyone wash their hands even prior to eating *chulin* bread so that the *kohanim* would become accustomed to washing their hands prior to eating. See the *Aruch HaShulchan* (OC 160:23) who explains that the *Rambam* differentiates between washing for *chulin* and washing for *trumah*.

this is the minimum measure required for this purification (*shiur tahara*).

The first *Mishnah* teaches that one *revi'it* of water can be used to wash two people's hands. If there is a requirement for a *revi'it* to be used for one person how can it now be shared by two people? The *Gemara* (*Chulin* 107a) explains that our case is different since "it is coming from *shiyarei tahara* – "remnants of *tahara*". What does this mean?

*Rashi* explains that in our cases one person is washing after the other. Even though when the second person takes the utensil it contains less than a *revi'it*, it is nevertheless acceptable since the *kli* initially had a *shiur tahara*. To explain, since in the beginning there was a *revi'it*, the water got a *din* of *tahara* water for these purposes thereby enabling the second person to use the water (provided there was enough left to cover his hands).

The *Rambam* however requires a *revi'it* of water when washing hands. Nevertheless there are two washings, the initial wash that purifies the hands (*mayim rishonim*) and the second that removes the *tameh* water left on the hands (*mayim shniyim*). The *Rambam* understands that our *Mishnah* is referring to *mayim shniyim* and teaches that even though *mayim rishonim* require a *revi'it*, since *mayim shniyim* remove the "remnants of *tahara*", they may suffice with enough to wash the *mayim rishonim* off.

The *Ramban* and *Rashba* understand that our *Mishnah* is referring to *mayim rishonim* and have two difficulties. Firstly if our case is where both parties wash their hands at the same time, then the term "remnants" does not fit. Secondly, if our case is where they washed one after the other then the second person will not be washing with a *revi'it*. They argue with *Rashi*, asserting that having a *revi'it* in the beginning should have no bearing on the fact that the second person is now washing without a *revi'it*.

Instead the *Ramban* and *Rashba* explain that our *Mishnah* is discussing a case where one washes after the other while the water is being poured as a constant stream. The case would be where the second person placed his hands directly under the first. The constant flow allows the water to be considered one mass thereby making as if the second person's hands are also immersed in a complete *revi'it* (*nitzuk chibur*). This then would be similar to the *Mishnah* in *Mikvaot* (7:6) where two people immersed in a *mikveh* with a minimum volume one after the next. Provided that the first person kept one foot in the water, it was as if the second person immersed in a valid *mikveh*.

Two additional points must be added to this final explanation. The *Beit Yosef* explains that the second person's hand must be close to the first person's. The reason is that if there is a gap, then it might be considered like the second person used water that was used for washing, which is invalid. The *Mishnah* would then be teaching if they are closed together then it is considered like their hands are one. The *Magen Avraham* adds that the case must be referring to where they came to wash together. If however one was washing and another quickly slipped his hands under, he would not be considered *shiyarei tahara*.

## Tumat Yadayim – Understanding D'Rabbanan

### Yadayim (3:2)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

A debate ensues in our *masechet* (3:2) regarding which *tumah* can make hands *tameh*:

Anything that invalidates *trumah* [a *sheni le'tumah*] makes hands *sheni le'tumah*. One [*tameh*] hand can make the other *tameh*. These are the words of *R' Yehoshua*. The *Chachamim* say that a *sheni le'tumah* cannot make [another thing] *sheni le'tumah*. [*R' Yehoshua*] said to them, *kitvei kodesh* are *sheni le'tumah* and make hands *tameh*! [The *Chachamim*] responded... one cannot derive conclusions from one rabbinic law to another.

On a simple level, the debate is regarding whether a *sheni le'tumah* can make hands *tameh*. The problem with this understanding is that this *Mishnah* would be repeating the previous one (3:1). There *R' Yehoshua* and the *Chachamim* argue regarding whether food or *keilim* that became *sheni le'tumah* through contact with *tameh* liquids can make hands *tameh*. Why is this debate repeated?

The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that there are different reasons behind the eighteen cases of rabbinic *sheni le'tumah*. Some are due to *derara detumah* - concerns regarding the risk that *tumah* will arise. For example, the *gezeirah* regarding contact with *tameh* liquids arising out of concern about contact with liquids from a *sheretz* or *zav*. Another reason is related to rabbinic prohibitions. For example one who immerses his head and a majority of his body in drawn water; the concern there is thinking that immersing in drawn water is valid. Similarly the *tumah* that applies to *kitvei kodesh* was born after people placed their *trumah* with the *sifrei kodesh* which attracted rodents that damaged the *sifrei kodesh*.

The *Mishnah Achrona* therefore explains that the previous *Mishnah* is referring to cases of *sheni le'tumah* connected to *derara detumah*; it discusses food that became *tameh* through

*tameh* liquids. With respect to *derara detumah*, *Chachamim* accept that in some cases a *sheni* can make another item *sheni* when liquid is the intermediary. Consequently their response there is that they have a tradition that only items that became a *rishon le'tumah* can *metameh yadayim*. Our *Mishnah* does not refer *sheni le'tumah* that stem from *derara detumah*. Consequently the *Chachamim* argue differently that, where there is no *derara detumah*, we do find that a *sheni* makes a *sheni*.

Is there a difference between the types of *sheni le'tumah*? The *Mishnah Achrona*, citing the *Rash*, explains that the second case in our *Mishnah*, relating to one hand causing the other to be *tameh*, is only with respect to *kodesh* and not *trumah*. In other words, *R' Yehoshua* and the *Chachamim* argue whether the second hand would be *tameh* for *kodesh*. The problem is that the *Mishnah* in *Chagigah* rules that one hand can *metameh* the other for *kodesh* recording no debate. The *Mishnah Achrona* explains that the case in *Chagigah* is one of *derara detumah*. There everyone agrees that with respect to *kodesh* it should be treated stricter. Our *Mishnah's* case of *yadayim* is with respect to *stam yadayim* (*Bartenura*) – normal hands. Since the concern is with dirt and cleanliness (*Tosfot Yom Tov 2:2*) it is debated. Consequently, we find the even though the “bottom line” *Halacha* may appear to be the same, the driving force behind them can be very different thereby having other implications when looking at the finer details.

This lesson can perhaps shed light on another *Mishnah* (4:6). The *Tzedukim* criticised the *Chachamim* for making *sifrei kodesh* while leaving heretical texts *tahor*. *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* responded that one could also be critical that a donkey's bones are *tahor* while the *kohen gadol* bone's are *tameh*. The *Tzedukim* responded that they understand that the reason that a human's bones are *tameh* is out of respect for the deceased preventing their offspring from crafting ladles from their bones. *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* responded that the *Chachamim* too, out of dear respect from the *sifrei kodesh* also make them *tameh*. The *Tosefta*

elaborates: *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* explained that this was to prevent one from using the parchment of *sifrei kodesh* as a rug for their animals.

A question raised on that *Mishnah* is why *R' Yochanan ben Zakkai* did not provide them with the real reason. The *Tifferet Yisrael* answers that it is forbidden to teach such people the real reasons as they would mock it. The *Mishnah Achrona* however understands that they already knew the real reason, but questioned it nonetheless; calling *sifrei kodesh tameh* appeared degrading. *R' Yochanan* had to dispel that notion. Perhaps we can add that whether or not they knew the real reason, *R' Yochanan* had to teach them this important lesson. They lumped everything that the *Chachamim* made *sheni le'tumah* together. *R' Yochanan* cleverly demonstrated to them using their own logic (*Tosfot Yom Tov*) that even though the bottom line may be the same, the motivation behind this law was different and out of love and respect for *sifrei kodesh*.

## Uktzin

### Yad ve'Shomer

#### Uktzin (1:1)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

In the first *Mishnah* of *Masechet Uktzin* we learn about two concepts relating to *tumat ochlin* – the *yad* and *shomer*. In short, a *yad* is part of a food that is used to handle the food when eating it (*Bartenura*), e.g. the stalk of a date. A *shomer* on the other hand, is part of the food that protects the food; for example the peel of an orange.

The *Mishnah* teaches that a *yad* has the ability to transfer *tumah* to and from the food. In contrast the *shomer* is considered part of the food when calculating its volume, aside from acting as a “conductor” of *tumah*. A practical ramification is where the food is already *tameh* and the size of a *ke'beitzah* only when including the *shomer*. Since the *shomer* can be included in this measure, it would satisfy the minimum *shiur* to transfer *tumah* to something else.

The *Gemara* (*Chulin* 118a) learns the source of these laws from *pesukim*. The *yad ha'tumah* is learnt from the *pasuk*: “But if water had been placed on a seed and then their carcass falls on it, it is contaminated to you” (*Vayikra* 11:38). The *Gemara* learns that any additional parts of the food that are for your needs can transfer *tumah* to and from the food. The law of the *shomer* is learnt from the previous *pasuk*. Let us however turn our attention to the *yad* in order to get a better understanding.

One issue that is debated is whether the *yad* itself can become *tameh*. The *Rambam* understand that the *yad* can. This is only however while the *yad* is still attached, because it only becomes *tameh* because it is *tafel* to the food (*Ritva Sukkah* 13b). Therefore when the *Mishnah* mentions that a *yad* can transfer *tumah* in each

direction it is referring to transfer between the food and the *yad*. The *Tosfot* (*Chulin* 128a) however understand that even though the *yad* serves as a conduit, it itself does not become *tameh*. Consequently the *Mishnah* is referring to the *yad*'s ability to transfer *tumah* to and from the food to another object (*Rash*, *Rosh*).

According to the two different understanding above there does not appear to be any practical ramification in *Halacha*. The *yad* transfers *tumah* while it is attached and is *tahor* when detached. Nonetheless they do provide two very different appreciations of a *yad*. An analysis of another issue will help to develop this idea.

One requirement that was mentioned in the introduction was that the *yad* must be attached to the food. The *Mishnah Achrona* notes that this requirement appears to be more extreme than what is implied by the derivation from the *pesukim* – “for all your needs”. A simple reading might lead on to believe that even a utensil should be considered a *yad* for the liquid it contains for one cannot handle liquids without it. Why must the *yad* be attached?

The *Mishnah Achrona* provides two reasons. The first is that this requirement is learnt from the laws of a *shomer*. In the *pasuk* from which a *shomer* is derived, the *shomer* is attached to the food – wheat in their shells. Consequently this requirement applies to a *yad* as well. In the second answer, he explains that *pasuk* is required because a *yad* on its own is not susceptible to *tumah*. The *pasuk* then teaches that since it is required for the food it is considered like the food. Now since food must be attached to other food well for it to combine for one *shiur*, the *yad*, which is really not even food, must also be attached. In slight contrast the *Mishneh LeMelech* (*Tumat Ochlin* 5:1) explains that a *yad* must be attached such that it can bear the food's full weight (see *Tosfot* *ibid.* 128b). That requirement is much stricter than the requirement for different foods to combine where a moderate attachment is enough.

Perhaps then we can use the second answer of the *Mishnah Achrona* to explain the debate about whether the *yad* itself becomes *tameh*. Recall that the *Mishnah Achrona* explains that a *yad* would ordinarily not be susceptible to *tumah*. The *pasuk* comes to teach us that the *yad* is like food. What does this mean? One option is that the *pasuk* made the *yad* while attached, into something close to food, but not equal to it (“food-minus”); it still cannot combine with the food like a *shomer* can. According to this understanding it makes sense that the *yad* can now become *tameh* – its status has changed. Also we understand why according to *Mishnah Achrona* understands that there is a requirement that it must be attached in the same way as two foods must be attached. The other option is that the *pasuk* does not change the status of the *yad* at all – it still is not food. Nevertheless the *Torah* made it like food only in the sense that it conducts *tumah* (“not-food-plus”). According to this understanding it makes sense that the *yad* does not become *tameh* – it is not food. Furthermore, we can understand why according to the *Mishneh LeMelech* the level of attachment require for a *yad* is greater than between two foods.

**310 Worlds**  
**Uktzin (3:12)**  
**Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier**

The last *Mishnah* includes two statements. In this article we will study the first and leave the second for your own *Siyum HaShas*. The *Mishnah* (3:12) teaches:

*R' Yehoshua ben Levi* says, in the future *HaKadosh Baruch Hu* will bestow on each and every *tzaddik* 310 worlds as it states (*Mishlei* 8:21): “I have what (*yesh*) to bequeath to those who love me, and I shall fill their store houses.”

The derivation is based on the word *yesh* (spelled *yud-shin*) which has the numerical value of 310. What is *R' Yehoshua ben Levi* trying to teach us and why is this *Mishnah* brought now?

The *Bartenura* explains, having reached the end of the six volumes, the *Mishnah* teaches us about the great reward waiting for those who learn and keep all that is contained within it. The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that this reward is 310 times all the benefits of this world which they had to forgo for the toil in *Torah*.

The *Rambam* adds that this “measure” of the reward is really only *hit'orerut* – an attention grabbing motion of encouragement – for there is no comparison between the reward in this world and the next one. Indeed this is hinted to in the word *yesh*, meaning existence. For the *tzadikim* will inherit the great reward of eternal true existence. But what then is the significance of the 310? The *Rashbatz* explains we know that *Shabbat* is referred to as *me'ein olam ha'bah* – a hint of the world come. If we then subtract from the solar year the *Shabbatot* and *Regalim* we are left with the 310 days of toil. The *tzadikim* will therefore be rewarded with the promise of a time that is entirely *Shabbat* (see *Rosh Hashanah* 31a).

Is there however more to the figure of 310? The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that there are a total of 620 *mitzvot* – 613 biblical and 7 rabbinic. However since *Hashem* assists one in fulfilling the *mitzvot*, it is only fitting that that the *tzaddik* receive half of the work. The *Torat Chayim* however explains that the *tzaddik* receives half the reward as it is shared with the *tzaddik's eizer k'negdo*. It is noteworthy that at a time that one might bask in the glory of making a *Siyum HaShas*, we are humbled by the recognition of our dependence on *Hashem* and others for our success in learning.

Another point that gets attention is the *R' Yehoshua ben Levi's* reference to each and every *tzaddik* – “*kol tzaddik ve'tzaddik*”. The *Tosfot Yom Tov* explains that the *Mishnah* is referring to both the *tzaddik* that ruled *assur* (forbidden) and the *tzaddik* that ruled *mutar* (permitted). He adds that this is indeed an appropriate close to the *Mishnayot* that appear to be full of debates. Since their sole intention was for the sake of heaven, both are considered loved. Indeed the *Baal Shem Tov* explains that this is the reference to “those that love Me” for a debate between the *Tana'im*, a *machloket le'shem shamayim*, is characterised by each parties pursuit of truth in their love of *Hashem* and their counterpart, but not of themselves.

The *Emet L'Yaakov* asks that if the *Mishnah* was referring to the *Tana'im* of the *Mishnah* the term *Chacham* would have been more appropriate. *Tzaddik* usually refers to one that performs acts kindness for people. Yet we find that *tzaddik* is used in the *Torah* when dealing with false witnesses: “...and you shall vindicate the *tzaddik* and find the wicked one guilty.” The *Emet L'Yaakov* explains that in this context the *tzaddik* refers to the party with which the truth is found. Consequently this is an appropriate term given to *Tana'im* and an encouraging end to the *Mishnah*. The unique thing about the debates of the *Tana'im* is that the truth can be found in both the one that is *oser* and the one that is *matir* – “*elu v'elu divrei Elokim chayim*”.

Perhaps an appropriate close to this cycle is the explanation of the *Tifferet Yisrael* for “each and every *tzaddik*.” He explains that the *Mishnah* teaches that even a *tzaddik* that is not a complete one, if he goes over and over *Mishnayot* again, he is considered a *yirei Hashem* and his reward will be with him in the next world.

*Mazal Tov* and *Hatzlacha* for the next cycle.



## Revision Questions

## Keilim

- What are the five *avot ha'tumah* and to what items do they transfer *tumah*? (י"א: י"א)
- What are the two more severe sources of *tumah* that can transfer *tumah* by virtue of being carried? How else is it more severe? (י"ב: י"א)
- What source of *tumah* is even more severe and how so? (י"ג: י"א)
- How is *dam niddah* even more severe and what other sources are on that level? (י"ג: י"א)
- What are *merkav* and *mishkav* and how are they more severe? (י"ג: י"א)
- Which is more a more severe level source of *tumah* – a *zav* or *zava* – and why? (י"ד: י"א)
- Which person is a source of *tumah* more *severe* than both of them? (י"ד: י"א)
- What are the most and second most severe source of *tumah* and why? (י"ד: י"א)
- What are the ten levels of *tumah* that can apply to a person and how do they differ? (י"ה: י"א)
- (Regarding the ten levels of *kedusha*;) In what way is *Eretz Yisrael* more *kadosh* than other lands? (י"ו: י"א)
- How are walled cities more *kadosh* than the rest of *Eretz Yisrael*? (י"ז: י"א)
- How is inside *Yerushalaim* more *kadosh* than other walled cities? (י"ח: י"א)
- How is *Har Ha'bait* even more *kadosh*? (י"ח: י"א)
- Explain how the following areas increase in *kedusha*?
  - The *cheil*.
  - The *Ezrat Nashim*.
  - The *Ezrat Yisrael*.
  - The *Ezrat Kohanim*. (י"ח: י"א)
  - Between the *Ulam* and *Mizbeach*.
  - The *Heichal*.


- The *Kodesh HaKodashim*. (א: טי)
- According to *R' Yosi* in what five ways is the area between the *Ulam* and *Mizbeach* the same as the *Heichal*? (א: טי)
- What four utensils are: "יפשוטיהן טהורים ומקבליהן טמאים" (ב: א:)
- What is the law if one of these utensils that were *tameh* broke and was then reformed? (ב: א:)
- How do *klei cheres* (earthenware vessels) become *tameh*? (ב: א:)
- How do *klei cheres* transfer *tumah*? (ב: א:)
- How can one remove the *tumah* from *klei cheres*? (ב: א:)
- How small can *klei cheres* (or parts of *klei cheres*) still be defined as utensils? (Provide all three opinions.) (ב: ב:)
- What is the rule regarding *klei cheres* that cannot become *tameh*? List some of the examples brought in the *Mishnah*. (ב: ג:)
- When are lanterns susceptible to *tumah*? (ב: ד:)
- What are the explanations why a peddler's funnel is susceptible *tameh*? (ב: ד:)
- When are covers of wine jars susceptible to *tumah*? (ב: ה:)
- What are the two reasons why stew pot covers are (generally) susceptible to *tumah*? (ב: ה:)
- What is a *gistra* and when is it susceptible to *tumah*? (ב: ו:)
- What is the law if one of the compartments in a spice container becomes *tameh*? (ב: ו:)
- Explain the debate regarding a *masrek shel tzirtzur*. (ב: ח:)
- How large must a hole be in a *tameh kli cheres* to render it *tahor*? (Provide both measures.) (ב: ט: א:)
- Regarding the previous question, how large must the holes be in the following utensils: (ב: ט: ב:)
- A barrel?
- A large pot?
- A *pach*?
- A *tzartzur*?

- If a broken piece of *kli cheres* had a hole that was sealed, when is it still *tameh*? (יג: יג)
- What other case shares a similar law to the previous question? (יד: יג)
- Explain the debate regarding when an outer coating of plaster on a *kli cheres* is considered part of the *kli* and why is this important? (יז: יג)
- If food touches the plastering of a *tameh* oven, does it become *tameh*? (יז: יג)
- Which of the following two substances that are used to plaster a water-heater are considered a *chibur* (attachment): *chomer* or *charsit*? (יז: יג)
- Why does *R' Yosi* declare that a kettle whose hole is plugged with *zefet* (pitch) is considered *tahor*? (יז: יג)
- What is the law regarding a barrel whose hole has been repaired with an excessive amount of *zefet*? (יח: יג)
- What are the three opinions regarding plugged funnels made of wood or of earthenware and their susceptibility to *tumah*? (יח: יג)
- What is the law regarding a broken piece of *cheres* that cannot stand due to the attached handle? (יח: יד)
- Explain the debate regarding the previous case if the handle then broke off. (יח: יד)
- Explain the debate regarding a barrel that splits down the middle. (יח: יד)
- How poor must a severely cracked barrel be in order that it is no longer susceptible to *tumah*? (יב: יד)
- What is a *gistra*? (יג: יד)
- What is the rule regarding a *gistra* that has *chidudim*? (יג: יד)
- What are the three cases of an earthenware utensil that has “three rims”? (יד: יד)
- From what point in production is an earthenware utensil susceptible to *tumah*? (יד: יד)
- What are the minimum dimensions of a *tanur* and a broken *tanur* such that it is susceptible to *tumah*? (יח: יז)


- What is the “g’mar melacha” of a *tanur*? (ה'א: ה')
- Regarding the previous two questions, what is the law regarding a *kira*? (ה'ב: ה')
- What is the law regarding an *ateret kira*? A *tirat tanur*? (ה'ג: ה')
- Explain the debate regarding a *beit ha'pach*. (ה'ג: ה')
- Is a *tanur* that was fired (for the first time) without the knowledge of the owner susceptible to *tumah*? (ה'ד: ה')
- What is a *mussaf ha'tanur* and when is it *tahor*? (ה'ה: ה')
- What is the law regarding a *tanur* that:
  - Is half filled with earth?
  - Was placed over a pit? (ה'ו: ה')
- How does one purify a *tanur* that became *tameh*? (Include all opinions) (ה'ז: ה')
- If a *tanur* was sliced horizontally, how thin must the rings be such that they are *tahor*? (ה'ח: ה')
- What type of a *tanur* can be used by a *niddah* and would remain *tahor*? (ה'ח: ה')
- If a *tanur* came in parts how does the addition, removal and subsequent addition of *limudin* affect its *tumah* and *tahara*? (ה'ט: ה')
- What is the *tanur shel achnai* and what is the debate regarding it? (ה'י: ה')
- What is the *tanur shel ben dinai* and what is its status regarding *tumah* and *tahara*? (ה'י: ה')
- How does an oven made of metal differ from the ovens discussed so far with respect to: (ה'יא: ה')
  - Susceptibility to *tumah*?
  - When it becomes *tahor*?
- Does covering a metal oven with clay give it the status of an earthenware oven? (ה'יב: ה')
- What are *pitputim* and when are they susceptible to *tumah*? (ה'יב: ה')
- If a stone is used to rest a pot on alongside another item, for which of those items is the stone susceptible to *tumah* and for which is it not? (ה'יב: ה')

- What was the *kirat nezirim*? (י:ב)
- Explain the case of the *kirat hatabachim*. (י:ב)
- What is the law regarding three stones that are used as two stoves (the middle stones serving both) where the outer stone became *tameh*? (י:ג)
- What is the law regarding the previous question if: (י:ג)
  - The other outer stone were removed?
  - The *tameh* stone was removed?
  - The centre stone was very large?
  - If the centre stone was removed? Then returned?
- What is the law regarding a *kira* of two stones where additional stones were placed on either side? (י:ד)
- Regarding *kalatut* of *ba'alei batim*, when does it become *tahor*? (י:א)
- What is a *dachon* and why (and how) is it susceptible to *tumah*? (י:ב)
- If a *kira* is cut in a vertical direction, when is it *tahor* and when is it (still) *tameh*? (י:ג)
- Does the same rule apply to a *kofach* and why? (י:ג)
- When is a *chatzar ha'kira* susceptible to *tumah*? (י:ג)
- Regarding the previous question, when does the law differ and how so? (י:ד)
- When are the spaces of *pitputei kira* all *tameh*? (י:ד)
- Explain the debate if one of them is removed. (י:ה)
- What other two cases are debated in a similar manner? (י:ה)
- How is the space between the *pitputim* measured? (י:ו)
- Can a *tanur* be divided for *tumah* and *tahara* by placing a plank of wood in the middle? (י:ח)

- What is the law regarding the following cases (include when the law changes and other opinions where applicable):



- When is a *kli* found in a *tameh tanur* also *tameh*? (ח' די')
- Explain the case of the *Beit Se'or* and its ruling. (ח' ו')
- When can a pit have the same status as a *kira*? (ח' ט')
- A can a person who is a *rishon le'tumah* cause a *tanur* to become impure? (ח' י')
- What other similar case applies to a woman? (ח' י"א)
- What other case is similar? (ח' י"ב)
- What is the law regarding the following cases (include when the law changes and other opinions where applicable):



- What are the three cases involving a *tameh* needle in the beginning for the ninth *perek*? (ט:יא)
- What is the debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* with respect to the *menikit*? (ט:יב)
- What is the law regarding earthenware that had absorbed *tameh* liquids and fell into a *tanur*? (ט:יג)
- What other case brought is similar to the one in the previous question? What is the exception to the rule? (ט:יד)
- What is the law regarding *gefet* that was trodden on by someone *tameh* and then expelled liquid? (ט:טו)
- What is the law regarding a metal ring completely contained in a brick that: (ט:טז)
  - Was in an *ohel ha'met*?
  - Moved by a *zav*?
  - That was *tameh* and fell in a *tanur*?
- What are the maximum breaches regarding a *sridah* attached to a *tanur* such that it is still considered a *tzamid patil*? (Provide both measures.) (ט:יז)
- Regarding the previous question, what is the law regarding the breaches in the *ein ha'tanur*? (Provide all opinions.) (ט:יח)
- List some of the utensils to which the law of *tzamid patil* applies. (י:א)
- Which orientation of a *kli* is subject to debate and explain the debate. (י:ב)
- Which of the *keilim* in the list is unique? (י:ג)
- List some of the substances that can be used as a seal. (י:ד)
- List some of the substances that cannot be used and the reason provided in the *Mishnah*. (י:ה)
- Which substances should not ideally be used? (י:ו)
- Is a seal that is *mechulchelet* effective? (י:ז)
- Is a *beit etzbah* considered like the inside of the utensil? (י:ח)
- In what case can a ball be used as a protective covering? (י:ט)
- In what case is an internal *tzamid patil* debated and explain the debate. (י:י)

- When can branches be used to plug a barrel (*tzamid patil*)? (י: יג)
- How can planks of wood be used to (protectively) cover a *tanur*? (י: יג)
- What is the exception to requirements provided in the previous question? (י: יג)
- Explain the case of the old oven inside the new oven? (י: יד)
- Why and how does the law change when the new oven is inside the old oven? (י: יד)
- Explain the case of the three *lefasim*. (יח: י)
- Are flat metal vessels susceptible to *tumah*? (יא: יא"י)
- What is the law regarding *tameh* metal utensils that were broken then fixed again? (יא: יא"י)
- Explain the debate regarding the previous question. (יא: יא"י)
- List the seven metal utensils that are not susceptible to *tumah* and explain. (יב: יא"י)
- What is the law regarding utensils made from boards of metal and what is the concern? (יג: יא"י)
- What substance is the subject of debate when used to form utensils? (יג: יא"י)
- What is the law regarding a utensil formed from metal from a mixture of *tameh* and *tahor* utensils? (יד: יא"י)
- What are two laws regarding a *klustera*? (יד: יא"י)
- What are the two parts of the reins that are discussed? List the three opinions regarding their susceptibility to *tumah*. (יז: יא"י)
- What is a *pika* and explain the debate regarding its susceptibility to *tumah*? (יז: יא"י)
- When is a flute containing metal not susceptible to *tumah*? (יז: יא"י)
- When is an animal horn susceptible to *tumah*? (Provide both cases.) (יז: יא"י)
- Which battle armour is susceptible to *tumah*? (יח: יא"י)
- Are weapons susceptible to *tumah*? (יח: יא"י)
- Is jewellery susceptible to *tumah*? (יח: יא"י)

- Describe the *nezem* that if broken two parts are still susceptible to *tumah*? (י"א:ט')
- Which rings are susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ב:א')
- Provide two cases when a chain is susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ב:א')
- When is a *kane moznaim* of *ba'alei batim tameh*? (י"ב:ב')
- What is the general rule provided regarding the susceptibility to *tumah* of *uklayot*? (List some of the cases.) (י"ב:ב')
- Explain the debate regarding a metal covering of a *teni*. (י"ב:ג')
- Regarding the previous question, what case is not the subject of debate? (י"ב:ג')
- What case is similar to the one in the previous question? (י"ב:ג')
- Is a picture frame hook susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ב:ג')
- Is the nail in a sundial susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ב:ד')
- What are the other five cases involving a nail and what is the law? (י"ב:ד' – ה')
- What are the four cases where *Rabban Gamliel* rules *tameh* and the *Chachamim* rule *tahor*? (י"ב:ו')
- What are the two ways an expired coin can become susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ב:ז')
- Is there any restriction in keeping expired coins? (י"ב:ז')
- Is a ruler susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ב:ח')
- Which *golmei kli eitz* are not susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ב:ח')
- What are the two opinions regarding the susceptibility to *tumah* of knives? (י"ב:א')
- Explain the debate regarding whether scissors that come apart are susceptible to *tumah*. (י"ב:א')
- What is a *koligrifon* and explain the law discussed regarding it? (י"ב:ב')
- What other utensil is discussed in a similar manner? (י"ב:ב')
- What are the three ways a needle can no longer be susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ב:ה')

- Regarding the previous question: (י"ג: ה')
- What two cases are the exceptions?
- How can it become *tameh* again?
- Explain the case of a utensil where the “wood serves the metal” and another utensil where “the metal serves the wood” and what is the law? (י"ג: ו')
- What is a *kadum* and when is it susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ג: ז')
- Regarding what did R' Yehoshua say: (י"ג: ח')
- דָּבַר חֵידוּשׁ חֵידוּשׁוֹ סוּפְרִים וְאֵין לִי מָה אֲשִׁיב׃
- What is the difference between flax and wool combs regarding their susceptibility to *tumah* when the teeth break off? (י"ג: ט')
- List some cases when those teeth are susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ג: י')
- How large must the remainder of a broken utensils be to be susceptible to *tumah* for the following vessels: (י"ד: א')
- A bucket?
- A large urn?
- A large pot?
- Explain the debate regarding a stick that had nails driven into it. (י"ד: ב')
- Are tent pegs susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ד: ג')
- Are measuring chains susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ד: ד')
- Are lids susceptible to *tumah*? What is the exception? (י"ד: ה')
- List some of the parts of a wagon that are susceptible to *tumah*. (י"ד: ו')
- List some of the parts of a wagon that are not susceptible to *tumah*. (י"ד: ז')
- What has happened to a cover of a *teni* such that it is now debated whether it is susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ד: ח')
- When is a broken mirror still susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ד: ט')
- What two points are debated between R' Eliezer and R' Yehoshua regarding broken metalware that became *tameh met*? (י"ד: י')
- What is the debate regarding an *arkuva* key? (י"ד: י"א')

- List some ways a *gam* key can no longer be susceptible to *tumah*. (י"ד: ט"ח)
- How broken must a mustard sieve be to no longer be susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ד: ט"ח)
- List two differences between metal and wood utensils. (ט"ו: א')
- Greater than what volume must a wooden chest be such that it is no longer susceptible to *tumah*? (ט"ו: א')
- Related to the previous question, regarding what do *R' Meir* and *R' Yehuda* argue? (ט"ו: א')
- Explain the debate regarding the baker's plank. (ט"ו: ב')
- How can a *serod* belonging to a homeowner become susceptible to *tumah*? (ט"ו: ב')
- Which *yam nafa* is susceptible to *tumah*? (ט"ו: ג')
- Regarding the previous question, which case does *R' Yehuda* add? (ט"ו: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding *teluyim*. (ט"ו: ד')
- What is the general rule regarding when a *rachat* is susceptible to *tumah*? (ט"ו: ה')
- Which of the seven liquids is not susceptible to *tumah*? (ט"ו: ו')
- Which of the books of *Tanach* is not *metameh* hands? (ט"ו: ו')
- Which animal trap is *tameh* and which is *tahor*? (ט"ו: ו')
- What is the law regarding a wooden utensil that is broken in two? (ט"ו: ז')
- What is the exception to the previous question? (ט"ו: ז')
- When is a wooden utensil considered complete? (ט"ו: ז')
- When are the following wooden utensils considered complete:
  - Wooden *salim*?
  - *Kalkala*?
  - *Beit Haleginim*? (ט"ו: ז')
  - Small and large *kenonim*?
  - *Arak*? (ט"ו: ז')
- When are the following leather utensils considered complete (include both opinions):
  - *Turmel*?
  - *Skurteya*?

- *Ketavulya*? (ט"ז: ז"ד)
- When is a *chatol* susceptible to *tumah*? (ט"ז: ז"ה)
- What is the general rule regarding the susceptibility to *tumah* of leather gloves? (ט"ז: ז"ו)
- Provide some examples to the rule in the previous question. (ט"ז: ז"ז)
- What is the general rule regarding the susceptibility to *tumah* of accessories to essential tools? (ט"ז: ז"ח)
- Provide some examples to the rule in the previous question. (ט"ז: ז"ט)
- What is the general rule regarding the susceptibility to *tumah* of bags of utensils? (ט"ז: ז"י)
- Provide some examples to the rule in the previous question. (ט"ז: ז"יא)
- How large would a hole in the following wooden and leather utensils be such that they are no longer susceptible to *tumah*:
  - Household utensils? (ט"ז: ז"יב)
    - Include both opinions in detail.
    - Explain the debate regarding small utensils (ט"ז: ז"יג)
  - A gardener's *kupah*? (ט"ז: ז"יד)
  - A *chemet*?
  - A pot-chest?
  - A *beit ha'rei*? (ט"ז: ז"יז)
  - Bread baskets? (ט"ז: ז"יח)
- Explain the debate regarding how *apifyrot* can become susceptible to *tumah*. (ט"ז: ז"יט)
- How large is a dimension described as a *rimon*? (ט"ז: ז"כ)
- What are the four opinions regarding the importance of *rimonei badan*? (ט"ז: ז"כא)
- What is the measure of a *kebeitzah*? Provide both opinions on how it is determined. (ט"ז: ז"כב)
- What are following measures and their sample:
  - A *grogeret*? (ט"ז: ז"כג)
  - *Kezayit*?
  - *Ke'seora*?
  - *Adashah*?

- *Mardeah*? (For what law is this important?) (י"ח: ז"י)
  - *Amah*? (י"ט: ז"י)
  - What were the two “*amot*” in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* and why were they important? (י"ט: ז"י)
  - What are the two opinions regarding which items in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* used a different measure of an *amah*? (י"ז: ז"י)
  - What used the *Italki* measure? (י"א: ז"י)
  - What measures are subject to the dimensions of the person of interest? (י"א: ז"י)
  - Regarding the previous question, which case is the subject of debate? Explain the debate. (י"א: ז"י)
  - Explain the debate regarding the fixed measure of “two meals”. (י"א: ז"י)
  - List some of the laws for which a *midah gasa* is used. (י"ב: ז"י)
  - For what law is the fist of *ben Batiach* a measure? (י"ב: ז"י)
  - Regarding that law, when is the measure different and what is that measure? (י"ב: ז"י)
  - What is the law regarding utensil made from sea creatures? Which creature is the exception? (י"ג: ז"י)
  - When does the law described in the previous question change? (י"ג: ז"י)
  - Which of the days of creation have no *tumah* associated with those thing created on that day? (י"ד: ז"י)
  - Explain the following statement and to what it applies: (י"ט: ז"י)
- יֵשׁ לָהֶם מְעֵשָׂה וְאֵין לָהֶם מַחְשָׁבָה.
- To what laws did *Rabban Yochanan ben Zackai* explain: (י"ט: ז"י)
- אוי לי אם אמר אוי לי אם לא אמר.
- When are the following items susceptible to *tumah*: (י"ז: ז"י)
    - *Mashchezet*?
    - *Pinkas*?
  - Explain the debate regarding a straw mat. (י"ז: ז"י)
  - Explain the debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding how to measure the dimensions volume of a chest. (י"ח: ז"י)

- On which point do they agree? (Include all opinions.) (י"ח:א')
- When is the *muchni* measured as part of the chest and what other laws are affected in this case? (י"ח:ב')
- How is the volume of a dome covering of a chest measured and when is this important? (י"ח:ב')
- Explain the debate regarding a case when one of the legs of a chest breaks off. (י"ח:ג')
- Which parts of a bed are susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ח:ג')
- Explain the debate regarding the: "מלבן שנתנו על לשונות". (י"ח:ד')
- If a *tameh* bed is dismantled by removing one side, when is it still *tameh* and when is it the subject of debate? (י"ח:ה')
- How much of the legs of the bed must be cut such that it *tahor*? (י"ח:ה')
- What is the law regarding a *tameh* bed, if the beam at its length breaks and is repaired? (י"ח:ו')
- What is the law if the other beam breaks and is repaired? (י"ח:ו')
- If is the law regarding the leg of a bed that was *tameh midras* prior to being attached to a bed? (י"ח:ז')
- What is the law if it is then removed? (י"ח:ז')
- Regarding the previous two questions, what is the law if the leg had come into contact with a corpse? What if it was originally *tumat erev*? (י"ח:ז')
- When would a *tefillin shel rosh* that was *tameh met*, become *magah tameh met*? Become *tahor*? (י"ח:ח')
- What is the law regarding a *tameh* bed, of which half was stolen? (י"ח:ט')
- What is the law if the half was returned and the bed was put together again? (י"ח:ט')
- Explain the debate between *R' Eliezer* and the *Chachamim* regarding how a bed (constructed of parts) can become *tameh* and *tahor*. (י"ח:ט')
- If a *tameh* bed is dismantled, are the straps/ropes also *tameh*? (י"ח:ט')

- At what point are the straps/ropes of a bed considered part of (*chibur*) the bed? (י"א: ט"א)
- Regarding the previous question, how much of those ropes would then be considered a *chibur*? (י"א: ט"א)
- How much of excess rope hanging off a *tameh* bed is *tameh*? (י"ב: ט"א)
- What are the two reasons for the ruling described in the previous question? (י"ב: ט"א)
- What is the *mizran* of a bed, and how much of its excess hanging from a *tameh* bed is *tameh*? Include both opinions. (י"ג: ט"א)
- What two cases are brought as a practical difference between these two opinions? Explain. (י"ד: ט"א)
- What is the law regarding a *mizran* that was wrapped around a bed that was *tameh midras*? (י"ה: ט"א)
- What is the law if the *mizran* is removed? (י"ה: ט"א)
- What are the other two cases brought that are similar to the previous two questions? (י"ה: ט"א)
- What is the law regarding the bed and *mizran* where the *mizran* came into contact with a *sheretz* while attached, and was then removed? (י"ו: ט"א)
- Explain the following principle: (י"ז: ט"א)  
 שֶׁהַכֵּל הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַיְשָׁנוֹת
- What forms of *tumah* is a chest susceptible to if its opening is on its top? (י"ז: ט"א)
- If a chest is broken at which end is it no longer *tameh* (*tamei met*)? (י"ז: ט"א)
- In that case, what is the law regarding the drawers? (י"ז: ט"א)
- What other two cases are similar to the previous two questions? (י"ח: ט"א)
- What forms of *tumah* is a chest susceptible to if its opening is on its side? (י"ט: ט"א)
- What is the law if that chest breaks at the top? (י"ט: ט"א)
- Explain the debate if that chest breaks at the bottom. (י"ט: ט"א)
- What other case is debated in a similar manner? (י"י: ט"א)

- Which of the following (leather) items if they break are still *tameh midras*: (כ״א: א׳)
  - Mattress?
  - Pillow?
  - *Klutar*?
  - *Turmel*?
  - Sacks?
- Which trough is the subject of debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel*? Explain. (כ״ב: ב׳)
- How are the remnants of wooden utensils stricter than the original utensil? (כ״ב: ב׳)
- What are the two cases that are considered a: חיבור בשעת מלאכה? (כ״ג: ג׳)
- What is the reason why if a chair is formed at the end of a beam of an olive press it is not susceptible to *tumat midras*? (כ״ג: ג׳)
- Explain the debate regarding a large trough with a large hole that was modified for sitting on. (כ״ד: ד׳)
- What is the law regarding the large trough that was modified to contain animal feed and was fixed to a wall? (כ״ד: ד׳)
- What are the two requirements for a *kofet* that is built into a wall such that it is no longer susceptible to *tumah*? (כ״ה: ה׳)
- What are the other two cases similar to the one in the previous question, and which of the two is slightly different? (כ״ה: ה׳)
- What is the law regarding a sheet that was modified to be used as a curtain? (כ״ה: ה׳)
- What is the debate regarding the previous question and who are the parties in the debate? (כ״ו: ו׳)
- What are some of the ways a *machtzelet* can be modified so that it is no longer susceptible to *tumat midras*? (כ״ז: ז׳)
- What is the law regarding a *machtzelet* that was cut in half along its width? Along its length? (כ״ז: ז׳)
- At what point in a *machtzelet*'s production does it become susceptible to *tumah*? (כ״ז: ז׳)

- List some of the some components of a weaving machine that are and are not a *yad* for the woven fabric. (כ"א:א)
- When is the *ve'ira* considered a *yad* for the fabric? (כ"א:א)
- When is the *pika* a *yad* for the *plach*? (כ"א:א)
- List some part of the of the yoke-plough apparatus that are a *yad* to the plough. (כ"א:ב)
- Which parts of a *megeira* are considered a *yad*? (כ"א:ג)
- Is a bow ever considered a *yad* for an arrow? (כ"א:ג)
- Explain the debate regarding a mole trap. (כ"א:ג)
- Who much space must be left from a table whose surface gives way for it to remain *tameh*? (כ"ב:א)
- What other case has the same rule as in the previous question? (כ"ב:א)
- When can a table whose legs begin to break off once again be susceptible to *tumah*? Include both opinions. (כ"ב:ב)
- When can a bench that loses both its legs still be susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ב:ג)
- What is the law regarding a footstool that loses a leg? (כ"ב:ג)
- What is the three-way debate regarding the *kise shel kalla*? (כ"ב:ד)
- What else is the subject of debate between these parties? (כ"ב:ד)
- In what case is a chair whose seat was removed still be susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ב:ה)
- What is the law regarding a chair whose outer seat-boards were removed? (כ"ב:ו)
- What is the law if the inner seat-board was removed? (כ"ב:ו)
- What is the law if two adjacent seat boards were removed? (כ"ב:ז)
- What case does *R' Yehuda* add? (כ"ב:ז)
- What are two ways that a *Shida* can come apart and still be susceptible to *tumah*? Explain. (כ"ב:ח)
- What third way is the subject of debate? (כ"ב:ח)
- Is a chiseler's work bench susceptible to *tumat midras*? (כ"ב:ח)

- Explain the debate regarding the painted *kofet*. (כ"ב: טי)
- At what point is a basket filled with stuffing for the purpose of seating susceptible to *tumat midras*? (כ"ב: טי)
- What is the law regarding an *aslah*, where the leather separates from the frame? (כ"ב: י)
- What other case is similar to the previous one and how does it differ? (כ"ב: י)
- What is the law regarding a bench where one of the legs is made of stone? (כ"ב: י)
- When is a *kankilin* susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ב: י)
- When does the stuffing of an item that is torn transmit and not transmit the *tumah* of the item? Provide examples from the *Mishnah* for both cases. (כ"ג: א)
- List some items that are susceptible to *tumah* through *merkav*. (כ"ג: ב)
- What is the difference between *tumah* through *merkav* and *moshav*? (כ"ג: ג)
- When is a *tafit* of a donkey susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ג: ג)
- Is a bed set aside for use of corpses susceptible to *tumat midras*? (כ"ג: ד)
- What is the opinion of *R' Yosi* regarding the susceptibility to *tumat midras* of a *kise she kalla*? (כ"ג: ד)
- Is a fish net susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ג: ה)
- List some traps that are susceptible to *tumah* and some that are not? (כ"ג: ה)
- What are the three *trisin* and how do they differ from each other? (כ"ד: א)
- What are the three *agalot* and how do they differ from each other? (כ"ד: ב)
- What are the three *areivot* and how do they differ from each other? (כ"ד: ג)
- What are the three *teivot* and how do they differ from each other? (כ"ד: ד)
- What are the three *tarbusin* and how do they differ from each other? (כ"ד: ה)

- What are the three *basisayot* and how do they differ from each other? (ר': כ"ד)
- What are the three *pinksayot* and how do they differ from one another? (ז': כ"ד)
- What are the three beds and how do they differ from one another? (ח': כ"ד)
- What are the three *mashpelot* and how do they differ from one another? (ט': כ"ד)
- What are the three reed-mats and how do they differ from one another? (י': כ"ד)
- What are the three *chamatot* and how do they differ from one another? (יא': כ"ד)
- What are the three hides and how do they differ from one another? (יב': כ"ד)
- What are the three sheets and how do they differ from one another? (יג': כ"ד)
- What are the three *mitpachot* and how do they differ from one another? (יד': כ"ד)
- What are the three leather gloves and how do they differ from one another? (ט"ו': כ"ד)
- What are the three *sevachot* and how do they differ from one another? (ט"ז': כ"ד)
- What are the three *kupot* and how do they differ from one another? (י"ז': כ"ד)
- Explain the debate regarding which utensils have an *achoraim va'toch*. (י"א': כ"ה)
- Which two utensils are explicitly debated? (י"א': כ"ה)
- In what context does the debate regarding the measures of four and seven arise? Explain. (י"ב': כ"ה)
- Explain the debate regarding oil and wine measures. (י"ג': כ"ה)
- What other utensils are included in this debate? (י"ג': כ"ה)
- Explain the debate regarding the utensil referred to as a *rova va'chatzi rova* where one compartment comes into contact with *tameh* liquids. (י"ד': כ"ה)

- What is the law regarding that outside of one of the compartments that came into contact with *tameh* liquid? (כ"ה:ה)
- What is the law regarding the dividing wall? (כ"ה:ה)
- What is the law regarding the outsides of the entire utensil if the liquid came into contact with the outside of one of the compartments? (כ"ה:ה)
- How much of the utensil must be placed in the *mikvah* if only one compartment came into contact with the *tameh* liquid? (כ"ה:ה)
- What is the law if *tameh* liquid came into contact with the handle of a utensil? (כ"ה:ו)
- If the liquid came into contact with which other parts, is the handle *tahor*? Is the hand *tameh*? (כ"ה:ו)
- What is the law of *beit tzeviah* and when does it apply? (List all five opinions.) (כ"ה:ז)
- What example is provided to explain the opinions of *R' Meir* and *R' Yosi*? (כ"ה:ח)
- Does one need to be concerned about the contents of a bubbling urn whose outside is *tameh*? (כ"ה:ח)
- What two stringencies apply to utensils used for *kodesh*? (כ"ה:ט)
- Complete the following rule and explain: (כ"ה:ט)  
 שְׁ \_\_\_\_\_ מְבַטֵּל מִיַּד הַמַּעֲשָׂה וּמִיַּד מִחֻשְׁבָּה  
 וְ \_\_\_\_\_ אֵינָה מְבַטֵּלֶת לֹא מִיַּד הַמַּעֲשָׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מִחֻשְׁבָּה
- What are the two opinions regarding the reason for the list of leather-ware utensils in the first *Mishnah* of the twenty-sixth *perek*? List some of those items. (כ"ו:א)
- When is a *kis shel shnatzot* no longer susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ו:ב)
- Which *tzror* is *tameh* is which *tzror* is debated? Explain. (כ"ו:ב)
- Which of the follow leather utensils are susceptible to *tumah*: (כ"ו:ג)
  - The thorn-pickers' "spoon"?
  - *Zon*?

- *Sharvulim*?
- *Praklimin*?
- Which *beit etzba 'ot* are susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"י: ג')
- What is the law regarding a sandal that was *tameh midras* and one of the straps broke and was then repaired? (כ"י: ד')
- What is the law if both straps broke and were then repaired? (When is the law different?) (כ"י: ד')
- Which type of sandal is *tahor* if it breaks in any part? (כ"י: ד')
- List some leather items that are susceptible to *tumat midras*. (כ"י: ה')
- Which item is debated between *R' Eliezer* and the *Chachamim*? (כ"י: ה')
- Which item is debated between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel*? (כ"י: ו')
- What item did *R' Yosi* rule was not susceptible to *tumah* and in whose name did he state the ruling? (כ"י: ו')
- What is the general rule regarding when thought (*machshava*) alone can render an item susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"י: ז')
- What is the difference between when the hides of a tanner and the hides of a *ba'al ha'bayit* can become susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"י: ח')
- Explain the debate regarding the difference between when the hides stolen by a *ganav* and *gazlan* can become susceptible to *tumah* through *machshava*. (כ"י: ח')
- If one wanted to make straps from a hide that was *tameh midras*, at what point would it become *tahor*? (כ"י: ט')
- What does *R' Eliezer bar R' Tzadok* add to the debate regarding the previous question? (כ"י: ט')
- What are the manners in which the following materials can become susceptible to *tumah*: earthenware; wood; leather; sackcloth; cloths? (כ"י: יא')
- What is minimum size of the following materials for them to be susceptible to *tumah*: cloth; sackcloth; matting? (כ"י: יב')

- About which of the fabrics is there a difference in the minimum size between its susceptibility to *tumat midras* and *tumat met*? (כ"ז: ב"י)
- About which of the fabrics does *R' Meir* argue and what is his opinion? (כ"ז: ב"י)
- What is the law regarding the minimum size of a garment made of a combination of fabrics? (כ"ז: ג')
- When do all materials share the same minimum size and what is that size? (כ"ז: ד')
- Explain the debate regarding a worn out “sieve” that was to be used for sitting on. (כ"ז: ה')
- What is the difference about the susceptibility to *tumah* of a child’s chair? (כ"ז: ה')
- Explain the debate regarding children’s clothing. (כ"ז: ה')
- List some items that are measured “doubled over”. Explain. (כ"ז: ו')
- What is the law regarding cloth just satisfying the minimum measure that became *tameh midras*, was then made part of a larger garment, and then a thread was removed from the original patch? (כ"ז: ז')
- Is the law different if the thread was separated prior to being made part of a larger garment? (כ"ז: ז')
- Regarding the previous two questions how is the law different if the patch originally became *tameh met*? Explain. (כ"ז: ח')
- Explain the debate regarding a sheet that was *tameh midras* then used as a door-curtain. (כ"ז: ט')
- What other case is debated in the same manner? (כ"ז: י')
- What are the two conditions for cloth of the minimum measure to be susceptible to *tumah*? Explain the debate regarding one of the requirements. (כ"ז: י"א')
- When is it required for both to be fulfilled and when is it enough for only one to be fulfilled? (כ"ז: י"א')
- When is a torn cloth of the minimum measure still susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ז: י"ב')

- Complete the following phrase: (כ"ז: י"ב)  
לְעוֹלָם \_\_\_\_\_ מִטְהַרְתָּהּ, \_\_\_\_\_ מִטְמְאָתָהּ.
- What are the three opinions regarding the scope of this statement? (כ"ז: י"ב)
- What is the difference between cloth that was three by three *etzba'ot* and three by three *tephachim* that was used to stuff a ball? That was made into a ball? (כ"ח: א')
- What are the three opinions regarding cloth, less than three by three handbreadths, that was used to hold a pot when cleaning? Explain the debate. (כ"ח: ב')
- What other cases are debated in the same manner? (כ"ח: ב')
- What is the difference between an *isplanit* and a *melugma* regarding when they are susceptible to *tumah*? (Include both opinions.) (כ"ח: ג')
- What are the three opinions regarding the susceptibility to *tumah* of material book coverings? (כ"ח: ד')
- Complete the following rule: (כ"ח: ה')  
כָּל שֶׁשְּׁנָהוּ \_\_\_\_\_ טָמֵא. \_\_\_\_\_ , טָהוֹר.
- Provide some examples for the previous rule. (כ"ח: ה')
- What is the law regarding a patch that was *tameh midras* that was used to patch a basket? (כ"ח: ו')
- What is the law regarding the patch and basket if it was then removed? (כ"ח: ו')
- How is the law different if it was used to patch clothing? (כ"ח: ו')
- Explain the debate regarding a cloth patch which was used to patch clothing made of leather or sackcloth. (כ"ח: ו')
- Explain the debate of how the three by three fingerbreadth measure is measured. (כ"ח: ז')
- When is a patch considered attached to clothing? (Include all three opinions.) (כ"ח: ז')
- What is different about *bigdei ani'im*? (כ"ח: ח')
- When are the parts of torn clothing no longer considered attached? (כ"ח: ח')

- To which cloth does the three by three fingerbreadth measure not apply? (כ"ח: ח')
- Are the following susceptible to *tumah* and if so which *tumah*: (כ"ח: ט')
  - A pad used by carriers?
  - Clothing made of fish netting?
- At what point in the manufacture of a *sevacha* is it susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ח: י')
- Why are the strings of a *sevacha* susceptible to *tumah*? (כ"ח: י')
- How much of the protruding strings from the following items are considered a *chibur* to the items: (כ"ט: א')
  - A sheet? (List other items that share the same measure?)
  - A *sagos*?
  - A *talit*? (List other items that share the same measure?)
  - A *punda*? (List other items that share the same measure?)
- For what are three pillow cases sewed together considered a *chibur*? (כ"ט: ב')
- How is the law different if four are sewed together? (כ"ט: ב')
- How does the ruling regarding how much of the string of a plumb-line is considered a *chibur* to the weight when it is for a carpenter? A builder? (כ"ט: ג')
- How does the ruling regarding how much of the string of a (manual) scale is considered a *chibur* if it is for goldsmiths or regular shop keepers? (כ"ט: ד-ה')
- What is the ruling regarding the extension of a hatchet handle beyond the hand grip? (כ"ט: ד-ה')
- Which other handles of tools have the same measure? (כ"ט: ה')
- List some of the items mentioned for which the length of the *chibur* is:
  - Two *tephachim*?
  - Three *tephachim*? (כ"ט: ו')
  - Four *tephachim*?
  - Five *tephachim*?
  - Six *tephachim*? (כ"ט: ז')
  - Seven *tephachim*? (כ"ט: ח')

- List the two items debated by *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding the length of the *chibur*? (כ"ט: רח:)
- Which glassware is not susceptible to *tumah*? (לי: א:)
- What is the law regarding *tumah* glassware that are broken and used to form new utensils? (לי: א:)
- Which mirrors are susceptible to *tumah*? (לי: ב:)
- Explain the debate regarding a glass ladle. (לי: ב:)
- How much must a glass cup be chipped for it to become *tahor*? (לי: ג:)
- Explain the debate regarding the susceptibility to *tumah* of glass cup whose hole at its base was plugged. (לי: ג:)
- What is the difference whether a small or large flask (*tzulichit*) whose neck broke off? (לי: ד:)
- How does *masechet keilim* start and end? (לי: ד:)

## Ohalot

- Through what chain of event beginning with contact with a corpse can:
  - One thing become *tameh* for seven days and another till the evening? (א: א:)
  - Two things become *tameh* for seven days and another till the evening? (א: ב:)
  - Three things become *tameh* for seven days and another till the evening? (א: ג:)
- In what way is the law regarding *tumah met* more strict for a person than utensils and it what way is it more lenient? (א: ד:)
- In what way is the law regarding *tumah zav* more strict for a person than clothing and it what way is it more lenient? (א: ה:)
- At what point does a person become a source of *tumat met*? (א: ו:)
- List some other law for which this is important. (א: ו:)
- If an animal is decapitated and is convulsing, is it source of *tumat neveilah*? (א: ז:)

- Is there a minimum measure for a limb for it to be a source of *tumah*? (א: יג)
- In what three forms of *tumah* can a limb from a dead creature be a source of *tumah*? (א: יג)
- How many *eivarim* are there in a man? (Hard: list them.) (א: ח)
- In what three ways can they transfer *tumah*? (א: ח)
- What condition is not fulfilled if they cannot transfer *tumah* in one of these ways? (א: ח)
- What is the *shiur* (minimum measure) of the following things for them to transfer *tumah* under an *ohel*:
  - *Netzel*?
  - *Rakav*?
  - Bones? (Provide three measures.) (ב: א)
  - Blood from a corpse?
  - *Dam tevusah*?
  - *Dam katan*?
  - *Ever serufin*? (ב: ב)
- Explain the debate for the last three cases. (ב: ב)
- What is the law regarding *rakav* that is mixed with water regarding *chibur*? (ב: ב)
- Which seven things transfer *tumat met* but not via an *ohel*? (ב: ג)
- When is a spine and skull considered *chaser*? (Include both opinions.) (ב: ג)
- Explain the debate regarding how a *golel* and *dofek* transfer *tumah*. (ב: ד)
- Which six things from a *met* are *tahor* if they are *chaser*? (ב: ד)
- Explain the debate regarding *rova atzamot* that came from two corpses. (ב: ו)
- What else is debated in the same manner? (ב: ו)
- Explain the debate regarding an *etzem ke'seorah* that split in two. (ב: ז)
- Explain the debate regarding *rova atzamot* that have been ground. (ב: ז)

- What cases are debated between *R' Dosa ben Harkinas* and the *Chachamim*? (יא: ג)
- In what cases do they agree? (יא: ג)
- Explain the debate regarding a ladle full of *rakav* that was scattered in a house? (ב: ג)
- What is the law regarding a *revi'it* of blood that was absorbed into the floor of a house? (ב: ג)
- When would a person that leaned over part of a *revi'it* of blood (from a met) be *tameh* and when would he be *tahor*? (ג: ג)
- What parts of a corpse are not *tameh*? (ג: ג)
- Provide three examples where parts of a *met* transfer *tumah* by virtue of a being a *chibur*. (ד: ג)
- What is *dam tevusah*? (Include all opinions.) (ה: ג)
- What is the minimum size for a hole for *tumat ha'met* to “spread through”? (ו: ג)
- Does the measure change for “saving the entrances”? Explain. (ו: ג)
- What are the minimum dimensions for an “*ohel*”? (ז: ג)
- What two functions can an *ohel* serve (for *tumah*)? (ז: ג)
- What are the three cases involving a *biv* and what is the ruling in each of these cases? (ז: ג)
- What extra qualification does *R' Yehuda* place on the definition of an *ohel*? (ז: ג)
- Are the holes through the side of a chest considered as being part of the *ohel* formed inside the chest? (ח: ד)
- If such a chest was inside a house, how would the law differ if the *tumah* was inside or outside the chest? (ח: ד)
- Explain the debate regarding *tumah* that is found in a deep drawer which had a small hole in the side. (ב: ד)
- What is the law regarding the contents of such a draw if the *tumah* was outside the drawer? (ב: ד)
- What is the law concerning a chest covering a doorway, whose opening is facing out ward and *tumah* is inside the chest? Inside the house? (ג: ד)

- What is the law regarding a case where a corpse was passed over the top of an exhaust of an oven, where the exhaust was outside the house and the oven was inside? (Include all three opinions.) (ה' א:)
- What other case is debated in a similar manner to the previous question? (ה' ב:)
- What further debate (relating to the previous question) did *Beit Hillel* then agree with *Beit Shammai*? (ה' ג:)
- What is the law regarding the liquid contents of an earthenware utensil covering an *arubah*, where the lower room contained a corpse? (ה' ד:)
- What is the law if the contents were poured into another metalware utensil in the same room (in the upper floor)? (ה' ד:)
- What other similar case shares the same ruling? (ה' ד:)
- List the utensils that would protect everything in the upper floor if used to cover the *arubah*. (ה' ה:)
- Explain the rule that “all *tahor keilim* are able to save when combining with the walls of an *ohel*”. (ה' ו:)
- What further requirement is there on the *kli*, regarding the previous question? (ה' ו:)
- Explain the following ruling including the example brought in the *Mishnah*: (ה' ו:)  
כְּשֶׁם שֶׁמְצַיְלִין מִבְּפָנִים כֶּךָ מְצַיְלִין מִבְּחוּץ.
- How does a person (or *keilim*) acting as an *ohel* differ from a regular *ohel*? (ה' א:)
- In what case would a house whose door is closed, still be *tameh* if a corpse passed under its *achsadra*? (ה' ב:)
- In what circumstance does a wall made of stacked *kankanim* and covered with plaster constituted a proper *mechitza* for *tumah*? (ה' ב:)
- Explain the following rule regarding the wall of a house: (ה' ג:)  
כֶּתֵל הַמְשֻׁמֵּשׂ אֶת הַבַּיִת דְּיוֹן מְחַצֵּה לְמַחֲצָה.
- What is *R' Yehuda*'s opinion regarding the above rule? (ה' ג:)

- What is the law regarding a person the stood on a wall where the *tumah* was inside the wall closer to the inside of the house? (ג: ה)
- What is the law regarding *tumah* found in the wall between two houses? (ד: ה)
- Explain the debate regarding the status of the *ma'aziva*? (ד: ה)
- What is the law regarding *tumah* that is found *bein ha'korot*? (Provide all three cases.) (ה: ה)
- What is the law regarding a “house that serves a wall”? (ו: ה) (Compare with how a “wall serves a house”). (ג: ו)
- What is the law regarding a case where *tumah* is found beneath a pillar? (ו: ה)
- Explain the debate regarding the utensils found beneath the overhanging decorations of the pillar. (ו: ה)
- Regarding the previous question, in what case is there no debate? (ו: ה)
- What is the law regarding *tumah* found in cupboards built into the wall? (ו: ה)
- When does *tumah* found in a wall cause all the floors in the building to become *tameh*? (ז: ז)
- In what case would the spread be stopped? (ז: ז)
- When would one touch the side of a *matezeiva* be *tameh* and when would he be *tahor*? (ז: ז)
- Is the space under the slanted part of an *ohel* considered part of the *ohel*? (ז: ז)
- What is the difference if one touches the inside or outside of an *ohel* once the corpse has been removed? (ז: ז)
- What is the law regarding a case where a half *kezayit* was on one side of the *ohel* and another on the other side? (ז: ז)
- What is the law regarding *tumah* that is found under that excess flap of a tent? (ז: ז)
- Explain the debate regarding a tent placed over an *arubah*. (ז: ז)
- What is the law regarding an item in the closed doorways of a house that contains a corpse? When does this change? (ג: ז)

- What are the two debates between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding the previous question? (י:א)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a woman miscarries after she was transferred between rooms during labour. (י:ד)
- In what case is the ruling different? (י:ה)
- Until what point is a baby aborted when it is threatening the mother's life? (י:ו)
- List some items that can spread *tumah* and shield against *tumah*. (י:א)
- What are *sechachot*? (י:ב)
- What are *pera'ot*? (י:ב)
- List some items that can spread *tumah* but cannot shield against *tumah*. (י:ג)
- List some items that can shield against *tumah* but cannot spread *tumah*. (י:ד)
- List some items that can neither spread nor shield against *tumah*. (י:ה)
- What is the law regarding to two tightly sealed earthenware jugs that each contains a half-*kezayit* of a *met*? (י:ו)
- What is law if one of them were opened? (י:ו)
- What other case is similar to the one in the previous question? (י:ו)
- (Question A :) Regarding a *kaveret* that that is placed inside a house lying on its side with it open outside the house, what is the law regarding items above, below and inside the *kaveret* and inside the house if: (י:ז)
  - A *kezayit* from a *met* is found underneath the *kaveret* (outside the house)?
  - A *kezayit* from a *met* is found inside the house?
  - Inside the *kaveret*?
- (Question B :) Is the law different if the *kaveret* was raised a *tephach* above the ground? (י:ז)

- (Question C :) In which two cases would the laws in the previous two cases change and what is the law in both those cases? (ט: ג-ד')
- What is meant by the term *afutza*? (ט: ג')
- If the opening of the *kaveret* was inside the house how would the law differ in the case of:
  - Question A? (ט: ה')
  - Question B? (ט: ו')
  - Question C? (ט: ז-ח')
- What is the law regarding a case where the *kaveret* “filled the house” in the three scenarios of Question A? (ט: ט')
- Provide some examples for the previous question? (ט: ט')
- What is the law regarding a case where the *kaveret* is found in a doorway and equal to its height in the three scenarios of Question A? (ט: י')
- Regarding a *kaveret* that that is outside and lying in its side what is the law regarding items above, below and inside the *kaveret* if: (ט: י"א)
  - A *kezayit* from a *met* is found underneath the *kaveret* (outside the house)?
  - Inside the *kaveret*?
- Is the law different if the *kaveret* was raised a *tephach* above the ground? (ט: י"ב)
- In which three cases would the laws in the previous two cases change and what is the law in those cases? (ט: י"ב)
- (Question A :) What is the law regarding an upright *kaveret* that is outside and: (ט: י"ג)
  - A *kezayit* from a *met* is found underneath the *kaveret*?
  - A *kezayit* from a *met* is found on top of the *kaveret*?
  - Inside the *kaveret*?
- (Question B :) Regarding the previous question what is the law if the *kaveret* is a *tephach* above the ground? (ט: י"ג)
- What other cases share the same law as the previous question? (ט: י"ג)

- In which three cases would the laws in questions A and B change and what is the law in both those cases? (ט"י: ט"ד)
- What is the law regarding an “aron” that is wide at its base and narrow at the top where one touched “above”? “Below”? (ט"י: ט"ו)
- What is the law if the *aron* was narrower at the top? (ט"י: ט"ו)
- Explain the debate when the walls are vertical. (ט"י: ט"ו)
- Explain how an *aron* is structured like a *gluskom* and the law in that case? (ט"י: ט"ו)
- What is the law regarding an earthenware barrel that is seated on top of *tumah*? (ט"י: ט"ז)
- What is the law if the *tumah* is under the belly of the barrel? (Provide both cases.) (ט"י: ט"ז)
- In what four cases would the law change? (ט"י: ט"ז)
- What is the law regarding a house with an *arubah* and *tumah* is found in the house? Under the *arubah*? (י"א: י"א)
- How does the law differ if a person placed their foot over the hole? (י"א: י"א)
- What is the law if a *kezayit* of *tumah* is placed partially under the *arubah*? (י"א: י"א)
- Regarding the previous three questions how does the law differ if the *arubah* is less than a *tephach*? (Include the opinions when where debated.) (י"א: י"א)
- What is the law regarding a case where multiple *arubot* are on top of one another and *tumah* is found in the house? Under the *arubot*? (י"א: י"א)
- What is the law if a utensil that was susceptible to *tumah* was placed of one of the *arubot*? (י"א: י"א)
- What is the law if the utensil was not susceptible to *tumah*? (י"א: י"א)
- Regarding the previous three questions, how does the law differ if the *arubot* are less than a *tephach*? (Include the opinions where debated.) (י"א: י"א)
- Regarding a house with an *arubah*, what is the law if an earthenware utensil the size of the *arubah* has *tumah* beneath


it and is placed on the floor? Is a *tephach* above the ground?  
(יג: י)

- Regarding the previous case, what is the law if the utensil was placed under the lintel? (יג: י)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a house's roof was cracked along its width and *tumah* was found in the inner part of the house. (יח: נ"י)
- What is the law regarding a cracked *achsadra* where *tumah* is found on one side? (יב: נ"י)
- Regarding the previous question, in which three cases listed would the law change? (יב: נ"י)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a person was lying under the crack of the *achsadra*. (יג: נ"י)
- Can folded clothing lying on the floor beneath the crack in the *achsadra* cause the *tumah* to transfer to the other side? (יג: נ"י)
- Regarding a case where a person is leaning out the window of a house over a *kever*, when is the ruling debated and when does everyone agree that the *tumah* is transferred into the house? (יד: נ"י)
- Which other case is debated in a similar manner? (יז: נ"י)
- Which further case that is similar to one referred to in the previous question is debated in a similar manner? (יז: נ"י)
- What are the four opinions regarding a house where a dog that ate a *kezayit* from a corpse died and lay on the threshold of the house? (יז: נ"י)
- How long after the dog ate the meat is it no longer a question? (יז: נ"י)
- Regarding the previous question, what is the law regarding fish and birds? (יז: נ"י)
- Explain the debate regarding the *chadut*, *menorah* and *chafisa*. (יח: נ"י)
- In which case is there a debate? (יח: נ"י)
- What is the law regarding *keilim* on the rim of the *chadut*? (יט: נ"י)
- What is the law if *tumah* is found on the rim of the *chadut*? (יט: נ"י)

- What is the law regarding *keilim* in the walls of the *chadut* if *tumah* is found in the house? (Include all three cases.) (י"א: ט') (י"א: ט')
- What is the law regarding *keilim* resting on a plank of wood that is placed over a new oven if *tumah* is found underneath the overhanging plank? (י"ב: א') (י"ב: א')
- How does the law change if the oven was old? (י"ב: א') (י"ב: א')
- What is the law regarding a case where a *srida* is placed tightly over an oven and *tumah* is found beneath the overhanging part? Inside the *tanur*? (י"ב: ב') (י"ב: ב')
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a plank of wood is placed over an oven and only overhangs on two opposite sides and *tumah* is found under on side. (י"ב: ג') (י"ב: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a *b'tach*. (י"ב: ג') (י"ב: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a *sandel shel arisa*. (י"ב: ד') (י"ב: ד')
- What is the law if regarding a case where the planks of wood on the first floor and the roof are spaced and aligned with one another, and *tumah* is found on the ground floor? The first floor? The roof? (י"ב: ה') (י"ב: ה')
- How would the law differ if the planks in the roof aligned with the spaces left by the planks on the first floor? (י"ב: ה') (י"ב: ה')
- What are the minimum dimensions of a round and square plank such that it can act as an *ohel*? (י"ב: ו') (י"ב: ו')
- What must the circumference of a pillar (lying on its side) be such that *tumah* is transferred if it is found underneath (but not squashed by) the pole? (י"ב: ז') (י"ב: ז')
- Explain the debate regarding a *kezayit* from a corpse that is found stuck to the threshold. (י"ב: ח') (י"ב: ח')
- What is law if it stuck to the outside of the lintel? (י"ב: ח') (י"ב: ח')
- What is the minimum measure (*shiur*) of the following spaces for *tumah* to be transferred through them:
  - A *Ma'or*?
  - *Sh'yarei Ma'or*? (Explain.)
  - A hole created by water? (י"ג: א') (י"ג: א')
- What other cases have the same ruling as the last case and in what situations does the size change? (י"ג: א') (י"ג: א')

- What is the *shiur* of a window made for ventilation for *tumah* to pass through it and when does this change? (י"ב: ג"י)
- What is the minimum measure (*shiur*) of the following spaces for *tumah* to be transferred through them:
  - A hole in a door? (Provide two cases.) (י"ג: ג"י)
  - A hole for a *kaneh*?
  - A peep-hole? (י"ד: ג"י)
- List some items that relate to *tameh* objects that can be used to reduce space of a window preventing *tumah* from spreading through them. (י"ה: ג"י)
- List some items that relate to *tameh* objects that cannot be used to reduce space of a window preventing *tumah* from spreading through them. (י"ו: ג"י)
- What is the general rule regarding the previous two questions? (י"ז: ג"י)
- What is a *ziz*? What is a *gizra*? When (in terms of placement and dimensions) can the transfer *tumah* to the inside of a house? (י"ח: ט"י)
- What is the difference between the required dimensions of a *ziz* above a door and a window? (י"ב: ט"י)
- Explain the debate regarding the difference between a *kaneh* and a *ziz*. (י"ג: ט"י)
- What is the law regarding the utensils under a *ziz*, only overlapping the doorway a width of three *eztba'ot* wide and that completely surrounds a house in which *tumah* is found? (י"ד: ט"י)
- Explain the debate regarding the previous question where the *tumah* is instead found under the *ziz*. (י"ד: ט"י)
- What is the law regarding two *zizim*, each a *tephach* wide, one on top of the other where *tumah* is found underneath them? Between them? Above them? (י"ה: ט"י)
- How does the ruling referred to in the previous question change if the upper *ziz* is wider?
- How does the ruling change if the gap between them is less than a *tephach*? (י"ו: ט"י)

- How does the ruling change if they are both less than a *tephach* wide? (י"ד: ט"ו)
- Can a solid stack of wooden boards transfer *tumah* (as an *ohel*)? (ט"ו: ט"ז)
- What other case brought has a similar ruling to the previous question? (ט"ז: ט"ח)
- If boards, a *tephach* from the ground, are set up in the following configuration:



What is the law if *tumah* is found beneath the first board and:

- A person touches the second?
- *Keilim* are found beneath the second? (ט"ז: ט"ח)
- What are the minimum dimensions of a *shulchan* for it to act as an *ohel* to spread *tumah*? (ט"ח: ט"ט)
- What is the law regarding rows of earthenware barrels where *tumah* is found under one? (ט"ט: ט"י)
- How does the ruling in the previous question change if they were already *tameh*? What other case shares the same ruling? (ט"י: ט"יא)
- What is the law if *tumah* is found behind a false wall in a house? (ט"יא: ט"יב)
- What is the law regarding *keilim* behind a false wall if *tumah* is found in the house? (ט"יב: ט"יג)
- When would the *keilim* behind a false wall be *tahor* even though *tumah* is also found there? (ט"יג: ט"יד)
- Regarding the previous three questions what is the law if the questions related to the space below the floorboards rather than behind a false wall? (ט"יד: ט"טו)
- Concerning a house that is filled with straw what is the law regarding the *keilim* inside the straw if *tumah* was found inside the straw? Inside the entrance of the house? (ט"טו: ט"טז)
- How does the law in the previous question change if the house was not filled to the ceiling (leaving a *tephach* space)? (ט"טז: ט"טז)

- How is the law different if the house was filled with dirt instead? (ט"ו:ז)
- Explain the debate regarding one who stands in a *chatzer ha'kever*? (ט"ו:ח)
- If a beam is used as a *golel* for a *kever*, when is it partially *tameh*, only four *tephachim* thick *tameh* and completely *tameh*? (ט"ו:ח)
- If an earthenware, sealed barrel full of liquid is used as a *golel*, what is the law regarding one who touches it? What is the law regarding liquid? (ט"ו:ט)
- Explain the debate regarding an animal that was used as a *golel*. (ט"ו:ט)
- Can a person transfer *tumah* by touching a corpse and acting as an *ohel* over *keilim*? (ט"ו:י)
- In what case would a person transfer *tumah* from a house with a corpse in it to another house, just by putting a hand in each house? (ט"ו:י)
- Explain the debate regarding the minimum dimension for movable items to act as an *ohel* to transfer *tumah*? (ט"ו:יא)
- Provide some examples for the position of *R' Akiva* regarding the previous question. (ט"ו:יב)
- What is the law regarding case where one finds a buried corpse? (ט"ו:יג)
- At what point is the area defined as a *sh'chumat k'varot*? (ט"ו:יד)
- Describe the manner in which the area is checked. (ט"ו:יד)
- What is the law if a stream cuts through the search area? (ט"ו:טז)
- List three cases that do not have the law of *tevusah*. (ט"ו:יז)
- How does a field become a *beit ha'pras*? (ט"ו:יח)
- How large is the resulting area of the *beit ha'pras*? (ט"ו:יח)
- How do the dimensions differ if the field is sloping? (Include both opinions.) (ט"ו:יט)
- In what three cases would the dimensions of the *beit ha'pras* be smaller? (ט"ו:יט)

- Explain the debate regarding whether a *beit ha'pras* can be the basis for another *beit ha'pras*. (י"ב: י"ז)
- What are the six cases of ploughed fields that had sources of *tumat met* in them that do not result in being a *beit ha'pras*? (י"ג: י"ז)
- What is the law regarding a field into which the soil of a *beit ha'pras* was washed? (י"ד: י"ז)
- What is the law regarding the attic of a house built in a field in which the location of a grave is unknown? (י"ה: י"ז)
- Explain the debate regarding the minimum measure of the soil from a *beit ha'pras* to be a source of *tumah*. (י"ה: י"ז)
- What other soil has the same measure? (י"ה: י"ז)
- What are the three opinions regarding how grapes from a vineyard in a *beit ha'pras* can be gathered and pressed and remain *tahor*? (י"ח: י"א)
- What are the three types of a *beit ha'pras* and how do they differ from one another? (י"ח: ב"ד)
- Explain the debate regarding the first category. (י"ח: ב')
- How can a *sde bochin* be checked? (י"ח: ד')
- For what purpose does checking the field help and for what purpose does it not help? (י"ח: ד')
- In what two ways can a *beit ha'pras* be purified? (י"ח: ה')
- What two methods does *R' Shimon* add? (י"ח: ה')
- How can one pass through a *beit ha'pras* without becoming *tameh*? (י"ח: ו')
- What is the law regarding one who travels outside Israel through the mountains? Through the sea? (י"ח: ו')
- What is a *Shunit*? (י"ח: ו')
- What is the law regarding fields in *Surya* with respect to *tumah*, *ma'asrot* and *shmittah*? (י"ח: ז')
- In what circumstances does a property occupied by a *goi* in *Eretz Yisrael* require checking for *tumah*? (What case is the exception?) (י"ח: ז')
- Provide the three opinions regarding the areas that required checking. (י"ח: ח')

- What are *itz't'vaniyot* and can they have the status of a *mador goyim*? (י"ח: ח')
- What does *R' Shimon ben Gamliel* rules does not have the status of *mador goyim*? (י"ח: ט')
- Which location was purified by the *Chachamim*? (י"ח: ט')
- Which location was purified by *Rebbi* and his *Beit Din*? (י"ח: ט')
- Which ten places do not have the status of *mador goi'im*? (י"ח: י')

## Negaim

- Explain the following statement: (א' א')  
מראות נגעים שנים שהן ארבעה...
- Explain the debate regarding the previous question. (א' א')
- Explain the debate regarding the colour of אדמדם. (א' ב')
- Explain how the different colour *negaim* combine: (א' ג')
  - *Liftor*? (Include all cases.)
  - *Lehachlit*? (Include all cases.)
  - *Lehasgir*?
- How many *mar'ot negaim* do the following *Tana'im* maintain there are: (א' ד')
  - *R' Channinah segan Ha'Kohanim*?
  - *R' Dosa ben Harkinas*?
  - *Akavya ben Mehalalel*?
- According to *R' Channinah segan Ha'Kohanim* on which days does the *kohen* not inspect *negaim* and why? (א' ד')
- Who argues with *R' Channinah segan Ha'Kohanim*? (א' ד')
- In what ways is the other opinion more lenient? (א' ה')
- In what ways is the other opinion stricter? (א' ו')
- Explain the debate regarding how the colour of a *nega* is assessed with people that have varying natural skin colours. (א' ב')

- What are the two opinions regarding the time of day that a *nega* should be inspected? (ב' : ב')
- Can a *kohen* that is blind in one eye inspect *negaim*? (ג' : ב')
- If a house does not have windows, are windows created to allow natural light in for the purpose of inspecting its *negaim*? (ג' : ב')
- Explain how *negaim* that are in concealed places are inspected. (ד' : ב')
- What other process uses the same method? (ד' : ב')
- What are the two opinions regarding the limit on whose *negaim* a *kohen* is allowed to inspect? (ה' : ב')
- For what other laws does a similar limit apply? (ה' : ב')
- Which people do not become *tameh* through *negaim*? (ו' : ג')
- What is the difference between whether a *kohen* or *yisrael* inspects *negaim*? (ו' : ג')
- Describe how a *yisrael* can assist a *kohen* in this task? (ו' : ג')
- Is one allowed to inspect two *negaim* at once? (ז' : ג')
- Can a *kohen masgir* a *muchlat*? (ז' : ג')
- What is the law if a *chatan* develops a *nega*? (ח' : ג')
- What other case shares the same law? (ח' : ב')
- How can a *metzora* become *tameh* for “two weeks”? How many days constitutes these “two weeks”? (ט' : ג')
- What are the three different signs (regarding a skin *nega*) that indicate a *metzora* is *tameh* (*muchlat*)? (ט' : ג')
- Is there a difference between these signs as to when they are significant? (י' : ג')
- What is the maximum quarantine period for a *nega shchin* and *michva*? (י' : ד')
- What are the two indications of *tumah* (*muchlat*) for *shchin* and *michva* and how do they differ from one another? (י' : ד')
- What is the maximum *hesger* period for *netakin*? (י' : ה')
- What are the two signs of *tumah muchlat* for *netakin*? (י' : ה')
- What is the maximum *hesger* period for *karachat* and *gabachat*? (י' : ו')
- What are the two signs of *tumah* for them? (י' : ו')

- What is the maximum *hesger* period for a *nega* on clothing? (יג: יז)
- What are the three signs of *tumah* for a *nega* on clothing? (יג: יז)
- What is the maximum *hesger* period for a *nega* on a house? (יח: יג)
- What are the three signs of *tumah* for a *nega* on a house? (יח: יג)
- What are the minimum a maximum *hesger* periods relating to all *negaim*? (יח: יג)
- What are the legal difference between the following signs indicating a *metzarah muchlat*:
  - White hairs and *Fishayon*? (יא: יד)
  - *Michva* and *Fishayon*? (יב: יד)
  - White hairs and *michva*? (יג: יד)
- What is the minimum length of the two white hairs? (יד: יד)
- What is the law if the white hairs have black roots? (יד: יד)
- Can a single split hair, which looks like two hairs, be considered as two hairs for this law? (יד: יד)
- What is the law regarding a *baheret* exactly the size of a *gris* that has both white and black hairs? (יד: יד)
- How wide must a “*chut*” extending from *baheret* to another be for it to combine them? (יה: יד)
- For what other law is this dimension important? (יה: יד)
- Explain the debate regarding a *baheret* the size of *gris* surround a *michya* that has white hairs inside it. (יז: יד)
- What other case is debated in a similar way and when do they agree? (יז: יד)
- What is the difference between whether a *nega* disappears and returns during the week of *hesger* or if it occurs after the *p'tur*? (יז: יד)
- When does a *nega* changing colour have now effect? (יז: יד)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where the *nega* spreads and recedes. (יז: יד)

- Explain the debate regarding a case where a *k'gris* sized *nega* spreads a half *gris* in one direction, but a half *gris* portion of the original *nega* to the other size disappears. (ד: ח')
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a *k'gris* sized *nega* that spreads:
  - More than a half *gris* in one direction, but a half *gris* portion of the original *nega* to the other side disappears.
  - More than a *gris* in one direction, but all of the original *nega* disappears. (ד: ט')
  - Spreads a *gris* in one direction and present two white hairs but the original *nega* disappears. (ד: י')
- What is the law regarding a half *gris baheret* that has one hair, next to which appears another half *gris* sized *baheret* with a white hair? (ד: י')
- Is the law different if the original half had two hairs? (ד: י')
- Is the law different if the second half had two hairs? (ד: י"א)
- What is the law if there is a doubt whether the hairs preceded the *baheret*? (ד: י"א)
- What other case of doubt shares the same rule as the previous question, and what is the rule in all other cases of doubt? (ה: י"א)
- What is the law if one of the signs of a *metzora muchlat* disappears from a *metzora muchlat* and another one appears? (Which case is missing from the *Mishnah* and why?) (ה: ב')
- Explain the debate regarding the definition of *se'ar p'kuda* and the debate regarding the law (ה: ג')
- When does the law regarding the ruling that applies to *safek negaim* change? (ה: ד')
- Provide examples for both cases and their ruling. (ה: ד'-ה')
- What are the minimum dimensions of a *baheret*? (ו: א')
- What are those dimensions in “hairs”? (ו: א')
- What are the minimum dimensions of both a *baheret* and the *michya* inside for it to be *tameh*? (ו: ב')

- Regarding the previous question what is the law if either the *baheret* increases or decreases in size? If the *michya* increases or decreases in size? (יב: י)
- Regarding the previous question, what is the law if the *michya* was originally too small? (Which case is the subject of debate?) (יג: י)
- Regarding the previous question, what is the law if they were both originally larger than the minimum size? (יד: י)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a *baheret* is surrounded by *michya* which is surrounded by a *baheret*. (יה: י)
- Regarding the previous question, explain the debate when the *baheret* spreads over the *michya*? (יז: י)
- What is *R' Shimon's* opinion regarding the scope of the debate described in the previous question? (יח: י)
- What is the law if the previous case involved a *bohak* in place of the *michya*? (יט: י)
- What are the twenty-four *roshei eivarim* and why are they important? (יא: י)
- List some of the places that cannot make someone *tameh* due to a *baheret*? (יב: י)
- For which other four cases are these locations important? (יג: י)
- Is there any time that the head can be treated as normal skin for *tzara'at*? (יד: י)
- List some cases where a *baheret* is found on the body but the person is not *tameh*? (טו: י)
- Explain the debate regarding “*tchilatan v'sofan tameh*” and list some examples of such cases. (טז: י)
- What are the three opinions regarding a *ger* that converts with a *baheret* and the colour subsequently changes? (יז: י)
- What is the law regarding a *baheret* that after the two weeks of *hesger* does not change? (יח: י)

- What is the law regarding one who has a *baheret* with a sign of *tumah*, but that sign disappears just prior to the *kohen* assessing it? (יג: יז)
- What is the law regarding one who removes one of the signs of *tumah*? (יד: יז)
- How does the answer to the previous question change if the sign was removed during *hesger*? After he was declared *tameh*? (יד: יז)
- What is the law regarding one that cuts off a *baheret*? (Include all cases.) (יה: יז)
- Can *tzara'at* prevent a *brit millah*? (יה: יז)
- What is the difference between a case where *tzara'at* spreads over the body of one that was declared *tahor* and one that was declared *tameh*? (יא: ח)
- What is the law if a *baheret* containing a *michya* spreads over one's body and then the *michya* disappears? (בי: ח)
- What is the law regarding a case where confirmed *tzara'at* has spread over one's body and then: (בי: ח)
  - A *michya* appears?
  - Two white hairs appear?
- What is the law regarding a case where a *baheret* containing two white hairs spreads over one's body? (ג: ח)
- What is the law regarding a case where *tzara'at* covers a person's body and the *roshei eivarim* keep clearing and covering over? (ד: ח)
- Explain the following principle: (ה: ח)
 

כל הראוי לטמא בנגע הבהרת מעכב את הפריחה  
כל שאינו ראוי לטמא בנגע אינו מעכב את הפריחה
- What is the law regarding a case where two *beharot*, one *tameh* and the other *tahor* spread into one another then spread across the entire body? Is the law the same if they were on two separate fingers? (ו: ח)
- What is the law if the *tzara'at* spreads over the entire body except for the *bohak*? (ז: ח)

- What is the law if, after spreading over the entire body, the *tzara'at* disappears from less than a *gris* from *roshei eivarim*? (ר: ח)
- What is the law if a person is first presented to the *kohen* already fully covered in *tzara'at*? What if two hairs appear? What if it recedes and the covers again? (ר: ח)
- If *tzara'at* has covered a person, then receded and then covered again, when is the person *tameh* and when are they *tahor*? (ח: ח)
- What is the difference between a *metzora musgar* and a *metzora muchlat*? (ח: ח)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a person had *tzara'at* covering his body with a *michya*, and then it covered his body, and then receded from *roshei eivarim*. (ט: ח)
- List two cases where a person ultimately was covered in *tzara'at* when presented to the *kohen*, where the hesitation in presenting resulted in stringency and a leniency. (י: ח)
- What is *shchin*? (א: ט)
- What is *michva*? (א: ט)
- What are their indications of a *metzora muchlat*? (א: ט)
- Can *shchin* and *michva* combine with each other? With a *nega* on skin? (ב: ט)
- When specifically can *shchin* and *michva* be *tameh* if a *nega* is found inside them? (ב: ט)
- What is the law regarding a *shchin* that contains a *baheret* exactly its size? Why? (ג: ט)
- What are the two indication of *tumah* for *netakim*? (א: י)
- Explain the debate regarding the definition of “*dak*”. (א: י)
- Explain the debate regarding the case whether the yellow hairs can precede the *netek*. (ב: י)
- Can the yellow hairs be scattered? On the edge of the *netek*? (ב: י)
- What is the law if two black hairs are present in a *netek*? (ג: י)
- How close from the edge of the *netek* must they be for the law to apply? (ג: י)

- Does the same law apply if a black and a white hair are present? (יג: י)
- Explain the debate regarding whether yellow hairs that preceded the *netek* can have the same status as black hairs? (יד: י)
- How (and when) is the *netek* shaved? (יה: י)
- What is the law if a *netek* spreads then receded to what it was then spreads again? (יז: י)
- When are two *netakim*, side-by-side that combine, *tameh* and when are they *tahor*? (יח: י)
- What other case is similar to the one in the previous question and how are they different? (יט: י)
- Explain the three opinions regarding a case of a *netek* that was *muchlat*, then black hairs appeared, then disappeared. (כ: י)
- What is the law regarding a *netek* that spread over one's head? Is the law different if it did not spread over the beard? Can a *netek* bridging the beard and head combine? What is the area defined as the beard? (כא: י)
- What are the two indication of *tumah* (*muchlat*) of *tzara'at* affecting *karachat* and *gabachat*? What are the regions defined as *gabachat* and *karachat*? What is the law if a *nega* spreads from *karachat* to *gabachat*? (Include both opinions.) (כב: י)
- What clothing can be affected by *negaim*? (כג: נ"י)
- What is the law regarding clothing purchased from *goyim* that contain a *nega*? (כג: נ"י)
- At what point can clothes made from skin from sea creatures became able to be *tameh* from *negaim*? (כג: נ"י)
- What is the law regarding clothing made from a blend of camel hair and wool with respect to *negaim*? (כד: נ"י)
- Explain the debate regarding whether naturally coloured clothing can become *tameh* from *negaim*. (כה: נ"י)
- Does the law change if the clothing is leather? (כה: נ"י)
- Is the law the same for houses that are coloured? (כה: נ"י)

- What is the law regarding clothing that only the warp of the fabric is coloured? (ד: א"י)
- What colours of *nega* are indications of *tumah* for clothing? Do these colours combine for spreading? (ד: א"י)
- Explain the debate regarding the cases where the colour of the *nega* changed prior to spreading. (ד: א"י)
- What is the law regarding clothing with a *nega* that: (ה: א"י)
  - Does not change after a week?
  - Does not change after two weeks?
  - Become lighter after inspection but prior to *hesger*?
- When is a *matlit* required? (ה: א"י)
- What is the difference if a *nega* returns to the *begged* or to the *matlit*? (ו: א"י)
- What is the law if a patch was taken from clothing that was *musgar b'tahor* and placed on another garment, and a *nega* returned to the original garment? A *nega* returned to the patch? (ו: א"י)
- What is the law regarding a striped white garment across which a *nega* spread? (ו: א"י)
- What is the law regarding a garment that has a single white stripe completely covered with a *nega*? (ו: א"י)
- When is the measure of spread a *gris* and when is it less? (ו: א"י)
- When can warp and woof threads become *tameh* from *negaim*? (ז: א"י)
- What is the law if thread is being transferred from one spindle to the next and a *nega* is on one of them? (ז: א"י)
- What is the law regarding the woven section if a *nega* is seen on the “standing” warp threads? (ז: א"י)
- What is the law regarding the threads at the edge of a sheet if a *nega* is on the sheet itself? Is it different if it is the other way around? (ז: א"י)
- Can sandal straps become *tameh* through *negaim*? (ח: א"י)

- What is the law regarding a case where a *begged musgar* is mixed with other garments? Is the law different if the *begged* was *muchlat*? (י"א:י"ב)
- What is the law regarding a house purchased from a *goi* that already had a *nega*? (י"ב:א')
- Can a round house become *tameh* through *negaim*? (י"ב:א')
- Can a houseboat become *tameh* through *negaim*? (י"ב:א')
- Can a house whose walls are covered with marble become *tameh* through *negaim*? (י"ב:ב')
- What the three materials must a house be made from in order to become *tameh* through *negaim*? (י"ב:ב')
- Explain the debate regarding the number of stones on each wall and the minimum size of a *nega* for a house to become *tameh* from *negaim*. (י"ב:ג')
- What is the minimum quantity of wood and earth for a house to become *tameh* from *negaim*? (י"ב:ד')
- Houses in which locations cannot become *tameh* from *negaim*? (י"ב:ד')
- Describe the process of how a house is inspected for *negaim*. (י"ב:ה')
- What items were cleared out of the house? (י"ב:ה')
- Where would the *kohen* stand when declaring the house required *hesger*? (י"ב:ו')
- What would happen if the *nega* spread after one week of *hesger*? (י"ב:ו')
- Regarding the previous question, what would happen if after another week, the *nega* returned? (י"ב:ז')
- From where does the *Mishnah* learn the following phrase: אוי לרשע אוי לשכנו (י"ב:ו')
- Complete the following: (י"ב:ז')  
 הפשיון הסמוך \_\_\_\_ והרחוק \_\_\_\_ והחוזר לבתים \_\_\_\_
- What are the "Ten laws of Houses"? (י"ג:א')
- In what case is removal stricter than dismantling? (י"ג:ב')
- What is the law regarding the attic above a house that requires *netitza*? (י"ג:ג')

- What is the law regarding a house below an attic that requires *netitza*? (י"ג: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding the minimum size of the stone, wood and earth of a *bayit menuga* for them to be a source of *tumah*. (י"ג: ג')
- What is the difference between, with respect to *tumah*, of a *bayit muchlat* and a *bayit musgar*? (י"ד: ג')
- What is the law if stone from a *bayit musgar* were used in the construction of another house and a *nega* returned to the original house? A *nega* returned to those stones? (י"ה: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a *bayit menuga* that is built inside another house. (י"ו: ג')
- What is the law regarding a case where: (י"ז: ג')
  - A *metzarah* is standing under a tree and someone else walks by?
  - A *metzarah* walks by a tree under which someone is standing?
- How much of one's body must enter a *bayit menuga* for them to be *tameh*? (י"ח: ג')
- How much of a *tallit* must be inside a *bayit menuga* for it to be *tameh*? (י"ח: ג')
- How much of a *tallit menuga* must be placed inside a house for the contents to be *tameh*? (י"ח: ג')
- What is the difference between when one is wearing and carrying cloths when entering a *bayit menuga* regarding when they become *tameh*? (י"ט: ג')
- What is the law regarding the ring in the case where one is standing inside a *bayit menuga* and he extending his hand with the ring outside the house? (י"י: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a ring in a case where one extends his hand with a ring inside a *bayit menuga*. (י"י: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding which *keilim* become *tameh* when a *metzarah* enters a house. (יא"י: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding the time it takes for those *keilim* to become *tameh*. (יא"י: ג')

- What is the law regarding a *metzorah* that wants to enter shul? (י"ג: י"ב)
- Explain the debate regarding the similarities between *metzorah* and *tumat ha'met* regarding *ohel* and *tzamid patil*? (י"ג: י"ב)
- Describe the purification process of a *metzorah*. (Include all four stages.) (י"א: י"ג)
- Which detail in the process is debated? (י"א: י"ד)
- What is the *metzorah's* status after the first, second and third stage of purification? (י"ב: י"ג)
- For which three people is “shaving” a *mitzvah*? (י"ד: י"ד)
- What is the law if the two birds are not the same monetary value? (י"ד: י"ה)
- What is the law if the first one was slaughter and: (י"ד: י"ה)
  - Found not to be *dror*?
  - Found to be a *treifah*?
  - The blood spilled?
- What are the requirements of the *etz erez*? *Eizov*? (י"ד: י"ו)
- What sacrifices are brought on the eight day? (י"ד: י"ו)
- What sacrifices are brought instead by a poor person? (י"ד: י"ז)
- What sacrifice was slaughtered first and what was done with the blood? (י"ד: י"ח)
- Where was the *metzorah* standing at this time? (י"ד: י"ט)
- Explain the debate regarding the purification of a *metzorah* that does not have a right hand. (י"ד: י"ט)
- Explain what was done with the oil during the final stages of the purification of the *metzorah*? (י"ד: י"י)
- Which two points are the subject of debate regarding the previous question? (י"ד: י"י)
- Explain the debate regarding one whose financial status changes in the process of bring the *korbanot* of a *metzorah*? (י"ד: י"יא)
- What is the law regarding a poor *metzorah* that brought the *korbanot* brought by a wealthy one? (י"ד: י"יב)
- Is the law different if the situation was reversed? (י"ד: י"יב)

- What category of *korban* does one bring for their child? (י"ד: י"ב)
- What is the law regarding a case where the *korbanot* of two *metzora'im* where mixed, one set was offered, then one of the *metora'im* passed away? (י"ד: י"ב)

## Parah

- What are the three opinions regarding the requisite age of a cow for it to be used for *para aduma*? (א: א)
- What are the three *halachot* that *R' Yehoshua* heard and how did *Ben Azai* explain them? (א: א)
- What are the three opinions regarding the requisite age of a bull for it to be used for *korbanot*? (ב: א)
- What are the ages of the following animal that are brought as *korbanot*: Lambs? Rams? (ג: א)
- What is the name given to a sheep in its thirteenth month and what is the law if it is offered as a *korban*? (ג: א)
- Which *korbanot* are valid from when the animal is thirty days old? Eight days old? (ד: א)
- Can a pregnant cow be used for *para aduma*? (ב: א)
- Can a cow purchased from *goyim* be use for *para aduma*? (ב: א)
- Which two *Menachot* are the only ones that must be brought from *chadash* and from within *Eretz Yisrael*? (א: ב)
- What is the law regarding a *para aduma* that:
  - Has black horns or black hooves?
  - Is dwarfed?
  - Had a wart removed? (ב: ב)
  - Was born through caesarean section?
  - Was used to purchase a dog?
  - Was ridden upon? (ב: ג)
- Complete following rule: \_\_\_\_\_ , כשרה, \_\_\_\_\_ כל שהוא (ב: ג). פסולה

- What is the law regarding a *para aduma* on which a bird rested? (ב:י:ד)
- Explain the debate regarding the black hairs that would disqualify a *para aduma*. (ה:י:ה)
- Describe how the *kohen* was prepared prior to *sreifat para aduma*. (א:י:ח)
- Describe how the water was brought to *Har Ha'Bayit* and what was done in advance to facilitate it. (ב:י:ב)
- Where was the existing *eifer chatat*, how was it extracted and what was done with it? (ג:י:ג)
- Regarding the previous question, which point was the subject of debate? (ג:י:ג)
- Was the *tahara* that was performed for one *chatat* applicable for another? (ד:י:ד)
- What point was debated regarding the preparation of the children that took part in the preparation for *para aduma*? (ד:י:ד)
- What are the seven *parot aduma* from which the ashes were stored in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (ה:י:ה)
- Where was the *para aduma* burnt? (ו:י:ו)
- Describe the construction of the bridge that lead to that location. (ו:י:ו)
- What are the different reasons brought for why a black *para* could not be used to lead the *para aduma* to the site? (ז:י:ז)
- Why (and how) would they cause the *kohen* to become *tameh*? (ז:י:ז)
- Where was the *mikvah* in which would the *kohen* then immerse? (ח:י:ח)
- What would was used for the fire and how was it structured? (ח:י:ח)
- How as the *para aduma* bound and how was it place on the wood? (ט:י:ט)
- Describe how it was slaughtered and what was done with the blood. (ט:י:ט)
- Why did the *kohen* wipe the blood on the cow? (ט:י:ט)

- What are the two opinions regard how the fire was lit? (י' ט:)
- What was done when the *kohen* took the cedar, hyssop and scarlet thread? (י' ג:)
- How were they bound together? (י' א:)
- What was first done with the ashes from the *para aduma*? (י' א:)
- How were the ashes divided and what was done with each part? (י' א:)
- Which of the following would invalidate the *para aduma* and which are the subject of debate:
  - Slaughtered with the proper intent.
  - The *kohen* that accepted the blood hadn't washed his hands and feet.
  - The *kohen* that performed the *para aduma* was not the *kohen gadol*.
  - The *kohen* was not wearing all the *bigdei kehuna*. (י' ד: א:)
  - The *para* was not slaughtered in the correct location.
  - Two *parot* was burnt in the same spot.
  - The blood was not sprinkled in the correct direction. (י' ד: ב:)
  - The fire was fuelled using straw.
  - The *para*'s hide was stripped and the animal was cut apart.
  - The *para* was slaughter with the intent to eat it. (י' ד: ג:)
- Which other act involving the sprinkling of the blood would invalidate that *para aduma*? (י' ד: ב:)
- What is the rule regarding when those that are involved in the *para aduma* are *tameh*? (י' ד: ד:)
- Can extra fire wood be added? (י' ד: ד:)
- Until which point does *melacha* invalidate the water used for *mei chatat*? (י' ד: ד:)
- Until which point must everything be performed by a *kohen*? (י' ד: ד:)
- How does one go about acquiring a *kli cheres* for the purpose of *mei chatat*? (י' ה: א:)
- How does this differ to one that requires the *kli cheres* for *trumah*? (י' ה: א:)

- What is the difference if one immerses a *kli shetef* in water fitting for *mei chatat* and water that is not fitting, for the purposes of filling it with *mei chatat*? (ה' ב') (ה' ב')
- In what case is there no difference? (ה' ב')
- Explain the debate regarding when a hollowed out pumpkin can be used to contain the water for *mei chatat*. (ה' ג')
- Explain the debate in detail regarding a *shfoferet* that was made into a *kli* for the purpose of contain the *eifer chatat*. (ה' ד')
- Explain the debate regarding which three people cannot place the *eifer* in the water. (ה' ד')
- Are there any *keilim* in which *mei chatat* cannot be *mekadesh*? (ה' ה')
- Can the *kiddush* be performed if the water is on one's hands? (ה' ה')
- Which two laws regarding *tumah* and *tahara* apply only to *klei cheres*? (ה' ה')
- Can a clay shell be used for *kiddush mei chatat*? (ה' ו')
- Can an egg shell be used for *kiddush mei chatat*? (ה' ו')
- List five legal differences if a trough was carved in stone or formed from stone and then attached to the ground with plaster. (ה' ז')
- What difference does it make if a *shoket* was perforated at its base or side and in both cases were plugged with rags? (ה' ז')
- When does a clay rim invalidate a utensil for use in collecting water for *mei chatat*? (ה' ז')
- In which two cases where two troughs were carved in a detached stone, would *kiddush* in one affect the other? (ה' ח')
- Can two stones, that one brought together to make a trough, be used to contain the water for *kiddush mei chatat*? (ה' ט')
- What is the law if the *eifer* fell into the *shoket*? (ה' י')
- What is the law if the *eifer* was removed and prior to placing it in the *shoket* the person closed the door to the room? (ה' י')
- When does standing the *shfoferet* upright prior to placing the *eifer* in the *shoket* not invalidate the *kiddush*? (ה' י')

- Explain the debate regarding whether *eifer* that was used to *mekadesh* some water can be reused for other water. What are the two cases discussed? (ב: י)
- What is a *t'fi*? What is the law regarding the water in a *t'fi* that was fully immersed in the *shoket* during *kiddush*? (ג: י)
- What is the law regarding a case where a sponge was found in the base of the *shoket*? (ג: י)
- What substances can be used to guide water from a *maayan* into a *kli* for it to be used for *mei chatat*? (ד: י)
- Can water from a spring channelled into a cistern be use for *mei chatat*? (ה: י)
- For what other cases does this law apply? (ה: י)
- Can five people separately collect water for the purpose of one *kiddush mei chatat*? (א: יג)
- If those five people collected them for five *kidushin* can they be combined for one? (א: יג)
- Would the law be different in the previous case if they were all collected by one person? (א: יג)
- What is the law if one collected the water for one *kiddush* and then decided to use them water for five? In what case would the law change? (א: יג)
- Can one fill water for two *kidushin* at the same time? (ב: יג)
- Does the law change if the second is for someone else? (ב: יג)
- In what situation would one not invalidate the water if at the time of filling he did another *melacha* with his other hand? (ג: יג)
- What is the law if one performs *kiddush* for himself and for someone else at the same time? (ג: יג)
- What is the law regarding a case where one says to another: (ד: יג)
  - “You perform *kiddush* on mine and I will perform *kiddush* on yours”?
  - “You perform *kiddush* on mine and I will collect water for yours”?
  - “I will collect water for yours and you perform *kiddush* on mine”?

- How should one collect water if they wish to collect water for *mei chatat* and for their own personal use? (יח: יג)
- Regarding the previous question, how should they then carry the water? (יח: יד)
- Can one return a rope he borrowed to fill water for *mei chatat* when returning from the task? (יח: יד)
- How should one wind the rope tied to the bucket when drawing the water for *mei chatat*? (יח: יד)
- In what case would hiding away the rope after filling not invalidate the water? (יח: יד)
- In what case would clearing potshard from the *shoket* prior to *kiddush* not invalidate the water? (יח: יד)
- What would the law be if one gave direction to another whilst caring the water for *mei chatat*? (יח: יד)
- Can one eat while carrying the water? (יח: יד)
- What is the general rule given by *R' Yehuda* regarding activities that invalidate water if performed whilst carrying it? (יח: יד)
- Explain the debate regarding who can be entrusted with guarding the water collected for *mei chatat*. (יח: יד)
- Explain the debate about a case where one assisted another person when both people were filling water for *mei chatat*, regarding whether the water is invalid. What specific case is debated? (יח: יד)
- What is the law regarding one that makes a breach in a fence on the way to filling the water for *mei chatat* and did so with the intention that he would rebuild it? (יח: יד)
- What are the two other cases brought similar to the one in the previous question? (יח: יד)
- What is the law regarding a case where two *shomrim* are guarding the water and one does *melacha*? (יח: יד)
- Why should one perform *kiddush* barefooted? (יח: יד)
- What is the difference if the *mei chatat* falls on the person's skin or clothes? (יח: יד)

- Explain how the phrase "מִטְמָאֵיךְ לֹא טְמֵאוּנִי, וְאַתָּה טְמֵאתָנִי" applies to the following:
  - *Parah aduma?* (ח: גי)
  - *Neveilat ohf tahor?* (ח: די)
  - *Vlad ha'tum'ot?* (ח: הו)
  - *Kli cheres?* (ח: וו)
  - *Sheini le'tumah?* (ח: זו)
- Explain the debate regarding which bodies of water have the status of a *mikvah*. (ח: חו)
- Complete *R' Yosi's* ruling regarding the previous question: (ח: חז)
 

כל הימים מטהר \_\_\_\_\_, ופוסלין \_\_\_\_\_, ולקדש מהן \_\_\_\_\_.
- What is *mayim mukim*? (ח: טו)
- What is *mayim mechatzvim*? (ח: טז)
- Can these types of water be used for *mei chatat*? (ח: טז)
- Why can *mei karmiyon* not be used for *mei chatat*? (ח: טז)
- Why can *mei yarden* not be used for *mei chatat*? (ח: טז)
- Explain the debate regarding the validity of water for two valid sources that were mixed together. (ח: יז)
- Is water whose appearance changed valid? (ח: יזא)
- What is the law regarding using water from a well into which earth fell? (ח: יזא)
- Explain the debate regarding the case where valid water fell into *mei chatat*. (ח: יזב)
- What is the law if dew fell into *mei chatat*? (ח: יזב)
- What is the law if juice fell into *mei chatat*? (ח: יזב)
- What is the law if ink fell into *mei chatat*? (ח: יזב)
- What is the law if the following creatures fell into *mei chatat*: (ח: יזב)
  - *Shekatzim*?
  - *Chipushit*?
  - A louse?
- What is the law if an animal drunk from the *mei chatat*? (ח: יזג)
- What is the law if a bird drunk from the *mei chatat*? (ח: יזג)

- Which of the *sheratzim* that drink for *mei chatat* would invalidate it? (ג: ט)
- At what point from when one thinks to drink *mei chatat* and finally drinks it does it invalidate the *mei chatat*? (Include all opinions.) (ד: ט)
- Explain the debate regarding whether one can use invalid *mei chatat* to mix cement. (ה: ט)
- What other debate is similar to the one in the previous question? (ה: ט)
- What restrictions are applied on transporting *mei chatat* across water (and why)? (ד: ט)
- Do these restrictions also apply to water to be used for *mei chatat*? (ו: ט)
- What is the law regarding *eifer* for *mei chatat* that got mixed with regular ashes with respect to *tumah*? (ו: ט)
- Explain the debate regarding whether the mixture can be used for *kiddush mei chatat*. (ו: ט)
- What is the law regarding a case where invalid *mei chatat* came into contact with one's skin? With one's hand? (ז: ט)
- How does the law change in the previous question if the *mei chatat* was *tameh*? (ז: ט)
- What is the law regarding a case where *eifer chatat* was placed on regular water and then came into contact with one's skin? One's hand? (ז: ט)
- What is *tumat madaf*? (ח: י)
- Which items that are susceptible to *tumat midras* are considered *madaf* for *chatat*? (ח: י)
- Which people are considered *madaf* for *chatat*? (ח: י)
- Explain the debate regarding which items that are susceptible to *tumat met* are considered *madaf* for *chatat*. (ח: י)
- What is the law regarding a *tahor* (for *chatat*) that touched a *madaf*? (ט: י)
- What is the law regarding a *tahor* person that touched food with his hands? With his feet? (ט: י)

- Explain the debate regarding a *tahor* that was *meisit* food. (י: ב')
- What is the law regarding a *kalal* that touched a dead *sheretz*? (י: ג')
- Explain the debate where the *kalal* was placed on top of the *sheretz*. (י: ג')
- What other case is debated in a similar manner? (י: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a case where one who was carrying *lugin* was standing on a *tanur*. (י: ד')
- What other case is debated in a similar manner to the previous question? (י: ה')
- What is the law regarding a case where *lugin* of *mei chatat* came into contact with *lugin* of *kodesh*? (י: ו')
- What is the law regarding a case where a *tahor* held the two *lugin*, one in each hand? (Provide all four cases.) (י: ז')
- What is the law if one touched both *lugin* that were resting on the floor? (י: ז')
- What is the law regarding a case where one leaves a *tzluchit* of *mei chatat* uncovered and finds it covered? What if it was the other way round? (י: ח')
- Does the law of *tzamid patil* apply to *mei chatat*? Does it apply to water collected for *mei chatat*? (י: ט')
- In what two ways are doubtful cases by *tumah* for *trumah* similar for *chatat*? (י: י')
- What is the law regarding *refafot*? (י: י')
- What is the law regarding one who eats *trumah* onto which *mei chatat* fell? (Provide both cases.) (י: י')
- How could one that is *tahor* for *mei chatat* cause the *mei chatat* to become *tameh*? (י: י')
- What is the difference for one that is required to immerse in the *mikveh*, before and after immersing and what remain prohibited? (י: י')
- If one requires immersion in *mikveh* by rabbinic decree, to what can he transfer *tumah*? (י: י')

- Which case is debated regarding the previous question? (י"ה: א"י)
- What is law regarding such a person after immersion in the *mikveh*? (י"ה: א"י)
- If one requires immersion, in what manners can they transfer *tumah* to *eifer chatat*? (What else can be made *tameh* in the same manner?) (י"ג: א"י)
- Explain the debate how such people can transfer *tumah* to the other three components of *mei chatat*. (What are they?) (י"ג: א"י)
- Which types of *eizov* are invalid to use for *tahara*? (י"ז: א"י)
- Can a *trumah eizov* be used? (י"ז: א"י)
- Can *yonkot* and *temarot* be used? (What are they?) (י"ז: א"י)
- Can an *eizov* that was used for *mei chatat* be use for purifying a *metzarah*? (י"ח: א"י)
- In what case would an *eizov* that was collected for purposes other than *mei chatat* onto which invalid water fell, be suitable for *mei chatat*? (י"ח: א"י)
- Explain the debate regarding the previous question if the wood was collected for *mei chatat*. (י"ח: א"י)
- Describe the different opinions regarding the requirement of the *eizov* from the *mitzvah* of the *eizov*. (י"ט: א"י)
- What should one do if the *eizov* is too short to reach the *mei chatat* when dipping? (י"א: י"ב)
- What are the three cases of doubt regarding *hazaya* and what is the law in each of those cases? (י"ב: ב')
- Explain the debate regarding a case where the *tzluchit* mouth is very narrow. (י"ב: ב')
- What is the law regarding a case where one performed *hazaya* in a direction different to what he intended? (Provide both cases.) (י"ב: ב')
- What is the law if one intended to performed *hazaya* on an item that is susceptible to *tumah* but performed it on an item that is not susceptible to *tumah*? (י"ג: ב')

- List the other cases that have a similar law to the previous question. (י"ב:ג')
- What is the law regarding the water that remains on the *eizov*? (י"ב:ג')
- What is the law regarding one that had *mei chatat* sprinkled on them, entered the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* and it was then found that the *mei chatat* was invalid? (Provide both cases.) (י"ב:ד')
- How does the answer differ if the person in question was the *kohen gadol*? (י"ב:ד')
- Why could one walk on the wet floor where the *hazaya* was performed? (י"ב:ד')
- How would one hold an axe when performing *hazaya* on it? (י"ב:ה')
- How much water is required of *hazaya*? (י"ב:ה')
- What is the difference if one performs *hazaya* with a small or large *tameh eizov*? (Define "small" and "large".) (י"ב:ו')
- What is different about one whose hands become *tameh* when concerning *mei chatat*? (י"ב:ו')
- What is the law regarding a *lugin* of *mei chatat* that came into contact with *tameh* water? (י"ב:ז')
- Are the parts of the bell considered *chibur* for *tahara*? (Which items listed are?) (י"ב:ח')
- List some items that are *chibur* for *tumah* but not *hazaya*. (י"ב:ט')
- What are the two opinions regarding whether a cover of a *meicham* connected with a chain is considered *chibur*? (י"ב:י')
- Which people may not perform *hazaya*? (י"ב:י')
- What is the law if the *eizov* was dipped in the *mei chatat* during the night and *hazaya* was performed during the day? (י"ב:יא')
- What is the law if the *tameh* person immersed in the *mikveh* during the night and then had *hazaya* performed on him during the day? (י"ב:יא')
- When is the earliest time *hazaya* can be performed (*lechatchila* and *bedi'eved*)? (י"ב:יא')

## Taharot

- What are the thirteen laws stated by *nivlat ohf tahor*? (א:א-ב) (א:א)
- Explain the debate regarding what can “*metaher*” an *ohf tahor* that is a *treifah*. (א:א) (א:א)
- Explain the debate regarding the *notza*. (א:ב) (א:ב)
- Explain what it means that the nails are “מְטַמְּאִין וּמְטַמְּאִין וּמְטַמְּאִין וּמְטַמְּאִין”? (א:ב) (א:ב)
- List the ways in which *nivlat ohf tameh* differs from *nivlat ohf tahor*. (א:ג) (א:ג)
- For which “*tumah*” can the hide of an animal combine with its flesh to complete the *shiur*? (List some other parts that share the same law.) (א:ד) (א:ד)
- What is law regarding the meat of a *tameh* animal that was slaughter by a *yisrael* for a *nochri*, while the animal is convulsing? (א:ד) (א:ד)
- Can food that is *rishon le'tumah* combine with food that is *sheni le'tumah* to make the minimum *shiur* to transmit *tumah*? (What is that *shiur*?) (א:ה) (א:ה)
- What is the law regarding a *ke'beitzah* of *sheni* that was mixed with a *ke'beitzah* of *sh'lishi* food? (א:ו) (א:ו)
- What is the law if that mixture was then split into two? (א:ו) (א:ו)
- How does the law change in the previous two questions if each part was initially two *beitzim* in size? (א:ו) (א:ו)
- What is the law if two piece of dough stuck together and then one came into contact with a *sheretz*? (א:ז) (א:ז)
- What is the law if they were then separated? (א:ז) (א:ז)
- How does the law change in the previous two questions if they became stuck together only after one touched a *sheretz*? (א:ח) (א:ח)
- In what case could a *sheretz* that touches *kodesh* bread cause all *kodesh* bread touching it (in a chain fashion) to be *tameh*? (א:ט) (א:ט)
- In what case would the law be the same for *trumah* bread? (א:ט) (א:ט)

- What is the law regarding a pot of cooking *trumah* vegetables where one (which is *tahor*) touches a leaf that hangs outside the pot? (ב' א:)
- How does the law differ if the leaf was wet? (ב' א:)
- How does the law differ if the person was *tameh met*? (ב' א:)
- Describe the case of doubt involving a *tevul yom* that relates to the previous questions and what is the law in that case? (ב' א:)
- Explain the debate regarding one that eats *tameh* food that is *rishon le'tumah*. (ב' ב:)
- What is the law regarding what has the ability to attract and transmit *tumah* for food that is *rishon*? *Sheni*? *Sh'lishi*? (ב' ג:)
- Describe the levels of *tumah* that apply to *trumah*. (ב' ד:)
- Describe the levels of *tumah* that apply to *kodesh*. (ב' ה:)
- What is the lowest level of *tumah* that can cause *chulin* liquid to become *tameh*? (ב' ו:)
- What is the lowest level of *tumah* that can cause *kodesh* liquid to become *tameh*? (ב' ו:)
- What is the law if *trumah* that is *sh'lishi* comes into contact with *kodesh*? (Consider both cases.) (ב' ו:)
- On which points does *R' Elazar* argue regarding the levels of *tumah*? (ב' ז:)
- What is the law regarding one that eats *sheni* food and then presses olives? (ב' ח:)
- Explain the debate regarding the levels of *tumah* for *chulin* that is kept under the sanctity of *kodesh*. (ב' ח:)
- What is the law regarding *tameh* milk that congeals? (ב' ט:)
- What is the law if that milk then becomes fluid again? (Consider both cases.) (ב' ט:)
- Which liquids do not share the same law as the previous two questions? (ב' י:)
- If a mass of *tameh* olives fell into an oven, when would the oven become *tameh*? (ב' י:)
- When would oil that was pressed from olives by a person who is *tameh met* not be *tameh*? (ב' י:)

- How would the law change if the person was a *zav*? (ג: ג)
- What other case shares the same law as the previous question? (ג: ג)
- What is the law if a *kezayit* from a *neveilah* was left in the sun and shrunk in size? (ד: ג)
- What is the law if rain then fell and the piece swelled to being larger than a *kezayit*? (ד: ג)
- Explain the following principle: (ג: ה)
 

"כל הטמאות כשעת מציא אתן"
- What is the law if a *katan* is found in a *mavoi* that contains *tumah*? (ו: ג)
- What is the law if an adult was in the *mavoi* but did not know if they made contact with the *tumah*? (ו: ג)
- What is the law regarding a child found next to a cemetery that is holding flower that is only found inside the cemetery? (ז: ג)
- What is the law regarding the utensils on the back of a donkey that is found inside a cemetery? (ז: ג)
- Explain the debate regarding the dough in the cases where a *tameh* baby is found next to it holding some of the dough in its hand. (ח: ג)
- What is the law regarding bread from which a rooster has pecked if in the house there is also *tameh* liquid? (ח: ג)
- For which animals does the law in the previous question differs and how so? (ח: ג)
- What is the law regarding a case where *tumah* is thrown about and it is unclear whether it touched *tameh* food? (ט: ד)
- In what case does *R' Yehuda* argue? (ט: ד)
- What is the law regarding a case where a weasel is seen walking across *trumah* rolls carrying a *sheretz* in its mouth? (י: ב)
- What is the law if the weasel was walking amongst people? (י: ד)
- What is the law if a dog was eating a *sheretz* and person walked past and is not sure if he touched the *sheretz*? (י: ד)

- What is the law if a crow carrying a *kezayit* from a *met* passes by and there is a doubt if it passed over a person? *Keilim?* (ד: 'ד)
- What is the law regarding the *keilim* if one pours liquid from one to the other and a *sheretz* is found in the lower *kli*? (ד: 'ד)
- What are the six *sfeikot* in which the rule is that *trumah* would be burnt? (ה: 'ד)
- In what cases are we *toleh trumah* in a case where the *safek* is between two *rokin*? (ו: 'ד)
- How does the law differ if the case involved one *rok*? (ו: 'ד)
- List some of the *sfeikot* that the *Chachamim* ruled were *tahor* even in a *reshut ha'yachid*? (ז: 'ד)
- What are the three opinions regarding the doubtful case involving floating *tumah* that the *Chachamim* ruled was *tahor*? (ח: 'ד)
- What is the case in which we rule: "ספק משקין לטמא, טמא"? (ט: 'ד)
- What is the case in which we rule: "...וּלְטַמֵּא, טהור"? (ט: 'ד)
- What is *R' Yosi*'s opinion regarding *safek mashkin*? (י: 'ד)
- What is the law regarding: (יא: 'ד)
  - *Safek yadayim*?
  - *Safek divrei sofrim*? (Describe such a case.) What case is the exception?
- Which *safek* is *taharat Prishut*? (יב: 'ד)
- What is the law regarding *safek sheratzim*? (יב: 'ד)
- When is *safek negaim tahor*? (יב: 'ד)
- What is the law regarding the ownership of *safek Bechorot*? (יב: 'ד)
- Can a *safek nazir* drink wine? (יב: 'ד)
- Describe the case of *safek korbanot* and what is its ruling? (יג: 'ד)
- Explain the debate regarding a case in which one path is *tahor* and the other is *tameh* and one is not sure which path he took. (ה: 'א)
- List some other cases that share the same rule. (ה: 'א)

- Explain the debate regarding a case in which there is a dead *sheretz* and a dead frog and one touched one of them but is unsure which one. (הי: ב') (ה)
- What is the law regarding a case with two paths, one *tameh* and the other *tahor*, where one walked on one and then handled *trumah* food, then ate it, went through the *tahara* process, walked on the other path and then handled other *trumah* food? (ה: ג') (ה)
- How does the law differ if the original food was not eaten? (ה: ג')
- How does the law differ if the person also did not go through the *tahara* process? (ה: ג')
- What other case is brought that is similar to the one in the previous questions? (ה: ד')
- What is the law in a case regarding the two paths where one person went on one path and another on the other? (Provide both opinions.) (ה: ה')
- What other case is brought that is debated in a similar manner to the previous question? (ה: ו')
- What is the law regarding one's clothes if they were trampled on by someone unknown to him? (ה: ז')
- What is the law regarding the clothes of one that slept in *reshut ha'rabim*? (ה: ז')
- Explain the debate regarding a case where one touched a body at night and in the morning it is discovered that it is a corpse. (ה: ז')
- In what cases would all the *rok* found in a city be deemed *tameh*? (ה: ח')
- In what case would a man not be required to ask a woman if she is *tameh* after she stepped on his clothing? (ה: ח')
- What would the law be in the follow cases: (ה: ט')
  - A witness says the person became *tameh* but the person denies it?
  - Two witnesses say *tameh* but the person denies it?
  - One witness say *tameh* but two witnesses say *tahor*?
  - Two witnesses say *tameh* but one says *tahor*?

- One witness say *tameh* but one says *tahor*?
- What is the law regarding doubtful cases of *tumah* in a domain that changes from a *reshut ha'yachid* to a *reshut ha'rabim* then back? (י"א: י')
- What other case is similar to the one in the previous question? (י"א: י')
- What are the four *sfeikot* that *R' Yehoshua* rules as *tameh* and the *Chachamim* rule as being *tahor*? (י"ב: י')
- What is the law if one climbs a tree in *reshut ha'rabim* that contains *tumah* but is not sure if he touched the *tumah*? (י"ג: י')
- What is the law regarding a case where one is not sure if they entered a shop that opened to *reshut ha'rabim* and contained *tumat ha'met*? (י"ג: י')
- What is the law if a person who entered one of two shops, one of which was *tameh*, but he was not sure which one he entered? (י"ג: י')
- What is the law regarding a double doubt concerning *tumah* in a *reshut ha'yachid*? (י"ד: י')
- Explain the debate regarding one that enters a valley during the winter but is not sure if he walked through the *tameh* field in that valley. (י"ה: י')
- Provide an example of a domain that is *reshut ha'rabim* for *tumah* but defined as a *reshut ha'yachid* for *Shabbat*? (Which case is debated?) (י"ו: י')
- What location is defined as a *reshut ha'rabim* for *tumah* but only in the summer? (י"ז: י')
- What is the definition of that location for *Shabbat*? (י"ז: י')
- What is the status of the following areas for *tumah* and *Shabbat* (including all opinions):
  - A *Basilki*? (י"ח: י')
  - A *Paran*? (י"ט: י')
  - An *Istavnit*?
  - A courtyard used as a public thoroughfare? (י"י: י')
- What is the law regarding the wares of a potter that left them unattended in *reshut ha'rabim*? (Include both opinions.) (י"א: י"ז)

- What is the law regarding a *chaver's* house if he entrusted his keys with an *am ha'aretz*? (יא: יז)
- Explain the debate regarding the contents of a *chaver's* house if he left an *am ha'aretz* there unattended. (בי: יז)
- Explain the debate regarding the contents of a *chaver's* house if he left tradesmen there unattended. (ג: יז)
- What are the two opinions regarding the contents of a *chaver's* house if she allowed an *am ha'aretz* use her mill? (יד: יז)
- What is the law regarding the contents of a *chaver's* house if he left an *am ha'aretz* to guard the house? (יה: יז)
- What is the law regarding the contents of a house into which tax collectors have entered? (יז: יז)
- What difference does it make if a *goi* was amongst the collectors? (יז: יז)
- What is the law regarding the contents of a house that has been robbed? (יז: יז)
- What is the law regarding one's utensils that he left in a bathhouse locker? (יז: יז)
- What is the law regarding a *kohen's* utensils that he left at the press from one seasons to the next? (יז: יז)
- Explain the debate regarding a *kohen* who abandoned his intention of eating more *trumah*. (יח: יז)
- Regarding the previous question, with respect to what is there consensus? (יח: יז)
- Regarding which people and cases do *R' Akiva* and the *Chachamim* argue? (יט: יז)
- Explain the debate regard a case where a *chaver* leaves his utensils in a *chatzer* shared with an *am ha'aretz*. (יא: יח)
- With respect to which *tumah* is one concerned if he entrusted a utensil with an *am ha'aretz*? (בי: יח)
- When does that law change? (בי: יח)
- What is *R' Yosi's* opinion regarding the previous two questions? (בי: יח)

- What is the general rule regarding when an item that is lost then found is considered *tameh*? (יג: ח)
- What is the law regarding clothes that are laid out in *reshut ha'rabim*? (יג: ח)
- How does the law change if the clothes were in *reshut ha'yachid*? (יג: ח)
- What is the law regarding one's bucket that fell in the well in the property of an *am ha'aretz* and was left unattended while the *chaver* went to get rope to retrieve it? (יג: ח)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where one left their house then returned finding it unlocked. (יד: ח)
- In which cases similar to the previous one, is there no debate? (יד: ח)
- What is the law regarding a *chaver's* house if an *am ha'aretz* entered to collect their child? (יה: ח)
- In what state does food become susceptible to *tumah*? (יז: ח)
- When does animal food become susceptible to *tumah*? (יז: ח)
- To what can the back of *keilim* that became *tameh* transfer *tumah*? (יז: ח)
- What are the opinions regarding whether parts of *tameh* dough can combine to make the minimum *shiur* in order to make the liquid in which they sat *tameh*? (יח: ח)
- What are the opinions regarding the previous question if the trough is slanted? (יח: ח)
- What are the three cases where liquids do not combine to transfer *tumah*? (יט: ח)
- For what else do they not combine? (יט: ח)
- When do olives become susceptible to *tumah*? (יט: ח)
- Can olives become susceptible to *tumah* if the owner did not complete collecting olive for some reason out his control? (יט: ח)
- What is the law regarding freshly picked olives onto which *tameh* liquid fell? (יט: ח)
- Is the law in the previous question different if all work in collecting the olives was complete? (יט: ח)

- Explain the debate regarding the moisture that leaves such olives. (ג: ט)
- What is *R' Shimon's* version of the debate? (ג: ט)
- What are the three opinions regarding how an *am ha'aretz* should complete picking his olives in order to separate *trumah*? (ד: ט)
- What is the law regarding olives that were left in a basket to soften? (Provide both cases.) (ה: ט)
- What is the law regarding olives that were placed on the roof for drying? (ו: ט)
- What is the law regarding such olives that were stored in the house in order to soften them prior to placing them on the roof? (ו: ט)
- Does the law change if they were in the house only while making space on the roof? (ו: ט)
- Explain the debate regarding a case when one takes olives from a vat for pressing when he has not finished collecting olives into that vat. (ז: ט)
- What is the law regarding a case where a *sheretz* is found:
  - On a grinding stone?
  - On the leaves on pressed olives? (ח: ט)
  - On clumps of olives above the main mass of olives in a vat?
  - On clumps above clumps above the mass?
  - Between the wall and the olives?
  - Burnt on top of the olives? (ט: ט)
- What is the law regarding the vat from which olives were being taken and placed on the roof if a *sheretz* is found amongst the olives on the roof? (ט: ט)
- What is the law if the *sheretz* was found in the vat? (ט: ט)
- Explain the debate regarding the case where the olive workers who were made *tahor* were locked in the press along with a *tameh kli*. (י: י)
- What is the law if *tameh* liquid was found spilt in an olive press in which the workers were treading? (י: י)

- Were the workers allowed to leave the press to relieve themselves? (י: ב')
- Explain the debate regarding whether the workers would need to be supervised when immersing themselves and the *keilim* prior to work. (י: ג')
- What is the scope of the decree that applies to picked grapes making them susceptible to *tumah*? (Include both opinions.) (י: ד')
- Grapes picked and stored in which locations would immediately be susceptible to *tumah*? (י: ה')
- What would be the law if one such grape (that was *tameh*) fell into many others? After how many more would the law be different? (י: ה')
- What is the law if an *am ha'aretz* spat while he talked and there is a doubt whether the spittle reached the vat? (י: ו')
- What is the law if while one was drawing wine out of the vat, a *sheretz* was found in the first barrel? In the last barrel? (י: ז')
- Regarding the previous question in what case is the ruling more stringent? More lenient? (י: ז')
- Which parts of a vineyard would be considered *reshut ha'rabim*? (י: ח')
- What must one do first if the utensils of a wine press became *tameh* through *tameh* liquids? (Provide both cases.) (י: ט')

## Mikvaot

- What is *mei gevaim*? (י"א: י"א)
- What is the law regarding one that drank from *mei gevaim* after someone *tameh* drank from it? (י"א: י"א)
- Regarding the previous question, what would the law be if *trumah* fell in such water? (י"א: י"א)
- What is the law regarding the previous two questions if instead of a *tameh* person first drinking from the *mei gevaim*:
  - Water was first drawn with a *tameh kli*? (י"ב: י"א)

- *Tameh* liquid first fell into the *mei gevaim*? (ג: א)
- A corpse fell into the *mei gevaim*? (ד: א)
- Provide some examples of bodies of water that qualify as *mei gevaim*? (ד: א)
- What is the law regarding *mei gevaim* that is found during the rainy seasons? During the rest of the year? (ד: א)
- When does *tameh mei gevaim* become *tahor*? (ה: א)
- What two things listed in the *Mishnah* can *mei gevaim* be used for? (ה: א)
- What is the body of water that is the next level above *mei gevaim* and how does it differ from *mei gevaim*? (ו: א)
- For what two things listed in the *Mishnah* can that water be used? (ו: א)
- What is the technical definition of a *mikveh* and what is it used for? (ז: א)
- What is the body of water that is the next level above a *mikveh* and in what ways is it similar to a *mikveh* and in what ways is it similar to a *maayan*? (ז: א)
- What is *mayim mukin*? (ח: א)
- For what is a *maayan* the only option? (ח: א)
- What is the law regarding one who is unsure whether they immersed in a *mikveh*? (א: ב)
- What other two cases of doubt share the same rules as the previous question? (א: ב)
- What is the law regarding a *mikveh* that was used for immersing *tameh* items and was later measured and found to contain water less than the required *shiur*? (ב: ב)
- Which forms of *tumah* are the subject of debate regarding the previous question? (ב: ב)
- What is the doubtful case involving drawn water that the *Chachamim* deemed as being *tahor*? (ג: ב)
- What is the debate regarding when, and the debate regarding the measure, of drawn water that invalidates a *mikveh*? (ד: ב)

- Explain the debate regarding a *mikveh* that filled naturally in an area that contained three small pockets (*log*) of drawn water. (ב' :ה')
- In what case could one that scrapes mud to the side of the *mikveh* invalidate it? (ב' :ו')
- Explain the debate regarding how one could use the rain water that collected in jugs on one's roof for a *mikveh*. (ב' :ז')
- What other case is debated in a similar manner to the previous question? (ב' :ח')
- Which further case is listed in the *Mishnah* that appears to be similar to the previous ones but does not include two opinions? (ב' :ט')
- Explain the debate regarding a *mikveh* (40 *seah*) that is a mixture of mud and water. (ב' :י')
- In which case do they both agree? (ב' :י')
- In which case do they argue? (Include all opinions.) (ב' :י')
- What is the law regarding two *mikvaot* that only had one and a half *log* of drawn water fall in each and these *mikvaot* were then combined to form one *mikveh*? (ג' :יא')
- Explain the debate regarding a *pasul mikveh* as a result of containing three *lugin* of drawn water that was divided in two. (ג' :יא')
- What are the ways in which one can fix a *pasul mikveh*? (Include both opinions.) (ג' :יב')
- What is the law regarding a pit of drawn water through which a stream passes? (ג' :יג')
- Explain the debate regarding a *mikveh* into which two people pour one and a half *lugin* of drawn water. (ג' :יג')
- If the water was poured with how many utensils would the *Chachamim* agree? (ג' :יד')
- In what case would the *Chachamim* disagree even if it was poured with one hundred utensils? (ג' :יד')
- What is the *tzinor* that is referred to in the fourth *perek*?
- Can water in a utensil that was placed under a *tzinor* be used for a *mikveh*? (ד' :יא')

- Is the material of the utensil important? (ד: א')
- Explain the debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding the previous questions. (ד: א')
- When would a *tavla* placed under a *tzinor* invalidate the water that passes over it for use in a *mikveh*? (ד: ב')
- If one carved holes in the *tzinor*, when would it invalidate the water? (ד: ג')
- How could the situation be remedied naturally? (ד: ג')
- What is the law regarding a *tzinor* that widens in the middle? (ד: ג')
- What is the law regarding a case where rain water and drawn water mixes prior to entering the *mikveh*? (ד: ד')
- What if both streams entered the *mikveh* directly? (ד: ד')
- What is the difference if a *shoket* was present in an existing rock or if it was originally a separate *kli* and connected to the ground? (Five different laws.) (ד: ה')
- In the later case, how large must a hole be in its base such that water that passes over it is valid for use in a *mikveh*? (Include all opinions.) (ד: ה')
- Is water in a *shoket* flowing from a *maayan* valid? (ה: א')
- Regarding the previous question, when could the water that collects further down stream be valid? (ה: א')
- What is the law regarding water that collected in a *breicha* from a *maayan* that was divided then reconnected with the stream from the *maayan*? (ה: א')
- Explain the debate regarding water from a *maayan* that passed over *keilim*. (ה: ב')
- Regarding water that spread from a *maayan* into multiple streams, when would adding drawn water to it change its status? (ה: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding the status of the oceans. (ה: ד')
- What is the law regarding “*zochalin*”? (ה: ה')
- What is the law regarding “*notfin*”? (ה: ה')
- Explain the debate regarding immersing in *notfin* that became *zochalin*. (ה: ה')

- When can a wave detached from the ocean purify? (י:ה)
- When can the foot-holes created by donkeys qualify as a *mikveh*? (י:ה)
- What is the case of the *chardelit* that is the subject of debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel*? When do they agree? (י:ה)
- Can one immerse items in the cracks of a *mikveh*? (יא:י)
- Explain the debate regarding when one can immerse items in the *Ukat HaMe'arah*? (יא:י)
- Can one immerse a bucket full of utensils at the same time? (יב:י)
- What is the law regarding a case where three *mikvaot* each had twenty *seah* of water and three *temei'im* immersed in each of them causing the waters to mix where: (יג:י)
  - The end *mikveh* consisted of drawn water?
  - The middle *mikveh* contained drawn water?
- What is the law regarding a case where a sponge containing three *lugin* of drawn water fell into a *mikveh* containing less than forty *seah*? (יד:י)
- Explain the debate regarding the manner in which one would be allowed to immerse in chest that is immersed in the ocean. (יז:י)
- Regarding the previous question, how does the law change if one wished to immerse inside a large basket? (יז:י)
- What other two laws are mentioned regarding baskets in the same *Mishnah*? (יז:י)
- What is the law regarding utensils that are immersed in a partially submerged *tameh gistra*? (יז:י)
- What other case is brought that is similar to the one in the previous question? (יז:י)
- What are the dimensions described as *k'shfoferet ha'nod* and for what are these dimensions important? (יז:י)
- What is the law if there is a doubt whether these dimensions are satisfied? (יז:י)
- Explain the debate regarding what items would reduce a hole that size. (יז:י)

- Explain how one can “*metaher*” one *mikveh* with another. (י:ח)
- What would be the solution to the previous question if the source *mikveh* was on forty *seah* and the other empty? (י:ח)
- Explain the debate regarding the direction of a crack in a wall between two *mikvaot* such that they combine without a whole *k’shfoferet ha’nod*. (י:ט)
- If the dividing wall broke at the top, how much water must pass between the two such that the *mikvaot* combine? (י:ט)
- What is an *avik* and when would it invalidate a *mikveh*? (י:י)
- Explain the debate regarding the *metaheret* in a *merchatz*. (י:י”א)
- Can snow be used to fill a *mikveh*? (י:י”א)
- Can hail be used to fill a *mikveh*? (י:י”א)
- What is the law if cooking water was used to fill the *mikveh*? (י:י”ב)
- When would the volume of fruit juice that was added to a *mikveh* be considered and when would it be ignored? (י:י”ב)
- What is the law if one washed a grape basket inside a *mikveh* and it changes its colour? (י:י”ג)
- What is the law if wine falls into a *mikveh* and changes its colour? (י:י”ג)
- What is the law if wine falls into a *mikveh* and only partially changes the colour? (י:י”ד)
- What is the law regarding three *login* of water amongst which is a *kurtov* of wine which gives it the appearance of wine and then falls into a *mikveh* of less than forty *seah*? (י:י”ה)
- What is the law regarding the previous question if instead there were three *login* of water that contained an additional *kurtov* of milk? (י:י”ה)
- What is *R’ Yochanan ben Nuri*’s opinion regarding the previous two questions? (י:י”ה)
- Explain the debate regarding a *mikveh* that has exactly forty *seah* and two people immersed in it one after the other. (י:י”ו)

- What are the problems one can face when immersing a leather pillow and what is the solution? (יג: יג)
- Can one immerse a bed in a *mikveh* if the legs sink into the mud below? (יג: יג)
- What solution is given to the problem of a shallow *mikveh*? (יג: יג)
- What is the law regarding a needle that is placed on the step of a *mikveh* and water only covers it when someone unsettles the water? (יג: יג)
- What is the difference between a *stam mikveh* found in Israel and other countries? (יא: יח)
- What are the two opinions regarding which *mikvaot* are *tahor* if found in *Eretz Yisrael*? (יא: יח)
- Which people are considered *Ba'al Kerayin* based on assumption? (Include all opinions.) (יב: יח)
- Explain the debate regarding within how many *onot* a *poletet* is *tahor*. (יג: יח)
- In what case would a woman that immerses be considered as if she did not immerse? (יד: יח)
- In what case would a *ba'al kerai* share the same law? (יד: יח)
- What is the law regarding a *nidah* that immerses with a coin in her mouth? (יז: יח)
- What is the law regarding a *nidah* that immerses with her hair in her mouth? With clenched fists? (יז: יח)
- What is the law regarding one that immerses utensils while holding onto them? (יז: יח)
- Which threads are a *chatzitza* for a person? (Include both opinions.) (יא: יט)
- Is dough under one's finger nails considered a *chatzitza*? (יב: יט)
- What is the concern with immersing with dust on one's feet? (יב: יט)
- What is *R' Eliezer's* rule regarding what qualifies as a *chatzitza*? (יג: יט)
- Is a hang nail considered a *chatzitza*? (יד: יט)

- What law is common to all the items listed in the previous few *Mishnayot*? (יט: יד)
- What is the exception? (יט: יד)
- For what items listed in the *Mishnah* are *zefet* and *mor* a *chatzitza*? (List some.) (יט: זח)
- For which of those items is there a difference between a wealthy and poor person and why? (יט: זח)
- Concerning a saddle, for which people does *zefet* not constitute a *chatzitza*? (יט: זח)
- What are three opinions regarding when *zefet* is a *chatzitza* on clothing? (יט: זח)
- For which aprons does the law of *chatzitza* not apply? (יט: זח)
- What is the general rule regarding when something constitutes a *chatzitza*? (יט: זח)
- Provide three cases when a handle is a *chatzitza* for a utensil? (יט: זח)
- What is the law regarding a utensil that was immersed face down? (יט: זח)
- Which utensil needs to be immersed on its side? (יט: זח)
- Which utensil needs to be perforated before it can be immersed in a *mikveh*? (יט: זח)
- Does a pillow need to be opened prior to immersion? (יט: זח)
- Do *tefillin* need to be opened prior to immersion? (יט: זח)
- What are some of the items listed in the *Mishnah* that do not require opening prior to immersion? (יט: זח)
- What are some of the items that do? (יט: זח)
- For how long must folded clothing be immersed in the *mikveh*? (List both cases.) (יט: זח)
- Explain the debate regarding immersing *keilim* whose handles are too long. (יט: זח)
- How much of a chain that is connected to a *tameh* bucket must be immersed in a *mikveh*? (יט: זח)
- What is the debate regarding the restrictions on purifying *tameh* water? (יט: זח)
- What is the law if one immerses a *kli* that is full of: (יט: זח)

- Wine?
- Urine?
- *Mei Chataf*?
- How are the laws that apply to *tameh* liquid stricter than the laws of liquids that apply to *mikvaot*? (י: יג)
- What is the difference if one drank *tameh* water or other *tameh* liquids, immersed in a *mikveh* and then vomited them out? Which other case is similar? (י: יח)
- What is the law regarding one that immersed with an arrow in them? (י: יח)

## Nidah

- Explain the debate regarding the *taharot* of a woman that discovers she is a *niddah*. (יא: יא)
- When would the law be different? (יא: יא)
- What example is brought for the opinion of *Beit Shammai*? (יא: יב)
- According to *R' Eliezer* which women are excluded from the debate? (יא: יג)
- What is the definition of the following people in the context of *nidah* and why is it important:
  - *Betulah*?
  - *Meuberet*?
  - *Meinikah*? (יא: יד)
  - *Zkeina*? (יא: טז)
- When do we no longer say *daya sha'ata* with respect to these women? (יא: יז)
- What is the exception to the answer in the previous question? (יא: יז)
- Which *nashim* do not require *bedikot*? (יא: יח)
- How many *bedikot* are required? (יא: יח)
- Which *nashim* require additional *bedikot* and for what? (יא: יח)
- Is it positive to increase *bedikot*? (יא: יט)

- How do *bedikot* apply to a *shota*? (ב' :א')
- How many *idim* are used for *shimush*? (ב' :א')
- When are they obligated to bring a *korban* with respect to these *idim*? (ב' :ב')
- What time period is considered “*achar zman*” and for what is it important? (Include both opinions.) (ב' :ג')
- When must the *ba'al* ask if she is a *niddah*? (ב' :ד')
- What is the debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding *bedikot*? (ב' :ד')
- To what did the *Chachamim* apply these terms and why are they important: chamber, ante-room and attic? (ב' :ה')
- What are the five *damim* that are *tameh*? Explain. (ב' :ו-ז')
- Which other *damim* are debated and by who? (ב' :ו')
- What is the debate regarding a *mapelet chaticha*? (ג' :א')
- What other cases share the same law? (ב' :ב')
- For what things that came from a *mapelet* would a water test apply? Explain. (ג' :ב')
- With respect to a *mapelet* regarding what do *R' Meir* and the *Chachamim* argue? (ג' :ב')
- What is the law regarding a *mapelet shafiri*? (ג' :ג')
- What is the law regarding a *mapelet*:
  - *shilya*? (Regarding what does *R' Shimon* argue?) (ד' :ג')
  - *Tumtum*?
  - *Androginus* and a male?
  - *Tumtum* and a female?
  - *Mesoras*? (ה' :ג')
  - But is unknown if it is male or female?
  - But is unknown if it is a *vlad* or not? (ו' :ג')
  - On the fortieth day? Forty-first day? (Regarding what does *R' Yishmael* argue?) (ז' :ג')
- From what age are *bnot kutim* treated as *nidot*? Why? (ד' :א')
- Explain the following: כֹּוֹתִיִּם מְטַמְּאִים מְשֻׁבָּב תַּחְתּוֹן פְּעָלִיוֹן Why? (ד' :א')
- Explain the debate regarding when *bnot tzedukim* have the same law as *bnot kutim*. (ד' :ב')

- Explain the debate regarding *dam nochrit*. (ד' ג:י)
- What else is debated in the same manner? (ד' ג:י)
- Explain the debate regarding *dam yoledet shelo tavla*? (ד' ג:י)
- What is the law regarding the *tumah* of a *yoledet b'zov*? (ד' ג:י)
- What is a *yoledet b'zov*? (ד' ד:ד)
- What is the *zman kishuya*? (Include all opinions.) (ד' ה:ה)
- Regarding what cases is there a debate whether *dam kishuya* can be *tahor*? Explain that debate. (ד' ו:ו)
- When is an *isha b'chezkat tahara*? (ד' ו:ו)
- What is the law regarding on that does not check at the time of her *veset*? (ד' ו:ו)
- In what case does *R' Meir* argue? (ד' ו:ו)
- Explain the debate regarding a *yotze dofan*. (ה' א:א)
- What is the difference between when a *zav* and *nidah* become *tameh*? (ה' א:א)
- What is the *shiur* for *tumat zav*? (ה' ב:ב)
- For what ages can one become *tameh nidah*? *Zava*? (ה' ג:ג)
- What are the eleven laws listed in the *Mishnah* that apply to a one year old? (ה' ג:ג)
- What are the laws listed that apply to a three years old girl? (ה' ד:ד)
- What are the laws listed that apply to a nine year old boy? (ה' ה:ה)
- What law applies to an eleven year old girl? (ה' ו:ו)
- What is the comparable age for a boy? (ה' ו:ו)
- Regarding the previous law what is different when the girl turns twelve? (ה' ו:ו)
- Can that law apply to a girl younger than that age that is extremely clever? (ה' ו:ו)
- For what laws did the *Chachamim* apply the following parable: *בְּחַל וְצִמָּל, פְּגָה, בְּחַל וְצִמָּל*? (ה' ו:ו)
- What are the *simanim* for a *bogeret*? (Include all opinions.) (ה' ח:ח)
- At what age would one become an *aylonit*? (ה' ט:ט)
- At what age would one become a *saris*? (ה' ט:ט)

- What law listed applies to both? (ה': ט')
- What is the law regarding one where only one of the upper and lower *simanim* have appeared? What case is debated? What case is considered impossible? (א': י')
- What hole in a *kli cheres* is larger: *machnis* or *motzi*? (ב': י')
- Can part of the body have a bone without a nail? A nail without a bone? (Why is this important?) (ב': י')
- Which of the following two *tumot* can cause *tumah* to more *keilim*: *tumat met* or *tumat midras*? (ג': י')
- Explain what the *Mishnah* means when it states that there are people that are fit for judging monetary cases that are not fit for judging capital cases. (ד': י')
- Which of the following two laws apply to more food: *tumat ochlin* or *chiyuv ma'asrot*? (ה': י')
- Which of the following two laws apply to more food: *peah* or *chiyuv ma'asrot*? (ו': י')
- Which of the following two laws apply to more animals: *matanot* or *reishit ha'gez*? (ז': י')
- Which of the following two laws apply to more produce: *biur* or *shvi'it*? (ח': י')
- What else must a fish have if it has scales? (ט': י')
- Do all animals that have horns have split hooves? Do animals that have split hooves all have horns? (ט': י')
- Does everything that requires a preceding *bracha* require one after? What things that require an after *bracha* require a preceding *bracha*? (י': י')
- At what age do a boy and girl become fully obligated in *mitzvot*? (יא': י')
- At what age is a *ben sorer u'moreh*? (יא': י')
- Till what age can a girl perform *mi'un*? (י"א': י')
- List some laws where two hairs are important? (י"ב': י')
- What is the minimum length of hairs for these laws? (י"ב': י')
- Explain the debate between *R' Meir* and the *Chachamim* regarding one that sees a *ketem*. (י"ג': י')

- What is the law regarding one that sees *dam* in *bein ha'shmashot* on the last day of *yemei zivah*? (ו:י"ד)
- To what was *R' Yehoshua* referring when he said:  
עַד שֶׁאַתֶּם מֵתְקַנִּים אֶת הַשּׁוֹטוֹת תִּקְנוּ אֶת הַפְּקוּחוֹת (ו:י"ד)
- List some items that are *metameh* both *lach* and *yavesh*? (ו:י"א)
- List some things that are *metameh* only *lach*? (ו:י"א)
- When are items referred to in the previous question still *metameh* when *yavesh*? (ו:י"א)
- On which item does *R' Yosi* argue? (ו:י"א)
- If a dead *sheret* is found in a *mavoi*, however far back are the items that were in the *mavoi* retroactively *tameh*? (ו:י"ב)
- What case is similar to the one in the previous question? (ו:י"ב)
- Explain the debate regarding *ketamim* from *Rekem*. (ו:י"ג)
- Explain the debate regarding *ketamim* found from amongst *Yisraelim*. (ו:י"ג)
- Where a *ketamim* found in *Eretz Yisrael* that they would be considered *tameh*? (ו:י"ד)
- Which *ketamim* are *metameh b'ohel* (and according to whom)? (ו:י"ד)
- Regarding which three laws (listed) are *Kutim* trust? Not trusted? (ו:י"ה)
- Is a *ketem* found on one's big toe *tameh*? (ו:י"ח)
- When would a *ketem* found anywhere on a garment be *tameh*? (ו:י"ח)
- What examples are brought for the following rule: וְתוֹלָה בְּכָל דָּבָר שֶׁהִיא יְכוּלָה לְתַלּוֹת (ו:י"ח)
- What is the limit to the previous rule? (ו:י"ח)
- What was the case with *R' Akiva* that illustrates the previous rule? (ו:י"ח)
- What is the law regarding a case where an *eid* that was placed under a pillow after *bedika*, had *dam* on it? (ו:י"ד)
- What is the debate regarding one that saw blood when she was *metilah mayim*? (ו:י"ט)
- What is the debate regarding a case where *dam* was found in a *sefel* that was shared by a man and woman? (ו:י"ט)

- What is the law regarding the *isha* that lent a garment to a *nidah* (without for checking it) and it was returned with a *ketem*? (יג: ט)
- What is the law if three *nashim* sat on a bench (one after the other) and *dam* was found on it? (יג: ט)
- In what case does *R' Nechemya* argue? (יג: ט)
- What is the law if three *nashim* shared a bed and *dam* was found beneath one? (יד: ט)
- When does that law in the previous question change? (יד: ט)
- Regarding the previous cases when would only two be *teme'ot*? (In what case does *R' Yehuda* argue?) (יה: ט)
- What other case relating to *tumah* is compared to the previous one? (יה: ט)
- What are the seven *samemanin* and what are they used for? (יז-י: ט)
- What is the law regarding a garment with a *ketem* that was immersed, and then the *ketem* was removed with the *samemanin*? (יז: ט)
- Describe how the *samemanin* must be applied. (יז: ט)
- List some of the *vestot* (*ha'guf*). (יח: ט)
- How many times must they occur for an *isha* to have a *veset*? (יח: ט)
- When would the *taharot* that she touched during a *veset ha'guf* be *tahor*? (יט: ט)
- What are *R' Yosi's* and *R' Yehuda's* opinions regarding *vestot*? (יט: ט)
- What is the law regarding an *isha* that had a *veset* on the fifteenth of the month but saw *dam* on the twentieth once? Twice? Three times? (י: ט)
- What does the *Mishnah* use the example of wines to explain? (יא: ט)
- What are the three debates between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* in the first *Mishnah* of the final *perek*? (יא: י)
- What are the three opinions regarding the point after *tumah* that an *isha* can get a *chezkat tahara* after *bedika*? (יב: י)

- What is the law regarding a *zava* that only checked on the first and seventh days? (יג: י)
- What is the unique law that applies to the corpse of one that died as a *zav*? (יד: י)
- Until when does this law apply? (יד: י)
- What is the debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding *nashim metot*? (יד: י)
- Explain the debate regarding *dam* that leaves an *isha she'meta*. (יה: י)
- In what case do they agree? (יה: י)
- What level of *tumah* is a *yoshevet al dam tohar*? (Provide the history.) (יז: י)
- Regarding the previous question when do *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* argue and when do they agree? (יז-יח: י)
- Explain the debate regarding an *isha* that sees: (יח: י)
  - On the eleventh day and *tavla l'erev v'shimsha*?
  - On the eleventh day and the next day *tavla v'shimsha*?
- In what case do they agree? (יח: י)

## Machshirin

- Is water *machshir* if it was only initially *l'ratzon*? If it was only *l'ratzon* at the end? (יט: יא)
- What liquids are *machshir* even if it is not *l'ratzon*? (יט: יא)
- If water falls as a result of shaking a tree on to detached fruit, in what two cases does everyone agree that the water is considered *b'chi yutan* and which case is debated? (כ: יא)
- Explain the debate regarding the previous question where the water falls on to attached fruit. (יג: יא)
- What (and whose) opinion does *R' Yehoshua*'s present? (יג: יא)
- Explain the debate regarding one that shakes water from a bundle of vegetables and the water runs across the lower vegetables. (יד: יא)

- What is the law regarding the water that is squeezed out of a leek and what is the law regarding the remaining water? (א: ה')
- What other case brought shares the same law? (א: ה')
- What are the two cases debated by *R' Shimon* and the *Chachamim*? (א: ו')
- What is the law regarding fruit that was hidden in water to prevent their theft? (א: ו')
- What is the law regarding fruit that was placed in the river to float for the sake of transportation? (א: ו')
- What is the law regarding moisture on a building? When does this change? (ב: א-ב')
- What is the law regarding human sweat? When does this change? (ב: א')
- In what case is the sweat of a *tahor* person *tameh*? (ב: ב')
- What is the law regarding the moisture generated in a house that contains one *tameh* and one *tahor* pool? (ב: ג')
- What are the other three cases that share a similar ruling to the previous question and which case has a condition? (ב: ג')
- What is the law regarding one that washes his clothes with *mei shofchim* and rain falls on them? (ב: ד')
- What other case is listed that shares the same law and what is *R' Yehuda's* opinion regarding both cases? (ב: ד')
- When is there a restriction regarding when one can use a communal bath after *Shabbat*? (Include both opinions.) (ב: ה')
- When would one be forbidden from buying vegetables until the time it takes for them to be imported from a nearby location has past? (ב: ו')
- Explain the debate regarding how one should identify the religion of an abandoned child. (ב: ז')
- When would one not be required to announce that he found a lost object? (ב: ח')
- What is the law regarding bread that is found in a city that is populated by both *Yisraelim* and *goyim*? (ב: ח')

- What is the law regarding meat that was found in such a city? How does the law change if the meat was cooked? (ב' טי)
- When would produce that was found in the street be considered *tevel*? *Chulin*? *Demai*? (ב' י')
- Explain that debate regarding the status of fruit in a storehouse that is shared by *Yisraelim* and *goyim*. (ב' י')
- What is the law regarding a mixture of fruit from different years of the *shmittah* cycle? Why is this important? (ב' י"א)
- What is law if the mixture contains exactly half from two consecutive years? (ב' י"א)
- Explain the debate regarding which water is considered “*b'chi yutan*” in a case where produce was placed on the river’s edge in order to draw water. (ג' י"א)
- What is the law regarding the moisture in produce that is in contact with the walls of an earthenware utensil that is filled partially with liquid? (ג' י"ב)
- To which of the seven liquids does this law not apply? (ג' י"ב)
- Explain the debate regarding bread (that was made with fruit juice) that, after baking, was placed over the mouth of a barrel of wine. (Include all three opinions.) (ג' י"ג)
- What is the law regarding wheat that was placed on a washed floor? (ג' י"ד)
- What other case brought is similar to the one in the previous questions? (ג' י"ד)
- What is the law regarding one that placed produce on newly dried cement? (ג' י"ה)
- Should one be concerned when casting their wheat onto a new washed threshing floor? (ג' י"ה)
- Explain the debate regarding wheat that was being brought for grinding and rain fell on it. (ג' י"ה)
- What is the law regarding olives on the roof onto which rain fell? (ג' י"ו)
- What are the other two cases debated by *R' Yehuda* and the *Chachamim*? (Hint: River and dirty feet.) (ג' י"ז)

- What is the law regarding the water that drips off a wagon's wheel that was immersed in the river for hardening? (יח: ג')
- If one sent an animal to drink from a river, water dripping from which parts of the animal is considered "*b'chi yutan*"? (יח: ג')
- In which two cases does the law in the previous question change to be considered "*b'chi yutan*"? Never be considered *b'chi yutan*? (יח: ג')
- If one drank water from the river, is the water that drips from his beard considered *b'chi yutan*? (יט: יד)
- In what case is the water on the outside of a barrel that was filled with water not considered *b'chi yutan*? (יט: יד)
- If water falls on someone that is *tameh*, at what point is that water considered *b'chi yutan*? (יב: יד)
- In what similar case does that water become *tameh* earlier? (יב: יד)
- When is the water in a bowl that is placed outside when raining not considered *b'chi yutan*? (יג: יד)
- Explain the debate regarding what one should do if water collected in a barrel of fruit, if they do not want them to be susceptible to *tumah*. (יד: יד)
- In which case do they agree? (יד: יד)
- What are the two other similar cases where *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* argue? (Hint: trough.) (יז: יד)
- If one washes their clothes in a river, if water drips from which part of their body is there a debate regarding if it is considered *b'chi yutan*? (יז: יד)
- What is the law regarding a basket of *turmosin* that was (unintentionally) placed in a *mikveh* and a *tameh* person: (יז: יד)
  - Took one?
  - Touch the basket after it was removed from the *mikveh*? (יז: יד)
- What is the law regarding a radish that was washed in a *ma'arah* by a *nidah*? (יז: יד)
- What is the law regarding a case where produce fell in a stream and a person with *tameh* hands removed them? (יז: יד)

- How does the law change if the person intended to wash his hands when removing the produce? (יג: ד)
- What is the law regarding an earthenware utensil that was full of water and was placed in a *mikveh* and an *av ha'tumah* placed their hand in it? (יח: ד)
- How does the law change if the person was a *maga tumah*? If the *kli cheres* was filled with other liquids? (יח: ד)
- Explain the debate regarding how long it takes for water in a *kilon* to be considered *b'chi yutan*. (יט: יב)
- What is the law regarding water on stick that consisted of both poured and rain water? When does the law change? (י: ד)
- What is the law regarding wood that absorbed *tameh* liquid and rain fell on it? (י: ד)
- How should they be burnt? (י: ד)
- What is the law regarding the water on one who was pushed into a river? (Both cases.) (יא: ה)
- What is the law regarding water that is kicked up when swimming? That is deliberately splashed on one's friend? (יב: ה)
- Explain the debate regarding the water that fell on fruit and was mixed in order that it dries quicker. (יג: ה)
- What is the law regarding water that is on a stick that was used to measure the dimension of a hole? Which case is debated? (יד: ה)
- If one placed his hand in a hole to check if it contained water, what is the law regarding the water on his hand? (ה: ה)
- If one threw a rock in a pit in order to determine if there was water, what is the law regarding the water from the resulting splash? The water on the rock itself? (ה: ה)
- Is there a difference regarding the water that came out from beating a hide if it was in the water or outside it? (ו: ה)
- What is the law regarding the water on a boat's sail? On fishing nets? (ז: ה)
- If one placed nails outside in the rain to harden, what is the law regarding that water? (ז: ה)

- When would the water on mats that cover bricks be considered *b'chi yutan*? (ה: ח)
- For which liquids is *nitzuk* consider *chibur*? (ה: ט)
- In which cases is it (effectively) always considered *chibur*? (Include both opinions.) (ה: י)
- Explain the debate regarding when the contents of a pot would become *tameh* if stirred by one that had *tameh* hands. (ה: יא)
- When would the juice that collected from grapes in scales become consider *b'chi yutan*? (ה: יא)
- What is the law regarding fruit that was placed on the roof so that worms leave and then dew fell on the fruit? (ה: יא)
- Regarding the previous question, when is there a difference regarding who placed them on the roof? (ה: יא)
- Explain the debate regarding market vegetables. (ה: יב)
- What other products share the same law? (ה: יב)
- Which food has a *chezkat tahara*? (ה: יג)
- Which food has a *chezkat tumah*? (ה: יג)
- Which foods is an *am ha'aretz* believed regarding *tumah*? (ה: יג)
- What are the seven liquids? (ה: יד)
- List some of the *toladot* of water? (ה: יד)
- List some of the *toladot* of *dam*? (ה: יד)
- What is the status of blood that comes from a *sheretz*? (ה: יד)
- Which liquids are both *metameh* and *machshir*? (ה: יד)
- Which liquids do *R' Eliezer*, *R' Elazar ben Azarya* and *R' Shimon* each argue only *metameh* but do not *machshir*? (ה: יד)
- List some liquids that even if they come from a *tameh* person are not *metameh* or *machshir*. (ה: יד)
- Explain, in detail, the debate regarding the difference between *chalav isha* and *chalav behema*. (ה: יד)

## Zavim

- What are the two debates between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* in the first *Mishnah*? (א:א)
- How does *R' Elazar ben Yehuda* explain the second debate? (א:א)
- List all the opinions regarding a case where a *zav* is *ro'eh ker* in the *shiva neki'im*. (ב:א)
- How does the law change if he was *ro'eh zav*? (ב:א)
- What is the law regarding one that was *ro'eh*:
  - Twice in one day and once the next?
  - Three consecutive days? (ג:א)
- How long must the break be to be considered different sightings? (ד:א)
- What is the *shiur* for one *re'iyah* to make one a *zav gamur*? (ה:א)
- What is the law regarding one that was *ro'eh*: (ו:א)
  - In the day and during *bein ha'shmashot*?
  - Twice in consecutive *bein ha'shmashot*?
  - Once in *bein ha'shmashot*?
- Can an *eved* be *metameh zav*? A *saris*? A *tumtum*? (א:ב)
- What are the seven ways for checking a *zav* and why is the checking necessary? (ב:ב)
- Explain the debate regarding which *re'iyot* require *bedika*. (ב:ב)
- For how long after one is *ro'eh ker* is he not *metameh zav*? (ג:ב)
- If a dog ate a *kezayit* from a *met*, within how long must it die for the dog to be *metameh* in an *ohel*? (ג:ב)
- What are the five ways a *zav* can *metameh* a *mishkav*? (ד:ב)
- What are the seven ways a *mishkav* can *metameh* a person? (ד:ב)
- What is the law regarding the cloths of a *tahor* that rode on the same horse as a *zav*? (א:ג)

- What is the law regarding a *tahor* that sat on the same bench as a *zav*? (List some other cases that share the same law.) (יג: יא)
- Explain the debates regarding a *zav* and a *tahor* that were: (יג: יב)
  - Opening a door together?
  - Helping each other out of a pit?
- When would the *tahor* not become *tameh* if they were both unloading a donkey? (יג: יב)
- If a *zav* and *tahor* were sharing a boat, how large must it be such that the *tahor* not become *tameh*? (יג: יג)
- What is the law if the *tahor* strikes the *zav*? If the *zav* strikes the *tahor*? (יג: יג)
- Regarding what previous law does R' Yehoshua argue in this *Mishnah*? (יא: יא)
- When would the contents of a basket of clothes carried by a *nidah* be *tameh midras*? (יד: יא)
- What is the law if a *zav* knocked on a pipe and a *kikar* of *trumah* fell as a result? (Include some other similar cases.) (יד: יב)
- List some other similar cases where the law is different? Where the law is debated? (יג: יג)
- What is the law where a *zav* lay on five benches? (Include both cases.) (יד: יד)
- Which of the chairs are *tameh* if the *zav* lay on six chairs with one under each arm, each leg, his head and one under his body? (יד: יד)
- What is the law if a *zav* stood with one leg on each chair? (יד: יד)
- What is the law if a *zav* lay on a pile of garments? (יד: יז)
- What is the law if a *zav* is on one side of scale and many garments are on the other and the scales move? (Include both cases and which case is debated?) (יד: יז)
- What would be the law if food and drink were on the other side of the scales? (יד: יז)

- How is *tumat zav* harsher than *tumat met* and how is *tumat met* harsher than *tumat zav*? (ד': ו')  
(ד': ו')
- Explain the debate regarding a *zav* sat on bed and patches of clothe were under each leg. (ד': ו')
- What comparable case is not debated? When would the law in that case be the reverse? (ד': ו')
- What is the difference between horses and donkeys for *tumat zav*? (ד': ו')
- Explain the debate regarding a *zav* that sat on a *machbesh*. (ד': ו')
- What is the law regarding a one that touches a *zav*? (ה': א')
- What is *R' Yehoshua*'s general rule relating to the previous question? (ה': א')
- Complete the following rule and explain with examples: (ה': ב')  
 כָּל הַנֶּשֶׂא עַל \_\_\_\_\_ טָמֵא, וְכֹל \_\_\_\_\_ נֶשֶׂא עָלָיו טָהוֹר, חוּץ מִן \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הֵן! \_\_\_\_\_
- Provide the three *kol ha'noseh* rules that relate to *zav*, *neveilah* and *tumat met*. (ה': ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a person carried only part of a *zav*. (ה': ד')
- What is the law if a *zav* sat on a small part of a *mishkav*? (ה': ה')
- What is the law if a *tahor* person sat on a small part of a *tameh mishkav*? (ה': ה')
- What is the law in the previous two questions if only part of the person was on the *mishkav*? (ה': ה')
- What is the law if *trumah* rested on a tissue on top of a *tameh mishkav*? (ה': ה')
- What other case is brought that shares a similar law and who argues? (ה': ה')
- What is the law regarding one that is touching a *zav* and how does the law change if he lets go? (ה': ו')
- Is the law the same if that person is touching a *mishkav*? (ה': ו')
- Explain the debate regarding the scope in which one can contract *tumah* from *zovo shel zav*. (ה': ז')

- When is one an *av ha'tumah* if they are utilising a *merkav* of a *zav*? (ח:ה')
- Can one become *tameh* from *mei chatat* without touching it? (ח:ה')
- At what point is one an *av ha'tumah* when eating a *neveilat ohf tahor*? (ה:ט')
- What is the law while the *neveilah* is in the person's mouth? (ה:ט')
- List some of the source of *tumah* are that are no more severe during contact that when the person is no longer touching it. (ה:י')
- Complete the following general rule:  
 כָּל הַנוֹגֵעַ בְּאַחַד מִכָּל \_\_\_\_\_ מְטַמָּא \_\_\_\_\_ וּפּוֹסֵל \_\_\_\_\_ חוּץ  
 מִן \_\_\_\_\_  
 פֶּרֶשׁ מִטַּמָּא \_\_\_\_\_ וּפּוֹסֵל \_\_\_\_\_
- What is level of *tumah* of a *ba'al keri*? *Bo'el nidah*? (ה:י"א)
- List all the items that are *posel trumah*. Explain. (ה:י"ב)

## Tevul Yom

- If separated *challot* were placed next one another and stuck to each other, when does *Bet Hillel* maintain that they are *chibur* for *tevul yom*? (א:א-ב')
- List some other cases that are the subject of a similar debate and how those cases change such that *Beit Hillel* agrees. (א:א-ב')
- How does the law change in the previous questions if the source of *tumah* is different? (א:א-ב')
- What is *R' Yosi's* ruling regarding how to assess whether something attached to food is *chibur* of *tevul yom*? (List some of those cases.) (א:ג-ד')
- Explain the debate regarding whether barley attached to bread is considered *chibur*. (א:ה')

- What is the difference between the fluids that come from a *tevul yom* and the liquids that come from other forms of *tumah*? (ב' א:)
- How are laws relating to *stam yadayim* stricter than *tevul yom* and how are they more lenient? (Provide an example.) (ב' ב:)
- What is the law if a *tevul yom* touches porridge where: (ב' ג:)

  - The porridge is *trumah* and the garlic is *chulin*?
  - The porridge is *chulin* and the garlic is *trumah*?

- When would the law in the previous question change? (Provide two cases.) (ב' ג:)
- What is the law if a *tevul yom* touched *trumah* oil that is floating on the batter-cake on porridge? (ב' ד:)
- How does the law change if the porridge is stirred? (ב' ד:)
- What is the law if a *tevul yom* touched the jelly that formed over *kodesh* meat? What if he touched the meat? (ב' ה:)
- What other cases are debated in a similar manner? (ב' ה:)
- Explain the debate regarding a barrel of *trumah* wine that was lowered into a large pit of *chulin* wine and a *tevul yom* touched the wine. (ב' ו:)
- What is the law if a *tevul yom* touched a hole in a barrel of wine? If the hole is in which location is the law debated? (ב' ו:)
- What is the law if a *tevul yom* touched the stream of *trumah* wine as it was being poured into a utensil? (ב' ז:)
- If a cavity in the wall of an earthenware container was perforated on both sides, what is the law if an *av ha'tumah* touched the liquid in the cavity? If the utensil was sealed tight and in an *ohel ha'met*? When does the law change? (ב' ח:)
- Which *yadot* of food are a *chibur* for *tevul yom*? (ב' ט:)
- Explain the debate regarding when the parts of partially attached food is considered *chibur*. (ב' ט:)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a *tevul yom* touched scrambled eggs that were resting on a *trumah* vegetable. (ב' י:)
- When does the law in the previous question change? (ב' י:)

- Explain the debate regarding whether the congealed eggs on a pot can be consider a *chibur* for *tevul yom*. (ג: ג)
- Which two cases, involving dough into which *trumah* is mixed, are debated whether a *tevul yom* can invalidate them? (ד: ג)
- Explain the debate regarding dough that was kneaded with fruit juice? (ד: ג)
- Explain the debate regarding a case where a *tevul yom* touched vegetables that were cooked with *trumah* oil. (ה: ג)
- If one was eating food and it fell from his mouth and landed on *trumah* when would the *trumah* be susceptible to *tumah*? (ו: ג)
- Explain the debate regarding whether the law is different if the case involved a *tevul yom*. (ו: ג)
- What is the law if a *tevul yom* or *stam yadayim* touched *ma'aser rishon* before *trumat ma'aser* had been separated? (ז: ד)
- How can one knead dough and then separate *challah* if:
  - They are a *tevul yom*? (ז: ב)
  - The kneading trough is *tevul yom*? (ז: ג)
- If one filled a *lagin* that was *tevul yom* with wine, what is the law if he said: (ז: ד)
  - It shall be *trumah* at night fall?
  - It shall be *trumah* at night fall and be used for an *eiruv techumim*?
- What is the law, in the previous question, if the barrel then broke? If the *lagin* broke? (ז: ד)
- What law is mentioned in the *Mishnah* that changed with respect to *ma'aser sheni* and *demai*? *Gittin*? (ז: ה)
- When would a broken *kadum* be susceptible to *tumah*? (ז: ו)
- When would a wooden *mizreh* be susceptible to *tumah*? (ז: ו)
- Explain the debate regarding one that draws wine from a large cistern and says “This is *trumah* if it comes out *b'shalom*.” (ז: ז)
- Regarding the previous question, when is it considered *b'shalom*? (ז: ז)

## Yadayim

- How many people can wash their hands with a *revi'it*? Half *log*? Full *log*? (א: א)
- Explain the following phrase: (א: א)  
"מוסיפין על השניי, ואין מוסיפין על הראשונים"
- Can one use a stone utensil to wash their hands? (א: ב)
- Can one wash their friend's hands by cupping water for them? (א: ב)
- What other water-related laws share the same ruling in this *Mishnah*? (א: ב)
- When can one use fetid water for hand washing? (א: ג)
- Can one use water into which dye fell? (א: ג)
- Explain the debate regarding using water into which bread fell. (א: ג)
- Can one use water that was used for washing utensils? (א: ד)
- Regarding the previous question, does it matter if the utensils were brand new? (א: ד)
- Can water from which a baker took water to wet his bread rolls be used? (א: ה)
- Can a *katan* pour water on another person's hands for *netilat yadayim*? (א: ה)
- Can a monkey pour water on a person's hands? (א: ה)
- What is the law regarding one that washed one hand with one pour of water? (א: ב)
- Explain the debate where one washed two hands with one pour of water. (א: ב)
- Explain the debate if *trumah* then fell into that water. (א: ב)
- What is the law if *trumah* fell into: (ב: ב)
  - *Mayim Rishonim*?
  - *Mayim shniyim* that fell in a different place?
  - *Mayim shniyim* that fell in the same place as the *mayim rishonim*?

- What is the law if one washed their hands and then found a foreign item on them? (Include both opinions.) (ב'י: ב')
- Provide some examples that explain the following: (ב'י: ג')  
"הַיְדֵיִם מְטַמְאוֹת וּמִטְהָרוֹת עַד הַפָּרֶק.""
- What is the law if one washed one hand then rubbed their hands together? Then scratched their head? (ב'י: ג')
- Explain the following rule providing examples for each: (ב'י: ד')  
"סִפֵּק הַיְדֵיִם לְטַמְאָה וּלְטַמְאָה וְלִטְהָרָה – טְהוֹר."
- Who argues with one of the previous cases and which one? (ב'י: ד')
- Explain the debate regarding one that places his hand (only) inside a *bait menuga*. (ג'י: א')
- Which other case is debated in the same manner? (ג'י: א')
- Explain the debate between the *Chachamim* and *R' Yehoshua* regarding the food that can cause make hands *tameh*. (ג'י: א')
- Complete the following rule: (ב'י: ג')  
"כָּל הַ\_\_\_\_\_ מְטַמְאָה אֶת הַיְדֵיִם לְהִיּוֹת \_\_\_\_\_.""
- Can one hand cause the other to become *tameh*? (ב'י: ג')
- Can *tefillin* straps make hands *tameh*? (ג'י: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding how much of the parchment of *sifrei kodesh* can make hands *tameh*. (ג'י: ד')
- If the writing of a *sefer* becomes rubbed out, how much must remain in order that it can still make hands *tameh*? (ג'י: ה')
- Which *sefarim* are debated regarding whether they are *metameh yadayim*? (ג'י: ה')
- What was decided *bo vayom* regarding (and explain each debate):
  - *Areivat ha'raglayim*? (א'י: ד')
  - *Korbanot* that were slaughtered for the purpose of a different *korban*? (ב'י: ד')
  - Produce in the *shmittah* year in the lands of *Amon* and *Moav*? (ג'י: ד')
  - *Ger Amoni*? (ד'י: ד')
- Is the *targum* in *Ezra* and *Daniel metameh yadayim*? (ג'י: ה')

- What are the three prerequisites for *kitvei kodesh* to be *metameh yadayim*? (יח: יד)
- Describe the exchange between the *Chachamim* and *Tzedukim* regarding the law:
  - That *kitvei kodesh* are *metameh yadayim*. (יח: יד)
  - Of *Nitzuk* with respect to *tumah*. (יח: יד)
- The writing of a *get*. (יח: יד)

## Uktzin

- What is the difference between parts of food that are a *yad*, *shomer* and neither? (יח: יא)
- When are the roots of garlic a *shomer* and when are they a *yad*? (יג-יב: יא)
- When is their “*amud*” a *shomer* and when are they a *yad*? (יג-יב: יא)
- Which of the following is a *yad*, *shomer* or neither (and describe the debates where relevant):
  - The spine of the ears of corn? (יב: יא)
  - The “empty-tail” of bunch of grapes?
  - The stalks of produce that is reaped? (How much?)
  - The stalks of food that is not reaped? (How much?) (יג: יא)
  - Cabbage stalks? (List others that share a similar law.) (יד: יא)
  - Stalks of food that was threshed? (יח: יא)
  - Stalks of carobs?
  - Stalks of dried dates?
  - Pumpkin stalks? (יח: יא)
- When is a sprig of a bunch of grapes a *yad*? (יח: יא)
- What other cases are similar to the one in the previous question? (יח: יא)
- Explain the debate regarding the stalk of artichoke. (יח: יא)
- What is the law regarding olives that were preserved with their leaves? (יא: יב)
- Explain the debate regarding the flower of a cucumber. (יא: יב)

- What is the law regarding fruit stones? Which case is the exception? (ב'י:ב'י)
- What is the law regarding a stone that is partially protruding? (ב'י:ב'י)
- How much of a bone is *mitztaref*? (ב'י:ב'י)
- What is the law regarding a partially rotten pomegranate with respect to *tziruf*? (ב'י:ג')
- Which of the following is *mitztaref* to the *rimon*: *pitma* or *netz*? (ב'י:ג')
- What is the law regarding outer-shells of food? (ב'י:ד')
- According to *R' Yehuda* how many shells does an onion have? Explain. (ב'י:ד')
- What is the difference between food that was cut for cooking and food that was cut for preserving with respect to *chibur*? (ב'י:ה')
- Which of the previous two cases is cutting for the purpose of placing on the table similar to? (ב'י:ה')
- What is the law regarding strung onions? When does the law change? (ב'י:ה')
- For how long is the shell of an egg a *shomer*? (Provide two cases.) (ב'י:ו')
- For how long is a bone a *shomer* of the marrow? (ב'י:ו')
- What other case brought is similar to the previous two? (ב'י:ו')
- For which vegetables are the leaves not *mitztaref*? (ב'י:ז')
- Which two cases does *R' Elazar bar Tzadok* exclude? (ב'י:ז')
- What are the two cases where one must compress the food in order to measure it? (ב'י:ח')
- How should one measure meat that has swelled or shrunk? (ב'י:ח')
- Explain the debate regarding a cucumber that was planted in a pot and grew outside the pot. (ב'י:ט')
- What is the difference between produce that grew in a pot with a hole at its base and produce that grew in a pot that did not? (ב'י:י')
- How large must the hole be? (ב'י:י')

- Does the law change if the pot was made of mud? (ב:י)
- Which food requires *hechsher* but not *machshava*? (א:ג)
- List some things that require both *machshava* and *hechsher*. (ב:ג)
- List the opinions regarding which wild vegetables do not require *machshava*. (ב:ג)
- Regarding the *neveilot* of which animal is there a difference between their location with respect to the requirement for *machshava*? (ג:ג)
- Which *neveilot* require *machshava* everywhere? (ג:ג)
- Which *neveilot* do not require *machshava* anywhere? (ג:ג)
- Which *neveilot* does R' Shimon add to those referred to in the previous question? (ג:ג)
- How can *shevet* lose its status and food and why is this important? (ד:ג)
- Which foods are not *metameh tumat ochlin* until they “sweeten”? (ד:ג)
- According to R' Akiva, what food is not *metameh tumat ochlin* but can be purchased with *ma'aser sheni* money? Who argues? (ה:ג)
- What other cases do they argue about? (ו:ג)
- Explain the debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding hard grapes. Regarding *ketzach*. (ו:ג)
- Which wood can be purchased with *ma'aser sheni* money? (ז:ג)
- What food is considered food for *tumah* but is exempt from *ma'asrot*? (ז:ג)
- Explain the debate regarding when fish become susceptible to *tumah*. (ח:ג)
- Explain the debate regarding a branch from a fig tree that breaks off but is still attached by its bark. (ח:ג)
- How much of produce that was uprooted must still be attached to the ground for it to be *tahor*? (ח:ג)
- Is milk from a *neveilat beheima tehora tameh*? (ט:ג)
- Is the law different if it was a *beheima temeiah*? (ט:ג)

- For what else is this law important? (ג': ט')
- When do *tameh* fish require *machshava*? (ג': ט')
- Explain the debate regarding whether a beehive that is resting on the floor is considered attached. (ג': י')
- What are the three laws brought that are practical ramifications of this debate? (ג': י')
- Explain the debate regarding when honeycomb can become *tameh* on account of being liquid. (ג': י"א)
- According to *R' Yehoshua ben Levi*, how many worlds are the righteous are destined to inherit? (ג': י"ב)
- What is the only “utensil” that *Hashem* was able to find that can contain *bracha*? (ג': י"ב)

סליק מסכת עוקצין  
 נשלם סדר טהרות  
 הדרן עלך שיתא סדרי משנה